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Abstract 
Information technology systems are attacked by offenders using digital devices and 
networks to facilitate their crimes and hide their identities, creating new challenges for 
digital investigators. Malicious programs that exploit vulnerabilities also serve as threats 
to digital investigators. Since digital devices such as computers and networks are used 
by organisations and digital investigators, malicious programs and risky practices that 
may contaminate the integrity of digital evidence can lead to  loss of evidence. For 
some reasons, digital investigators face a major challenge in preserving the integrity of 
digital evidence. Not only is there no definitive comprehensive model of digital forensic 
investigation for ensuring the reliability of digital evidence, but there has to date been 
no intensive research into methods of doing so. 
To address the issue of preserving the integrity of digital evidence, this research 
improves upon other digital forensic investigation model by creating a Comprehensive 
Digital Forensic Investigation Model (CDFIM), a model that results in an improvement 
in the investigation process, as well as security mechanism and guidelines during 
investigation. The improvement is also effected by implementing Proxy Mobile Internet 
Protocol version 6 (PMIPv6) with improved buffering based on Open Air Interface 
PIMIPv6 (OAI PMIPv6)  implementation to provide reliable services during handover 
in Mobile Node (MN) and improve performance measures to minimize loss of data 
which this research identified as  a factor affecting the integrity of digital evidence. The 
advantage of this is to present that the integrity of digital evidence can be preserved if 
loss of data is prevented. 
This research supports the integration of security mechanism and intelligent software in 
digital forensic investigation which assist in preserving the integrity of digital evidence 
by conducting experiments which carried out two different attack experiment to test 
CDFIM. It found that when CDFIM used security mechanism and guidelines with the 
investigation process, it was able to identify the attack and also ensured that the 
integrity of the digital evidence was preserved. It was also found that the security 
mechanism and guidelines incorporated in the digital investigative process are useless 
when the security guidelines are ignored by digital investigators, thus posing a threat to 
the integrity of digital evidence.  
iii 
 
 
                                PUBLICATIONS 
These peer reviewed journal and conference papers have been published as a result of 
the research in this thesis: 
Ademu, I. Imafidon, C. Preston, D. (2011a) 'Intelligent Software Agent applied to 
Digital Forensic and its Usefulness', Paper accepted and presented in the  International 
Journal of Computer Science and Informatics (IJCSI) Issue 1,2 Volume 2, 7 September 
2011, pp. 117-120 Available at 
http://interscience.in/IJCSI_Vol2Iss1/IJCSI_Paper_21.pdf (Accessed: 5 January 2014) 
Ademu, I. Imafidon, C. Preston, D. (2011a) 'Intelligent Software Agent applied to 
Digital Forensic and its Usefulness', Paper accepted and presented in the proceedings of 
the National Conference on Research Trends in Computing Science and Technology 
(NCRTCSA).  India. 7 July 2011 
Ademu, I. Imafidon, C. Preston, D. (2011b) 'A New Approach of Digital Forensic 
Model for Digital Forensic Investigation', International Journal of Advanced Computer 
Science and Applications (IJACSA) Issue 12, Volume 2,  10 December 2011, pp. 175-
178. Available at: http://thesai.org/Downloads/Volume2No12/Paper%2026-
A%20New%20Approach%20of%20Digital%20Forensic%20Model%20for%20Digital
%20Forensic%20Investigation.pdf (Accessed: 5 January 2014) 
Ademu, I. Imafidon, C. Preston, D. (2012a) 'The Need for Digital Forensic Investigative 
Framework', International Journal of Engineering Science and Advanced Technology 
(IJESAT) Issue 3, Volume 2, 15 May 2012, pp. 388-392.  Available at:  
http://ijesat.org/Volumes/2012_Vol_02_Iss_03/IJESAT_2012_02_03_01.pdf  
(Accessed: 10 January 2014) 
iv 
 
Ademu, I. Imafidon, C. (2012b)  'The Need for a New Data Processing Interface for 
Digital Forensic Examination',  International Journal of  Advanced Research in 
Artificial Intelligence Issue 4, Volume 1, 4 July 2012, pp. 7-11. Available at: 
http://www.docstoc.com/docs/138237864/Paper-2-The-Need-for-a-New-Data-
Processing-Interface-for-Digital-Forensic-Examination  (Accessed: 5 January 2014) 
Ademu, I. Imafidon, C. (2012c)  'Digital Forensic Acquisition and Analysis Tools and  
its Importance', Paper accepted and presented in the proceedings of the 11
th
  
International Conference on e-Learning, e-Business, Enterprise Information System,  
and e-Government (EEE’12) WORLDCOMP’12 Las Vegas, Nevada, USA, July 16-19,  
2012. Available at: http://world-comp.org/p2012/EEE7656.pdf (Accessed: 12 January  
2014) 
Ademu, I. Imafidon, C. (2012d) 'Agent-Based Computing Application and its 
Importance to Digital Forensic Domain', Paper accepted and presented in the 
proceedings of  the 14
th
 International Conference on Artificial Intelligence (ICAI’12) 
WORLDCOMP’12 Las Vegas, Nevada, USA, July 16-19 2012 Available at: 
http://world-comp.org/p2012/ICA7716.pdf (Accessed: 15th January 2014) 
Ademu, I. Imafidon, C. (2012e) 'The Influence of Network on Digital Forensic', Paper 
accepted and presented in the proceedings of the 11
th
 International Conference on 
Wireless Networks (ICWN’12) WORLDCOMP’12 Las Vegas, Nevada, USA, July 16-
19 2012 Available at: http://world-comp.org/p2012/ICW7717.pdf (Accessed: 12 
January 2014)  
Ademu, I. Imafidon, C. (2012f) 'Applying Security Mechanism to Digital Forensic 
Investigation Process', International Journal of Emerging trends in Engineering and 
v 
 
Development (IJETED) Issue 2, Volume 7, 10 November 2012, pp. 128-133. Available 
at: http://rspublication.com/ijeted/nov12/15.pdf (Accessed: 12 January 2014) 
Ademu, I. Imafidon, C. (2012g) 'The Influence of Security Threats and Vulnerabilities 
on Digital Forensic Investigation', International Journal of Computer Application 
(IJCA) Issue 2, Volume 6 18 December 2012, pp. 1-6 Available at:  
http://rspublication.com/ijca/dec%2012/1.pdf (Accessed 10 January 2014)  
Ademu, I. Imafidon, C. (2013) 'The Importance and Need for Digital Forensic 
Investigative Framework', Paper accepted and presented in the proceedings of the 2013 
International Conference on Artificial Intelligence (ICAI’13)  WORLDCOMP’1 3 Las 
Vegas, Nevada, USA, July 22-25 2013 Available at: http://world-
comp.org/proc2013/icai/ICAI_Contents__Vol_II.pdf (Accessed: 10 January 2014) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
vi 
 
Table of Contents 
 
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION ........................................................................... 2 
1.1 Background .............................................................................................................. 2 
1.2 Research Challenge ................................................................................................. 5 
1.3 Motivation................................................................................................................6 
   1.4 Research Hypothesis.................................................................................................7 
   1.5 Aims and Objectives.................................................................................................7 
   1.6 Research Question....................................................................................................9 
   1.7 Contribution to Knowledge......................................................................................9 
   1.8 Measure of Success................................................................................................10 
   1.9 Thesis Structure......................................................................................................11 
   1.10 Summary...............................................................................................................13 
 
CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW ............................................................ 14 
2.1 Evolution of Digital Forensic  ............................................................................... 15 
   2.2 Digital Evidence ................................................................................................. 18 
          2.2.1 Characteristics of Digital Evidence..............................................................18 
          2.2.2 Role of Digital Evidence..............................................................................20 
          2.2.3 Challenges in Digital Evidence....................................................................21 
          2.2.4 Digital Related Offences..............................................................................22 
          2.2.5 Digital Evidence and its Application............................................................24 
          2.2.6 Digital Evidence Processing Guidelines.......................................................27 
          2.2.7 Backbone of Digital Forensic Investigation.................................................32 
          2.2.8 Why the need for investigative Framework/Model......................................36 
       2.3 Existing Digital Forensic Investigation Framework/Model...............................37 
          2.3.1 Computer Forensic Investigation Process....................................................38 
          2.3.2 DFRWS Investigative Model.......................................................................38 
          2.3.3 The Scientific Crime Scene Investigation Process Model............................40 
          2.3.4 Abstract Digital Forensic Model..................................................................40 
          2.3.5 Integrated Digital Investigation Process.......................................................42 
          2.3.6 End-to-End Digital Investigation..................................................................43 
vii 
 
          2.3.7 Enhanced Digital Investigation Process.......................................................44 
          2.3.8 Extended Model of Cybercrime Investigation..............................................45 
          2.3.9 A Hierarchical Objective-Based Framework for Digital Forensic...............45 
          2.3.10 Case-Relevance Information Investigation................................................46 
          2.3.11 Framework for a Digital Forensic Investigation.........................................47 
          2.3.12 Computer Forensic Field Triage Process Model........................................48 
          2.3.13 Common Process Model for Incident and Computer Forensic..................49 
          2.3.14 Digital Forensic Model Based on the Malaysian Investigation Process....50 
          2.3.15 Network Forensic Generic Process Model.................................................51 
          2.3.16 Systematic Digital Forensic Investigation Model......................................51 
    2.4 Investigative Frameworks/Models Analysis.........................................................52 
       2.4.1 Gap Analysis....................................................................................................62 
    2.5 Digital Forensic Investigation and the  Impact of Security Threats/Attacks 
          and Vulnerabilities.................................................................................................65 
         2.5.1 Network Infrastructures.................................................................................68 
         2.5.2 Attacks and Vulnerabilities...........................................................................81 
         2.5.3 Adverse Events and Security Incidents.........................................................93 
         2.5.4 The Network Security Approach...................................................................95 
      2.6 Digital Forensic Analysis and Acquisition/Imaging Tools.................................99 
         2.6.1 Analysis Tools.............................................................................................100 
         2.6.2 Acquisition/Imaging Tools..........................................................................106 
     2.7 Intelligent Software Agent..................................................................................110 
         2.7.1 Properties of an Intelligent Agent................................................................111 
         2.7.2 Classification of Agents...............................................................................112 
         2.7.3 The need for an Intelligent Agent and Programming Language applied to  
                  Digital Forensic...........................................................................................116 
         2.7.4 Current Status of the Intelligent Agent Application in  
                   Digital Forensics.........................................................................................119 
    2.8 Summary............................................................................................................. 121 
 
viii 
 
CHAPTER THREE: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY ......................................... 123 
   3.1 Research Design...................................................................................................123 
   3.2 Implemented Research Methodology...................................................................127 
   3.3 Summary...............................................................................................................131 
 
CHAPTER FOUR: THE COMPREHENSIVE DIGITAL FORENSIC           
   INVESTIGATION MODEL..................................................133 
    4.1  Digital Forensic Investigation............................................................................134 
       4.1.1 Computer Forensics.......................................................................................135 
       4.1.2 Network Forensics.........................................................................................138 
       4.1.3 Email Forensics.............................................................................................143 
   4.2 Threats impact on Digital Forensic Investigation.................................................145 
   4.3 Towards a Comprehensive Model for Digital Forensic Investigation Process 
         and its security guidelines.....................................................................................147 
       4.3.1 Selection Criteria of the Layers of the New Model.......................................148 
       4.3.2 The New Digital Forensic Investigation Process..........................................148 
       4.3.3 The Security Layers of the New Comprehensive Digital  
                 Forensic Investigation Model.......................................................................159 
   4.4 The New Comprehensive Digital Forensic Investigation Model Incorporating 
         The Security Mechanism.....................................................................................169 
    4.5 Summary..............................................................................................................170 
 
CHAPTER FIVE: EXPERIMENTS ......................................................................... 171 
    5.1 Hypothesis...........................................................................................................172 
    5.2 Data Integrity.......................................................................................................172 
    5.3 Experiment 1........................................................................................................172 
       5.3.1 Experiment Design........................................................................................173 
       5.3.2 Experiment Component.................................................................................174 
       5.3.3 Implementation of Buffering.........................................................................175 
    5.4 Conducting the Experiment.................................................................................186 
    5.5 Experiment 2........................................................................................................196 
ix 
 
       5.5.1 Experiment Design........................................................................................196 
       5.5.2 Experiment Component.................................................................................197 
       5.5.3 FTK Interface................................................................................................198 
       5.5.4 Conducting the Experiment...........................................................................205 
   5.6 Summary...............................................................................................................217 
 
CHAPTER SIX: VALIDATION ............................................................................... 218 
    6.1 Comparative Analysis..........................................................................................218 
       6.1.1 Preparation.....................................................................................................219 
       6.1.2 Interaction......................................................................................................219 
       6.1.3 Reconstruction...............................................................................................219 
        6.1.4 Presentation..................................................................................................220 
     6.2 Criteria of Success..............................................................................................220 
     6.3 Case Study..........................................................................................................221 
         6.3.1 Case Study 1................................................................................................221 
         6.3.2 Case Study 2................................................................................................227 
     6.4 Comprehensive Digital Forensic Investigation Model  
            (CDFIM) Limitation..........................................................................................229 
         6.4.1 Mis-Configured  Security Components.......................................................229 
         6.4.2 The Model's inability to Enforce Human Intervention................................230 
         6.4.3 Lack of preservation of the Log Files..........................................................230 
     6.5 Summary.............................................................................................................230 
 
 
CHAPTER SEVEN: DISCUSSION AND EVALUATION .................................... 232 
     7.1 Experiments and Case Study Analysis...............................................................232 
          7.1.1 Preparation..................................................................................................234 
          7.1.2 Interaction...................................................................................................237 
          7.1.3 Reconstruction............................................................................................238 
          7.1.4 Presentation................................................................................................239 
x 
 
      7.2 Summary............................................................................................................240 
 
CHAPTER EIGHT: RECOMMENDATIONS ........................................................ 241 
     8.1 Recommendation for Enhancing Systems and Tools Authentication................241 
        8.1.1 Implementation of Multifactor Authentication.............................................241 
        8.1.2 Password Salting...........................................................................................242 
        8.1.3 Implementing Password Complexity............................................................242 
     8.2 Ensuring Integrity of Digital Evidence using Keyed Hash Functions................242 
     8.3 Implementing Intrusion Prevention Systems......................................................243 
     8.4 Recommendation for enhancing Digital Resource Performance...................... 243 
         8.4.1 Enhancing Digital Resource Performance...................................................243 
         8.4.2 Enabling IPv6 Traffic using 6to4 for Encapsulation...................................244 
      8.5 Summary............................................................................................................246 
 
CHAPTER NINE: CONCLUSION ........................................................................... 248 
     9.1 Conclusion..........................................................................................................248 
     9.2 Future Work........................................................................................................252 
REFERENCES............................................................................................................253 
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
xi 
 
 
APPENDICES 
Appendix 1: Building the Testbed.................................................................................267 
Appendix  2: Digital Investigation with Comprehensive Digital Forensic Investigation  
                      Model.......................................................................................................275 
Appendix 3: Bill of Indictment......................................................................................286 
Appendix 4: Federal Rule of Evidence (2012)..............................................................298 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
xii 
 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1: Contexts of Digital Forensics ............................................................................3 
Figure 2: Different types of digital devices (Ademu et al., 2011b).................................19 
Figure 3: The digital investigative process (Pollitt, 1995)..............................................38 
Figure 4: Digital Forensic Research Workshop (Palmer, 2001).....................................39 
Figure 5: Abstract Digital Forensic Model (Reith et al., 2002).......................................42 
Figure 6: Integrated Digital Investigation Model (Carrier and Spafford, 2003).............43 
Figure 7: End to End-Digital Investigation (Stephenson, 2003).....................................43 
Figure 8: Enhanced Digital Investigation Process (Baryamueeba and Tushaba, 
2004)................................................................................................................................44 
Figure 9: The extended model of cyber crime investigation (Ciardhuain, 2004)...........45 
Figure 10: A Hierarchical Objective-Based Framework for the Digital Investigation 
(Beebe and Clarke, 2004)................................................................................................46 
Figure 11: Case-Relevance Information Investigation (Ruibin et al., 2005)...................47 
Figure 12: Framework for a Digital Forensic Investigation (Kohn et al., 2006).............48 
Figure 13: Computer Forensic Field Triage Process Model (Rodger et al., 2006).........48 
Figure 14: Common Process Model for Incident and Computer Forensic (Freiling and 
Schwittany, 2007)............................................................................................................49 
Figure 15: Digital Forensic Model based on the Malaysian Investigation Process 
(Perumal, 2009)...............................................................................................................50 
Figure 16: Network Forensic Generic Process Model (Pilli et al., 2010).......................51 
Figure 17: Systematic Digital Forensic Investigation Model (Agawal et al., 2011).......52 
Figure 18:  The layers towards building the new investigation process model (Ademu 
and Imafidon, 2012f).......................................................................................................62 
Figure 19: The Conceptualised Digital Forensic Model (Ademu et al., 2011b).............65 
Figure 20: Possible sources of digital evidence for establishing crime...........................95 
Figure 21: FTK User Interface......................................................................................102 
Figure 22:  Visual Basic Express Edition..................................................................... 118 
Figure 23: The Layer contains digital forensic investigation process of the preparation 
phase of the new model................................................................................................149 
Figure 24: The digital forensic investigation process of the Interaction phase of the new 
model............................................................................................................................153 
Figure 25: The digital forensic investigation process of the Reconstruction phase of the 
new model......................................................................................................................156  
xiii 
 
Figure 26: The Layer contains digital forensic investigation process of the Presentation 
phase of the new model.................................................................................................158 
Figure 27: The security layer contributing to the development of the new model........162 
Figure 28: The layer of application and content based security requirement................163 
Figure 29: The layer of secure policies security requirement.......................................165 
Figure 30: The layer of secure operational procedures security requirement...............166 
Figure 31: The layer of performance security requirement...........................................167 
Figure 32: The layers of digital forensic investigation process integrating security 
measures for development of new model (Ademu and Imafidon, 2012f).....................169 
Figure 33: The Comprehensive Digital Forensic Investigation Model (CDFIM) (Ademu 
and Imafidon, 2012f).....................................................................................................170 
Figure 34: OAI PMIPv6 including buffering module...................................................177 
Figure 35: Operation of Packet Buffering Module........................................................178 
Figure 36: Main lines of pmip_buffering_init () function.............................................180 
Figure 37: Main lines of pmip_buffering_start() function............................................181 
Figure. 38 Main lines of pmip_buffering_reinject() function.......................................182 
Figure. 39 Main lines of pkt_reinject() function...........................................................182 
Figure 40: Flow chart of the improved buffering scheme.............................................184 
Figure 41: Main lines of Control_bytesrate() function..................................................185 
Figure 42: Main lines of modified pmip_buffering_reinject() function........................185 
Figure 43: The topology of PMIPv6 test bed................................................................188 
Figure 44: Handover results..........................................................................................190 
Figure  45: Total amount of packets arriving in MN.....................................................192 
Figure 46: Total amount of packets dropped for MN....................................................192 
Figure 47: The amount of remaining packets in the buffer (5% improvement)............194 
Figure 48: The amount of remaining packets in the buffer (10% improvement)..........194 
Figure 49: The amount of remaining packets in the buffer (20% improvement)..........195 
Figure 50: The search tab..............................................................................................199 
Figure 51: Overview of the case....................................................................................200 
Figure 52: The Explore tab............................................................................................201 
Figure 53:  The Graphic tab...........................................................................................202 
Figure 54: the Bookmark tab.........................................................................................203 
xiv 
 
Figure 55: Case processing option.................................................................................204 
Figure 56: Creating a New Case....................................................................................206 
Figure 57: Adding Evidence in FTK.............................................................................208 
Figure 58: Selecting an image destination.....................................................................209 
Figure 59: Selecting the image folder............................................................................210 
Figure 60: Identifying the evidence...............................................................................211 
Figure 61: Viewing the Email messages.......................................................................212 
Figure 62: Case processing options...............................................................................213 
Figure 63: Viewing the file properties...........................................................................215 
Figure 64: FTK Evidence item overview......................................................................216 
Figure 65: The result of the electronic evidence of the teardrop denial of service 
attack.............................................................................................................................222 
Figure 66: Packet 8 analysis result................................................................................224 
Figure 67: A detailed bit view of analysis result...........................................................224 
Figure 68: Using details to show security issue Teardrop DoS attack in packet 9........225 
Figure 69: A detailed hexadecimal view of the reassembled packet 9..........................226 
Figure 70: Using IPv6 with 6to4 for Encapsulation......................................................245 
Figure 71: Using 6to4 techniques by encapsulating IPv6 in IPv4 header.....................246 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
xv 
 
 
List of Tables 
Table 1: The Existing Digital Investigation Frameworks/Models..................................53 
Table 2: The Identification of Phases..............................................................................55 
Table 3: Models discussed showing important existing phases......................................58 
Table 4: The four layered analysis..................................................................................61 
Table 5:  Security requirement of the proposed mode (Ademu and Imafidon, 
2012f)...............................................................................................................................96 
Table 6: Forensic tools, cost and their customisation ability........................................105 
Table 7: The security measures of the new model (Ademu and Imafidon, 
2012f).............................................................................................................................168 
Table 8: Component of the Experiment's infrastructure................................................174 
Table 9: Component of Buffering Function Implementation........................................174 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
xvi 
 
Definitions and Terminologies 
For the purpose of this research, some definitions and terminologies are discussed as 
follows: 
Digital Forensic Investigation 
Digital forensic investigation is defined as the process of identifying, maintaining, 
analyzing, reconstructing and presenting digital evidence through the use of information 
technology to the investigation of digital attacks or incidents and preserving the digital 
evidence through the application of information security. 
Digital Evidence 
 Digital evidence is defined as a data packet or digital information stored or transmitted 
by a digital device that support or rebut an assumption about digital incident or event 
that provides relationship between the cause of an incident and the victim. 
Terminologies 
During the review process, it was discovered that various authors used different terms 
such as 'model', 'procedure', 'process', 'phase, and 'task', etc. in order to describe their 
respective processes taken to perform an investigation. In this research of the thesis, for 
the purpose of standardisation the term 'model' was used to represent the entire set of 
activities performed in the digital forensic investigation process. The term 'phase' was 
used to represent the high-level components of the investigation model and the term 
'activities' was used to represent task to be performed in each of the phases. The term 
digital object is used to represent digital devices. The term digital evidence was also 
used, as digital information, data and data packets. 
xvii 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
1. Introduction 
1.1 Background 
The influence of information technology is pervasive in our private and professional 
lives. The use of the internet, email and chat groups has changed the ways in which 
interaction is carried out as a society. This important change is also apparent in 
organizations and the economy. The majority of organisations rely very much on 
computer systems and the Internet to operate and to enhance their businesses, relying on 
the system's ability to process, transmit, store and retrieve data. Sommer (2009) 
demonstrates that 98% of all documents in organizations are based on electronic form.  
A large amount of information is produced, accumulated, and distributed via electronic 
means. It is necessary for forensic experts to increase their abilities to gather evidence 
from digital devices. According to Healy (2008), approximately 85% of 66 million US 
dollars was lost by organizations due to digital related crimes, these were categorised as 
a computer related financial fraud. Panda Labs report (2009) shows that Ehud 
Tenenbaum was extradited from Canada on suspicion of stealing $1.5 million from a 
Canadian bank through stolen credentials and infiltrated computers.   
The information technology has become the foundation for communications, banking, 
transformation etc. However, this has been capitalized on by the criminal in the society. 
Organisation's computers, servers and laptops have, therefore, increasingly become 
targets of crime and tools for committing crimes. The risk of terrorist organizations 
turning their attention to technology and cyberspace is very real (Rogers and Seigfried, 
2004). The attention is also focused on using the technology to gather information on 
potential victims. Digital attacks or threats to information technology may have a 
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momentous impact on organisations. These threats usually lead to the disclosure of 
information, modification, denial of service (DoS), illegal use, identity theft or 
repudiation (Ciampa, 2007).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Contexts of Digital Forensics 
Looking at the Dubai murder case reported on BBC News, Adler (2010) reports that the 
Dubai police believed 11 agents with six European passports were involved in the 
killing. In this case, there was fraudulent use of British passports. The then Prime 
Minister Gordon Brown was interested in carrying out forensic investigation, who said 
that evidence has to be collected about what actually happened, how it happened and 
why it happened. The Foreign Office also pledged to take actions that are necessary to 
protect British Nationals from identity fraud and said that the British embassy would 
ensure that a full investigation would be carried out into the fraudulent use of the 
passports. According to Adler (2010) the Serious Organised Crime Agency, who led the 
investigation, confirms that photographs and signatures on the passports used in Dubai 
did not match those passports issued by the UK. The alleged forgery raised a matter of 
great concern and raised the possibility that it could happen in terrorism cases.  
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Cole et al. (2007) believe that corporate security investigators are making increasing use 
of computer forensics in areas such as fraud, the accessing of pornography, and 
harassment and traditional criminal investigations need to be supported with digital 
collection and analysis tools and techniques. This need has led to the development of 
digital forensic science and specifically computer forensic (Rodgers and Seigfried, 
2004). However, the increasing complexity of  tools and techniques of digital 
investigation creates a new challenge for digital forensic investigators and corporate 
security investigators.  A digital crime scene follows the same rules as for a physical 
crime scene, and it must be analysed and preserved in its original form. It is important 
to realise how imperative it is to use collection and analysis tools and follow a 
procedure when conducting digital evidence but the paramount need is to ensure that the 
integrity of the digital evidence is preserved. 
According to Reith et al.  (2002) digital forensics is a synonym for computer forensics 
as the use of scientific methods toward the preservation, collection, validation, 
identification, analysis, interpretation, documentation, and presentation of digital 
evidence derived from digital sources for the purpose of facilitation or furthering the 
reconstruction of events found to be criminal.  
For the purpose of this research, digital forensics can be defined as the use of 
scientifically derived and proven methods and techniques for the identification, 
preservation, reconstruction, and presentation of digital evidence derived from digital 
devices found to be an attack or incident. The definition is not just considering digital 
evidence recovered from the computer but it covers digital evidence recovered from any 
devices that are not traditionally considered a computer and any digital activity that is 
identified as an attack or incident.  
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This chapter aims to give an understanding of the need for digital forensics, research 
challenge, aims and objectives, hypothesis, questions, definitions and terminologies and 
the thesis structure. 
1.2 Research Challenge  
Palmer (2001) defined digital forensic investigation as the application of scientific, 
systematic and proven methods towards the preservation, collection, validation, 
identification, analysis, interpretation and presentation of digital evidence derived from 
digital sources for the purpose of facilitating or furthering the reconstruction of events 
found to be criminal or perceived to anticipate the unauthorised actions shown to be 
disruptive to planned operations. By this definition, it is important to demonstrate 
proofs of the integrity of digital crime object. Digital forensic investigators are 
constantly trying to find better and more efficient ways of uncovering evidence from 
digital sources. The challenge here is that beyond the presumptions of the occurrence of 
a crime, it is important to prove the integrity of the source of digital evidence. Law 
enforcement and corporate professionals require tools for effective digital evidence 
acquisition and analysis. According to (Rogers and Seigfried, 2004) cyber crime 
challenges are technical challenges that hinder law enforcement's ability to find and 
prosecute criminals operating online, legal challenges resulting from laws and legal 
tools needed to investigate cyber crime being unable to catch up with developing 
technological, structural, social changes and the resource challenge.  Some of these 
tools already exist to capture, preserve and analyse data from hard drives, memory and 
network streams. They are available through commercial or open-source licences with 
their own unique user interface, features, and run on different operating systems. 
However, this presents a challenge to digital investigators because tools, systems and 
networks are vulnerable to threats or attacks.  
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 According to Ashcroft (2001) the US National Institute of Justice (NIJ) conducted a 
study designed to identify the issues that the law enforcement community was 
experiencing in relation to computer crime and argued that most state and local law 
enforcement agencies report that they lack adequate training, equipment and staff to 
meet their present and future needs to fight digital or electronic crime and also 
mentioned that greater awareness of electronic crime should be promoted for all 
stakeholders, including prosecutors, judges, academia, industry and the general public. 
The study also identified the need for reliable digital evidence. 
The present research addresses this issue through a proposed Comprehensive Digital 
Forensic Investigation Model (CDFIM), created by enhancing the current digital 
forensic investigation process. CDFIM identifies the need for the use of modern 
technologies to avoid security threats, when considering digital forensic investigation 
process in an attempt to present solution that contributes to a good security level and as 
a measure for integrity of digital evidence. 
1.3 Motivation 
Digital forensic techniques are used primarily by digital investigators, IT security 
officers and corporate security investigators etc to capture, preserve and analyse 
evidence on digital devices. Digital evidence collected at a crime scene has to be 
analysed, and the integrity of the digital evidence preserved. The search for digital 
evidence is thus a tedious task that consumes time. An extremely large amount of 
evidence needs to be processed in a very limited period, which leads to delay in 
processing schedules. Since it is the responsibility of the digital investigator to find 
what evidence exists and recover it in a sound manner, it is important for digital 
forensic investigators to be skilled and knowledgeable at pursuing cyber crimes to find 
related digital evidence on the private network, public internet, etc. A good 
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understanding of the technology entailed and security measures will allow digital 
investigators to recognise, collect, preserve, examine and analyse evidence related to 
crimes involving digital devices. 
The task of the digital forensic investigator has grown harder due to the increase in the 
sizes of storage devices. Since the space is growing faster than corporate security 
investigator’s ability to search, there is an opportunity for intelligent software to step in 
and assist law digital investigators. This thesis argues that security mechanism and 
guidelines can contribute positively to digital forensic investigation process and as a 
measure for integrity of digital evidence. Any admissible digital evidence should be 
able to proof that the integrity of the digital evidence is preserved. The presentation of 
digital evidence in the court of law is beyond the scope of this research. 
1.4 Research Hypothesis 
This research proposes that the integration of security mechanism and intelligent 
software when conducting digital forensic investigation can serve as a measurement tool 
for the integrity of digital evidence.  
The research assumes that the necessary legal authorisation to search for and seize the 
suspected workstation is been obtained.  
1.5 Aims and Objectives 
The aim of this research is to explore the use of modern technologies to avoid security 
threats when considering digital forensic investigation process in an attempt to present 
solution that contributes to a good security level and as a measure for integrity of digital 
evidence. It will also create CDFIM in order to assist in conducting the digital 
investigation. 
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In order to obtain the research objectives of this thesis, it was necessary to consider the 
main aim of the thesis and the research hypothesis. These led to some specific research 
objectives that need to be addressed as follows: 
 Develop a Background Understanding of the Core Subject 
 To gain an extensive understanding of the fundamental digital forensic 
investigation framework/models, which are currently implemented. In order to 
investigate the various types of digital forensic investigation model, this analysis 
will help determine the shortcomings of existing models of digital investigation, 
as well as the requirements of CDFIM 
 Examine the Current Issues Around the Core Subject 
To critically review the literature in order to identify the main problems in 
ensuring the integrity of digital evidence in digital forensic investigation.  
 Establish the Security Requirement for Digital forensic Investigation 
Process 
The extensive literature review will assist in identifying the requirement for 
CDFIM 
 Develop Model for Evaluating the Security Level of Digital Forensic 
Investigation Process 
To create a Comprehensive Digital Forensic Investigation Model based on the 
requirement. 
 Test the Model in Digital Investigation Context 
To evaluate the model conducting experiment and a test case investigation 
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1.6 Research Question 
A fundamental research question was posing to aid the development and refinement of 
research objectives. 
The fundamental research question is:  
 What might constitute the requirement for utilizing security mechanism 
for digital forensic investigation process? 
1.7 Contribution to Knowledge 
In the course of the research presented in this thesis, different contributions to 
knowledge have been made. The research has produced the following results:  
Identifying issues that can influence the integrity of digital evidence when 
conducting digital investigation: The research identified that none of the current 
method of digital investigation initiated major concentration to attacks that can 
influence the integrity of digital evidence. Current models are concentrated on 
identifying collection and analysis method of digital evidence. As the reliability of 
digital evidence is important in any investigation, this research has been able to identify 
issues that can influence the integrity of digital evidence when conducting digital 
investigation. Therefore, CDFIM is advancement on existing models in its 
comprehensive nature to address the security threats faced in digital forensic 
investigation process. The model is easy to understand and used by even non-expert 
individuals with management responsibility for digital devices.  
Creation of CDFIM as a Solution for the Problem of Altering the Integrity of 
Digital Evidence: This model is effective when investigating digital attack and 
ensuring the integrity of digital evidence. This is because most current digital 
investigation models are designed to deal with attacks such as those on systems and 
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networks. These models focus on translating the requirements of legal systems into 
those of IT systems in order to conduct proper digital forensic investigation. This is 
good; however, they do not address the issues faced in ensuring digital evidence 
integrity. It is in this cases that CDFIM helps in assisting digital investigation by 
employing its security mechanism and guidelines. 
Implementation of IP as an Identifier and a Performance Measure to Solve 
Handover Latency and Loss of Data Packets:  In the area of mobile network, the 
research proposed and implemented PMIPv6 with improved buffering to minimize 
performance issue on handover latency and loss of data which the research identified as 
able to assist in providing reliable services and in turn assist in digital investigation.    
This research conducted a network experimental test, which is based on comparing its 
proposed PMIPv6 with improved buffering to both standard PMIPv6 and buffering. It 
was set up, by analysing performance measures, which are handover latency and loss of 
data packet, which was identified in this research as an attack on the integrity of digital 
evidence. IP role as an identifier was also recognized in the research to identify the 
attacker of digital crime. 
Improvement of the Investigative Process by Designing the Interaction Phase in 
CDFIM: This phase is a major advancement in the development of digital forensic 
models.  In CDFIM  interaction phase had been designed to deal with applying secure 
protocol (communication/internet)  when conducting digital investigation to ensure the 
integrity of digital evidence collected. 
1.8 Measure of Success 
The success of the thesis is measured in two ways: 
 Evaluation: Two different digital attacks were identified, and experiments were 
conducted to test the hypothesis.  
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 Comparative Analysis: CDFIM approach was compared with other approaches 
of      digital forensic investigation. 
1.9 Thesis Structure  
 Chapter 1: Introduction  
In chapter 1, an introduction to the background of the core issue of the research is 
discussed. The aims and objectives, hypothesis, and approach of the thesis are 
presented. The fundamental research question mentioned in this chapter aims to develop 
and drive the research forward. The chapter identifies the research challenge and a 
possible solution that improves the research problem. 
Chapter 2: Literature Review 
In this chapter, the first part provide a holistic view of the background of digital forensic 
investigation process, digital evidence, characteristics of digital evidence, it's role, 
challenges and the procedures for digital evidence processing are addressed. The 
chapter also discusses the fundamental digital forensic investigation process and the 
need for framework/models. This section also covers the analysis conducted for existing 
investigation framework/model and the handling of different cases through these 
models. In this section, gaps in the existing models are identified giving a foundation of 
the need for a new model and then presents the conceptualised model.  The second part 
of this chapter examines areas of application of digital forensic investigation process, 
security threats and vulnerabilities. This section explains adverse events and security 
incidents, and discussion on some different cases of digital forensic investigation such 
as computer forensic, network forensic and email forensics. The chapter also discussed 
digital forensics and investigative tools and techniques. Also, the security requirement 
for the new model was an output of this chapter. 
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Chapter 3: Research Methodology 
This chapter discusses the implemented research process. The objectives of the research 
will be the backbone of the research methodology and the research process that was 
implemented to achieve them.  
Chapter 4: The Comprehensive Digital Forensic Investigation Model  
The chapter initially discussed the proposed model in a broad approach. In this chapter, 
the systematic design of the model was described presenting the Comprehensive Digital 
Forensic Investigation Model (CDFIM) that improves on previous digital forensic 
investigation process is created. In addition, the chapter examines the area of application 
of digital forensic investigation and impact of security threats and vulnerabilities. 
Chapter 5: Experiments 
This chapter conduct the experiments. The objective is to test the hypothesis and 
evaluate the requirements for the new model. It conducted a network experimental test, 
which compares its proposed PMIPv6 with improved buffering to both standard 
PMIPv6 and buffering. The experiment sets up by analysing performance measures, 
which are handover latency and loss of data packet, identified in this research as attacks 
on the integrity of digital evidence. In addition, this section conducts a test case 
investigation. The objective of this is to present the applicability of CDFIM. 
Chapter 6: Validation 
Two real cases used this model to identify whether incident/attacks was carried out and 
envisaged attacks during digital investigation, which can pose as a threat to the integrity 
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of digital evidence thereby applying precaution (security guidelines/measures) to avoid 
such threat. 
Chapter 7: Discussion and Evaluation 
This chapter discusses and evaluates CDFIM based on the experimental test results. 
Chapter 8: Recommendations 
This chapter suggest some recommendations that would assist in enhancing and 
improving digital investigation and the security level of digital information. 
Chapter 9: Conclusion 
This chapter of the thesis discusses the general conclusion. It presents this research 
findings and makes suggestions for future research. 
1.10 Summary 
This chapter discusses the aims, objectives, hypothesis, and approach of the research in 
the thesis. The fundamental research question mentioned in this chapter aims to develop 
and drive the research forward. The chapter identifies the research challenge and a 
possible solution that improves the research problem. This chapter also outlines the area 
of contributions of the research and the thesis structure.  The research contributes to: (1) 
the theoretical knowledge of security threats faced in digital forensic investigation, (2) 
the  new model can be turned into a measurement tool for the integrity of digital data. 
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Chapter Two: Literature review 
Objectives: 
 to define digital evidence 
 to introduce the shortcomings of current digital investigation models 
 to discuss digital attacks, security threats and vulnerabilities  
 to identify digital forensic analysis and imaging tools and the application of 
intelligent software agent to digital investigation  
 to identify the requirements of the new model 
 
This chapter aims to give a detailed review of the existing literature concerning existing 
digital investigation models and framework and how they handled different cases 
through these models and the influence of digital attacks and threats is discussed. The 
gap in the existing models is being identified giving a foundation of the need for a new 
model, and then the conceptualised model is presented. This chapter provides a detailed 
overview on the evolution of digital forensics, literature review on the classification of 
an investigation process. The chapter discussed digital evidence characteristics and its 
challenges. The main aim of this chapter is to present the research that has been 
conducted until now and to introduce the shortcomings of current models of digital 
investigation and to identify the requirements for the new model. 
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2.1 Evolution of Digital Forensic  
Computer crime is a huge criminal activity that continues to grow in its prevalence and 
frequency. This increase in criminal activity poses a strain on business organisation, law 
enforcement and government. Hence the need of shift from document based evidence to 
digital/electronic evidence has necessitated a rapid reformulation of standards and 
procedures (Casey, 2002). Digital forensic can be referred back to as early as 1984, 
when the FBI began developing programs to examine computer evidence (Noblett et al., 
2000). The standard procedures from physical forensics are adopted into digital 
forensics, specific forensic software is created, and comprehensive knowledge is 
obtained by digital forensic specialists to defeat digital criminality (Furuseth, 2005). 
The procedures adopted in performing the digital forensic investigation have direct 
influence on the outcome of the investigation. Selecting inappropriate investigative 
processes may lead to incomplete, missing and inadmissible digital evidence. Skipping 
a step or procedure may lead to inconclusive results, and evidence captured in an 
unstructured manner may face the risk of not being admissible in the court of law or 
during internal hearing. The area of computer forensic is in its journey to become a 
recognised scientific discipline (Reith et al., 2002). To date, computer forensic has been 
primarily driven by vendors and applied technologies with very little consideration 
being given to establish a sound theoretical foundation (Farrell, 2009). Although this 
may have been sufficient in the past, it will not remain so for the near future. The 
judiciary system has already begun to question the scientific validity of many of the ad 
hoc procedures and methodologies and is demanding proof of some sort of a theoretical 
foundation and scientific rigor (Yasinsac et al., 1997).   
 Pollitt (2007) explains that one of the foundational ways in which researchers try to 
understand the scientific basis of the discipline is to construct models that reflect their 
observation. Even though digital forensic investigation paradigm is laborious and 
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requires significant expertise on the part of the investigator, computational intelligence 
is expected to offer more assistance in some aspect of the investigation procedures, and 
better knowledge reuse and sharing in computer forensics argued (Ruibin et al., 2005). 
Over the past years, there were numbers of investigation models proposed by different 
authors. The research observed that some of the models tend to be applicable to very 
specific scenario while others applied to a wider scope. Some of the models tend to be 
quite detail and others too general. This may lead to difficulty for forensic investigators 
to adopt the correct or appropriate investigation model. In this aspect of the thesis, the 
various available models are analysed, and common phases are extracted and grouped to 
propose a new comprehensive purpose model that would be applicable to any scenario.  
In 1984 computer forensic investigative process was proposed for dealing with digital 
evidence investigation so that the results will be scientifically reliable and legally 
acceptable, it comprises four phases called Acquisition, Identification, Evaluation and 
Admission (Pollitt, 2007). In 2001, the first DFRWS investigative model proposed a 
general-purpose digital forensics investigation process that comprises of six phases 
(Palmer, 2001). Inspired by DFRWS investigative model, Reith et al. (2002) proposed 
an enhanced model, known as Abstract digital forensic model. In this model, the 
number of phases was expanded to nine, the three phases added to the model where 
Preparation, Approach Strategy and Returning Evidence. While majority of the authors 
and researchers have commented on the weaknesses, and strength in digital forensic, 
very few actual studies have been conducted. The National Institute of Justice in 1999 
conducted a study designed to identify the issues that the law enforcement community 
was experiencing in relation to digital crime. The study identified ten issues such as 
investigative and forensic tools, public awareness, training and certification, data 
reporting, management assistance for onsite electronic crime task, updated laws, 
cooperation with the high-tech industry, research and publications, management 
17 
 
awareness and support and structuring a computer crime unit (Ashcroft, 2001). Carrier 
and Spafford (2003) proposed an investigation process known as integrated digital 
investigation process with the intention to combine various available investigative 
processes into one integrated model. The author introduced the concept of digital crime 
scene, which refers to the virtual environment created by software, and hardware where 
digital evidence of a crime or incident exists. In 2003, there was also End-to-End digital 
investigation model that consist of six phases. The model took into account the source 
of the incident (Stephenson, 2003). Baryamueeba and Tushaba (2004) introduced the 
Enhanced digital investigation process (EDIP). This model was based on the integrated 
digital investigation process in 2003. The EDIP introduces two significant phase known 
as Traceback Phase and the Dynamite Phase. Ciardhuain (2004) proposed a model for 
cybercrime investigation that combines the existing models, generalising them and 
extending them by addressing certain activities not included in them. Unlike previous 
models, this model explicitly represents the information flows in an investigation and 
captures the full scope of the investigation rather than only the processing of evidence. 
Beebe and Clark (2004) proposed a model known as a Hierarchical Objective-Based 
Framework for Digital Investigation and introduced the concept of objective-based 
tasks in which the investigative goals are used to select the analysis task. In a similar, 
study Ruibin et al.  (2005) identified the need for computer intelligence technology in 
computer forensic framework. Rodger et al. (2006) proposed Computer Forensic Field 
Triage Process Model (CFFTPM) as an onsite approach to provide the identification 
analysis and interpretation of digital evidence in a relatively short period without the 
need to take back the devices or media back to the lab. Pilli et al. (2010) proposed a 
generic framework for network forensic analysis by specifically identifying the steps 
connected only to network forensic. Agawal et al. (2011) proposed the Systematic 
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Digital Forensic Investigation Model (SRDFIM) that focused on investigation cases of 
computer fraud and cybercrimes.  
The increased development in the application of information technology in businesses, 
and the government has increased the value of information and influence on digital 
evidence. Information security science has evolved to be the main factor and supporting 
component of the use of information technology and which can be used to fight against 
cybercrime.  
2.2 Digital Evidence  
Cole et al. (2007, p. 444) defined evidence as information presented in court that 
attempts to prove a crime was committed. Carrier and Spafford (2006) define digital 
evidence as digital data that support or refute a hypothesis about digital events or the 
state of digital data. This definition includes evidence that is not only capable of 
entering into a court of law, but may have investigative value. Evidence can be gathered 
from theft or destruction of intellectual property, fraud or anything else related to the 
use of a digital device. Evidence, which is also referred to as digital evidence is any data 
that can provide a significant link between the cause of the crime and the victim 
(Perumal, 2009). Therefore, this current research defines digital evidence as a data 
packet or digital information stored or transmitted by a digital device that support or 
rebut an assumption about digital incident or event that provides relationship between 
the cause of an incident and the victim. 
2.2.1 Characteristics of Digital Evidence 
Digital evidence is by nature fragile. It can be altered, damaged or destroyed by 
improper handling or improper examination. It is easily copied and modified, and not 
easily kept in its original state. Precautions should be taken to document, collect, 
preserve and examine digital evidence (Carrier, 2003). Buttressing this point is research 
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carried out by Sommer (2009) which argued that data from computers can be accurately 
preserved and presented and, like all other evidences, digital evidence must be 
admissible, authentic, accurate, complete and convincing. Digital evidence is different 
from all other evidences in that it can change from moment to moment within a 
computer and along the transmission line, digital evidence can easily be altered without 
a trace and can be changed during evidence collection (Ademu and Imafidon, 2012g). 
The main problem is to determine how an expert can measure the reliability of digital 
evidence. 
Digital evidence is data of investigative value that are stored on or transmitted by a 
digital device. Therefore, digital evidence is “hidden” evidence in the same way that 
deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) or fingerprint evidence is hidden. In its natural state, 
digital evidence cannot be known by the content in the physical object that holds such 
evidence. Investigative reports may be required to explain the examination process and 
any limitations (Pollitt, 2007). 
 
Figure 2: Different types of digital devices (Ademu et al., 2011b) 
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The digital devices such as those shown in figure 2 may contain potential evidence that 
relates to criminal activity. The majority of digital devices contain data that could be 
lost if not handled properly. Examples of other digital devices are audio recorders, 
answering machines, cables, GPS devices, telephones, pagers, chips, digital organisers, 
copy machines, scanners, dongles, wireless access points and fax machines. Potential 
evidence can also be found on multiple computers connected to each other or to the 
central server in a computer network. 
2.2.2 Role of Digital Evidence 
The major goal in an investigation is to relate the crime to its executor by uncovering 
compelling links between the offender, victim and crime scene. If the evidence suggests 
that the suspect committed a crime or violated an organization’s policy the investigator 
begins a case, which is a collection of evidence that can be presented in the court or  to 
interested parties, and for an internal hearing in an organisation (Ademu and Imafidon, 
2012e). A witness may identify a suspect, but evidence of a person’s involvement is 
usually more compelling and reliable. Previous scholars argue that anyone or anything 
penetrating a crime scene takes something of the scene with them and leaves something 
or a trace behind. In the physical world, a criminal might unconsciously leave 
fingerprints or hair at the scene and take a fibre from the scene. Similar to categories of 
evidence in the traditional forensic sense, digital equipments and their attributes can be 
grouped into class and individual groups. Printers, fax machines, scanners and all-in-
one office devices may leave discernible artefacts that lead to common class 
characteristics allowing the identification of a particular device, e.g. Canon, Epson, etc. 
Even though individual characteristics could be sometimes rare, it should  be possible to 
identify through detailed analysis (Ademu and Imafidon, 2012b). The investigator must 
evaluate the evidence thoroughly and document the chain of evidence, or chain of 
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custody, which is the route the evidence took from the time evidence was found until 
the case is presented. 
2.2.3 Challenges in Digital Evidence 
A huge number of organisations are faced with the need to collect evidence on their 
networks in response to incidents such as computer intrusions, intellectual property 
theft, fraud, child pornography, stalking, etc. The majority of organisations are taking 
into account legal solutions when criminals target them, emphasizes should also be 
given for more attention to handling digital evidence in a way that will be admissible. A 
lot of digital investigators deal with a huge number of crimes regularly, and there are 
fewer resources  and less time to open a full investigation for each incident. 
Digital evidence unlike physical evidence can be difficult to understand and handle. For 
instance, a hard drive contains a messy combination of data layered and mixed together 
over time. In most cases, only a small portion of this information can be relevant, 
making it necessary to extract useful pieces, fit them together and translate them into a 
form and language that can be interpreted. 
Digital evidence is commonly an abstraction of some event or digital object (Casey, 
2004). For instance in a situation where an email message is being sent by an individual, 
the resulting activities create data traces that give mainly an incomplete view of what 
occurred. Digital evidence can be influenced easily. Digital evidence can be altered 
either maliciously by criminals or accidentally during collection without leaving any 
noticeable signs of alteration (Ademu et al., 2011b). Digital evidence has different 
features that lessen this problem. For instance, digital evidence can be replicated exactly 
and a copy can be examined as if it were the original. With the right tools, it is very easy 
to know if digital evidence has been modified by comparing it with an original copy. 
Digital evidence can also be  difficult to destroy; even when a file is deleted, or a hard 
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drive is formatted, the digital evidence can be recovered applying the correct tools. 
When criminals attempt to destroy digital evidence, copies and remain can still exist in 
places that they have no knowledge (Sommer, 2009). With digital evidence, it is 
difficult to attribute a digital activity to an individual. For instance if a case centres on a 
single form or source of digital evidence such as date-time stamps on computer files, 
such a case is very weak. Without additional information, it could be argued that 
someone else used the computer at the time.  
The dynamic and distributed nature of the network makes it even more difficult to find 
and collect all relevant digital evidence. It is not realistic to take a snapshot of the entire 
network at a particular time. Also, network traffic is temporary and must be captured 
while it is in transit. Once network traffic is captured, only copies remain, and the 
original data are not available for comparison. The amount of data lost during the 
collection process can be documented, but the lost evidence cannot be recovered.  
A network contains a large amount of data and sifting through for useful information 
can be more or less impossible and can prevent an investigation. Even when the 
important digital evidence is obtained, networks provide a degree of anonymity making 
it difficult to attribute online activities to an individual. The ultimate aim of the research 
in this thesis is to explore the use of modern technologies to avoid security threats when 
considering digital forensic investigation process in an attempt to present solution that 
contributes to a good security level and as a measure for integrity of digital evidence. 
This thesis provides methods of addressing these obstacles. 
 2.2.4 Digital Related Offenses 
2.2.4.1 Cybercrime 
According to Casey (2004) computer related offenses required special consideration, 
twenty six member countries signed the Council of Europe (COE) Convention on 
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Cybercrime to create a common criminal policy aimed at the protection of society 
against cybercrime, by implementing suitable legislation and fostering international co-
operation. Even though the COE Convention on Cybercrime represents an aspirational 
policy document, a country that approves the Convention commits to putting in place a 
legislative framework that deals with cybercrime according to Convention requirements. 
Within this commitment, each country is given discretion in relation to the full scope. 
Despite the clear need for consistent legislation in Europe to facilitate cross-border 
investigations, there are major differences between the legal systems and cultures in 
European countries, making legislative consistency difficult. The COE Convention on 
Cybercrime has already been faulted by some for not taking due account of privacy 
rights. There are also differences between the Convention and existing laws in some 
European countries that will take time to resolve. To understand these differences, it is 
useful to compare categories of offences set out by the convention with related offences 
in English law.  
2.2.4.2 Computer Exploitation 
The United Kingdom  was the first European country to enact a law to address computer 
crime specifically in 1990. The Computer Misuse Act introduced three new offences, 
which are unauthorised access to a computer , unauthorised access with intent to 
facilitate the commission of further offenses and unauthorised modification of computer 
material (Mobbs, 2003). The Council of Europe Convention introduces five offences 
against the confidentiality, integrity and availability of computer data and systems 
which are illegal access, illegal interception, data interference, system interference and 
misuse of devices. 
2.2.4.3 Child Pornography 
Offences relating to the possession and distribution of child pornography are most likely 
the major ones litigated and certainly the most notorious of cyber offences. The 
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associated law in England pre-dates the Convention and did not specifically mention 
computers. The Protection of Children Act Section 1 (1) , 1978 as amended by the 
Criminal Justice and Public Order Act, 1994 makes it an offence for a person to take or 
permit to be taken an indecent photograph of a child, to distribute or show such indecent 
photographs and to have in his possession such indecent photographs with a view to be 
distributed or shown to others. With the support of the amendment made by the 1994 
Act, the term “photograph” includes data stored on a computer disk or by other 
electronic means that are capable of conversion into a photograph, including graphic 
images (Ademu and Imafidon, 2012c). 
 
2.2.4.4 Forgery and Fraud 
Forgery and fraud are traditional offences that may be assisted by the use of technology. 
The COE Convention describes computer related forgery offences as the intentional 
input, alteration or deletion of digital data resulting in inauthentic data with the intent 
that it is considered or acted upon for legal purposes as if it were authentic, regardless of 
whether or not the data are directly readable and intelligible. The COE Convention also 
describes computer related fraud as the intentional causing of a loss of property to 
another by any input, alteration or deletion of computer data or any interference with the 
functioning of a computer system with fraudulent intent of procuring, without the right 
to do so for the economic benefit for oneself or another (Mobbs, 2003). 
2.2.5 Digital Evidence and its Application 
When a digital device is seized, digital investigator's need to protect the system, its 
components and digital information. Digital investigators are careful to ensure that, no 
possible evidence is damaged, destroyed, or otherwise compromised by the procedures 
used to investigate the digital device extracted and possibly relevant evidence is 
properly handled and protected from later mechanical or electromagnetic damage and a 
25 
 
continuing chain of custody is established and maintained and if at all any information 
is inadvertently acquired during a forensic exploration it should be ethically and legally 
respected and not divulged (Ademu and Imafidon, 2012a).  
One of the most important issues of digital evidence is the handling of data. The major 
aim of digital forensic investigation is to gather digital evidence in a manner that will 
preserve the integrity of digital evidence. In order for this to happen, there should be 
procedures that can minimise the chance of contamination of evidence. In handling 
digital evidence, the crime scene should be secure, preventing unauthorised access into 
the digital device or anyone from touching the computer and other related digital object. 
It is important to document information gathered at all times during the investigation; 
this will be useful when reconstructing the scene. On identifying the digital evidence, it 
is important to preserve such evidence. There is need for scientific validity of many 
procedures and methodologies used in digital investigation process (Carrier and 
Spafford, 2006). It is important to proof the theoretical foundation and scientific rigor of 
an investigation process. 
A major error preventing digital evidence from being accepted is obtaining it and 
ignoring the preservative measures. In the case of exigency, a search can be made for 
any emergency without warrant needed. Digital examiners can also perform a search 
without a warrant by obtaining consent for the search in the case of purpose of internal 
hearing. Also in a situation where digital forensic examiners are authorised to search a 
computer, they must maintain a good level of security for the digital object, (Ademu 
and Imafidon, 2012f).  
2.2.5.1 Types of Evidence  
According to Casey (2004) when there is attack on a network or computer on the 
network, evidence can take several forms. For instances hardware devices such as hard 
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drives, keyboards, router, desktops, and servers are good sources of evidence gathering. 
These systems with their continuous increase in its amount of storage space can be rich 
sources of digital evidence. A simple file can contain incriminating information and can 
have related properties such as when and where the file was created, and by whom. The 
traditional telephones, mobiles, personal digital assistant, smart cards, log files, files on 
hard disk, database files, captures of a computer's state can also be a source of digital 
evidence.  
Depending on the type of attack, in the case of a live system, the digital investigator 
might need to document the current state of the system. Some information known as 
volatile data, which identifies the activities on a computer, is lost when the digital 
investigator shut down or unplugs the system, but there is relevant information that 
needs to be gathered from a live system (Cole et al., 2007). The digital investigator can 
gather information from viewing information about listening ports and network 
connections. Information about listening ports and established network connections can 
be viewed by using special forensic tools available for gathering data. Evidence can also 
be gathered viewing information about the applications running on the computer.  
2.2.5.2 Application of Digital Evidence 
The following are example of the application and use of digital evidence. 
• Criminal prosecutors use digital evidence in a variety of crimes where incriminating 
documents can be found such as homicides, financial fraud, drug and embezzlement 
recordkeeping, and child pornography (Sommer, 2009). 
• Civil litigators can readily make use of personal and business records found on digital 
devices that bear on things such as fraud, divorce, discrimination, and harassment cases. 
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• Insurance companies may be able to mitigate costs by using discovered digital 
evidence of possible fraud in accident, arson, and workman’s compensation cases. 
• Corporations often hire computer forensics specialists to ascertain evidence relating to 
sexual harassment, embezzlement, theft or misappropriation of trade secrets and other 
internal/confidential information (Ademu at al., 2011b). 
• Law enforcement officials frequently require assistance in pre-search warrant 
preparations and post-seizure handling of  computer equipments (Sommer, 2009). 
• Individuals sometimes hire computer forensics specialists in support of possible claims 
of wrongful termination, sexual harassment, or age discrimination (Ademu and 
Imafidon, 2012a). 
2.2.6 Digital Evidence Processing Guidlines 
When experts are ready to retrieve data they take careful steps to identify and attempt to 
retrieve data that exists on a computer. If the digital evidence is collected aimlessly then 
not only will there be an inefficient use of resources but the evidence could get 
compromised, thus liberating a criminal from all possible wrong doing. Before this 
evidence is submitted it must meet three basic requirements to maintain its reliability, It 
must be produced, maintained, used in a normal environment and be professionally 
authenticated  and also meet the best evidence rule. This means that what is produced 
must be the best evidence available and not a substitute for the evidence offered (Icove 
et al., 1995). 
There are also procedures that must be followed at the crime scene. Just like any other 
regular crime scene, in the case of computer forensic, a computer has to be kept in the 
same condition as it was found. Doing this prevents any evidence from being 
questioned. There are three methods recommended for handling evidence. Acquire the 
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evidence without altering or damaging the original, authenticate the recovered evidence 
as being the same as the originally seized data and analyse the data without modifying it 
(Yang, 2007).  
There are some effective procedures on an investigation utilising digital forensics. First, 
digital forensic investigators must preserve the evidence. This step is followed after 
entering the scene of the crime. Digital evidence is fragile and can be changed at any 
time by just touching a key on the keyboard. Evidence that is damaged or handled 
improperly will be excluded from evidence and could result in criminals being 
vindicated (Kruse and Heiser, 2001). After this, evidence must be examined which 
means data are ready to be retrieved. Once all files are collected the unallocated disk 
space (free space) is checked and also compare and remove duplicate files (Casey, 
2004). The empty space on the hard drive can contain previously deleted or formatted 
files. A bit-stream-copy method is used to find deleted files. Deleted files tend to be in 
strings, and the tool will help to rebuild documents. When someone deletes or formats, 
not all information is wiped; a special format is required for this to happen. When all 
files are retrieved, they need to be protected. Next, evidence is to be analysed. The 
analysis consists of the list of the digital device, any relevant data, and authorship 
information, and any indication to try and hide any revealing data. After this analysis, 
the data are taken to the appropriate place and prepared for presentation. Whenever 
needed, the forensics expert can provide consultation and/or testimony. Here they will 
be able to prove their theory of guilt or innocence based on their analysis of the 
evidence. If these procedures are followed correctly, criminals will be prosecuted 
thoroughly. These procedures should be followed  by everyone involved in the 
collection of digital evidence. A digital crime scene follows the same rules as traditional 
crime scene, and it must be analysed and preserved in its original form. It is important 
to realise how imperative it is to follow the procedure. 
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According to Solomon and Lattimore (2006) one major problem of digital forensics 
today is the lack of a standard and consistent investigative process. Current procedures 
and tools should not be mistaken for a consistent investigative process; tools and 
procedures are built from the experience of law enforcement simply in an ad hoc 
fashion instead of coming from the scientific community where other traditional 
forensic sciences gets their methodologies. “This is a problem because evidence must be 
obtained using methods that are proven to reliably extract and analyse data without bias 
or modification”. (Reith et al., 2002).  
According to Jennings and Barnard (2005) despite advances in automated technologies, 
human involvement is crucial. In agreement with the authors, the involvement of an 
investigator is important in digital investigation although it is possible for an 
investigator to make errors while performing specific actions or omitting facts while 
searching for digital evidence. To prevent such failures digital forensic tools and 
techniques in collaboration with good security guidelines are considered to achieve the 
goals of digital evidence searching, retrieval and recovery. The digital forensic 
investigator analyses a case and selects techniques to be used in the process of 
investigation. Carrying out a digital forensic investigation using a method manually 
could consume a huge amount of time, for example, searching all the clusters in a hard 
disk could take several years of work. Some specific tasks cannot be performed without 
the use of specific software tools. A large variety of software and hardware has been 
developed to help digital forensic investigators in performing digital forensic 
investigation. 
In dealing with digital forensic investigation, digital related crime evidence is gathered, 
analysed, and presented to a court of law to prove that an illegal activity has occurred. It 
is important that when undertaking digital forensics investigation no alteration, damage 
or data corruption occur. In order to do a good analysis, the first step is to secure the 
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collection of evidence Ademu et al., 2011). This is important to guarantee the evidential 
integrity and security of information. Choosing and using the right tools and techniques 
are very important in digital forensic investigation. The digital forensic techniques 
mentioned in this thesis are as follows: 
 Imaging 
One of the first techniques used in a digital forensics investigation is to image, or copy 
the data to be examined. Without care, data can be modified, even though as little as the 
modification can be, the integrity of the evidence can be compromised. A digital 
forensic investigator is required to have good knowledge of different operating system 
behaviour so that residual data will not accidentally be overwritten. Both hardware and 
software solutions have been created to allow imaging that does not modify the drive. 
For most operating systems, there are procedures to follow to protect the media to be 
imaged. This involves disabling auto-mounting services and accessing the raw devices 
directly. There are also hardware solutions, in the form of write blockers that physically 
prevent the OS from modifying the media. According to (Bolt, 2011) write blockers are 
most common for hard drives, and provide several variations on implementation 
technique. Once the digital forensic investigator is certain that the original disk will not 
be modified, the data must be copied from the original disk for analysis, and this has 
important details that must be considered. A physical media device is normally made of 
blocks where data is stored. These blocks can be grouped into multiple partitions per 
device, with spaces between the partitions. Partitions are then formatted into file 
systems, with certain blocks containing metadata and control data for the file systems. 
To ensure all information is accurately copied from a system, the system must be 
imaged at the block level. To support law enforcement and industry alike, the National 
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), has created the Computer Forensic Tool 
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Testing (CFTT) Program. CFTT has set standards, created testing utilities, reviewed and 
certified disk imagers, file recovery software, hardware and software write blockers. 
 Hashing 
In order to demonstrate that an image or file was not modified, the forensic community 
has adopted cryptographic hashing. Modern hashing functions use one-way 
cryptographic functions to obtain the hash. The uniqueness of the hash depends on the 
cryptographic function used. According to Casey (2004) before copying data from a 
disk, it is advisable to calculate the MD5 values of the original disk. The hash value of 
the original disk can be compared with copies to demonstrate that they are identical. In 
2004, MD5 was shown to be insecure by researchers. This research makes relying on 
MD5 hashes alone questionable in legal contexts. NIST collects software to hash for its 
National Software Reference Library project. NIST hashes the files collected with both 
MD5 and SHA-1 and plans additional functions in the future.  
 Carving 
Data carving is a technique used in digital forensics. Data files have certain identifiers 
in their coding structure such as text files and video files, etc. By carving through the 
lost pieces of data on a flash drive, common signatures can be found in order to 
reassemble the files. One category of tools in the digital forensic toolkit is called file 
carvers. These tools allow the scanning of disk blocks that do not belong to current files 
to find deleted data. An approach to recovering deleted files is to search unallocated 
space, swap files and other digital object for class characteristics such as headers and 
footers. This process is like carving files out of the combination of data in unallocated 
space (Casey, 2002). Recent advances in carving allow fragmented files to be recovered 
with more accuracy. Cohen (2008) described advanced JPEG carving as creating a jpeg 
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validation based on the open source lib jpeg and a distance function to find sudden 
image changes, indicative of an invalid reconstruction. 
2.2.7 Backbone of Digital  Forensic Investigation  
The investigative process is structured to encourage a complete, accurate investigation, 
ensure proper evidence handling and reduce the chance of mistakes created by 
preconceived theories and other potential pitfalls. This process applies to criminal 
investigations as well as public and private inquiries dealing with policy violations or 
system intrusion. Digital investigators and examiners work hand-in-hand in a systematic 
and determined manner in an effort to present an accurate and reliable evidence to the 
court or the interested parties (Ademu and Imafidon, 2013). While in the court, evidence 
is handed over to the prosecutors who scrutinise the findings and decide whether to 
continue or discontinue the case. The stages in each process are often linked and there is  
need for digital investigators and examiners also to revisit steps after it is thought to be 
complete. The fundamental investigation processes are as follows:  
2.2.7.1 Preparation 
Every process of investigation has a starting point. In a digital forensic investigation, 
this step can be signalled by a system administrator reviewing firewall logs, 
questionable log entries on a server or some combination of indicators from multiple 
security sensors installed on networks and host (Sommer, 2009). In the case of an 
automated incident alert, it is necessary to consider the source and reliability of the 
information. An individual making a complaint due to repeated offensive messages 
appearing on his or her screen might be dealing with a computer worm or virus. Alert 
from an intrusion detection system may only indicate an attempted, unsuccessful 
intrusion or a false alarm. It is usually very important to weigh the strengths and 
weaknesses related to the sources and involve the human factor as well as the digital. 
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It is important to carry out a thorough preparation for assessing an event occurrence, 
there should be some preliminary fact gathering before carrying out a full or detailed 
investigation. To perform this fact gathering and preliminary assessment, it is usually 
important to enter a crime scene and carefully scan through a variety of data sources 
looking for items that may contain relevant information. There is need for careful 
handling at this stage in an investigation because every action in the crime scene may 
alter evidence. Carrying out an investigation without proper authorization can 
undermine the entire investigative process. Therefore it is necessary to perform only the 
minimum actions necessary to determine if further investigation is needed.  
Documentation infuses all steps of the investigation process and is very important to all 
the steps of the investigation process. It is essential to record the details of each piece of 
digital evidence to help establish its authenticity and initiate a chain of custody. 
Investigators are usually busy with numerous cases or they have competing duties that 
require their attention. Putting in mind that investigative resources are limited, they 
must be applied where they are needed most. In civil, business and military operations, 
for instance, suspicious activity will be investigated but policy and continuity of 
operations often replace legalities as the primary concern, resources should be focused 
on the most severe problems or where they are most effective. Offenders and victims 
may deceive investigators intentionally claiming that something occurred or that they 
were somewhere at a particular time. By cross referencing such information with the 
digital traces left behind by an individual’s activities, digital evidence may support or 
refute a statement (Casey, 2009). In one homicide investigation, the prime suspect 
claimed that he was out of town at the time of the crime but his computer experienced a 
bug that made most of the time-stamp dates on his computer useless; email messages 
sent and received by the suspect showed that he was at home when the murder occurred, 
opposing his original statement. Therefore because he was caught in a lie, the suspect 
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admitted to the crime. Proper action must be taken to ensure the integrity of potential 
evidence both physical and digital. The methods and tools employed to ensure the 
integrity are very important at this stage. Their accuracy and reliability and also 
professional acceptance may be subject to questioning if the case is prosecuted. This 
stage is generally the first stage in the process that employees commonly used tools of a 
particular type. This stage involves the duplicating of copies of all sources of digital 
data. 
2.2.7.2 Collection 
Once the crime scene is secured, possible evidence of the incident must be identified 
and seized. Clear procedures and understanding of necessary legal criteria are essential 
before the activity can begin properly. To avoid wasting time, the main goal here is for 
experienced digital investigators not to seize everything at a crime scene but to make 
informed decisions about what to seize, to document them and to be able to justify the 
action. Digital investigators are often asked to provide some insight into the origins of a 
particular item of digital evidence. In addition to determining the origin of an email 
message, different file formats have characteristics that may be associated with their 
source (Casey, 2004).  
Comparing an item of evidence to an example can disclose investigative useful class 
characteristics or even individual characteristics. These embedded characteristics can be 
used to associate a piece of evidence with a specific computer. The earlier versions of 
Microsoft Office is also embedded with a unique identifier in files, called a Globally 
Unique Identifier (GUID), which can be used to identify the computer that was used to 
create a given document (Casey, 2009). 
In the digital environment, like in traditional forensics, the seizure of material items 
occurs but all or part of the state and character of some material evidence may be lost 
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almost immediately upon seizure by virtue of the volatility of electronic devices and 
their designs. Recently most digital devices have a large amount of storage space where 
process context information, network state information, etc. are stored. Immediately a 
system is shut down the immediate contents of that memory is lost and can never be 
completely recovered, however, when dealing with digital evidence crime it may be 
necessary to perform operations on a system that contains evidence, especially in 
network connected environments.  
2.2.7.3 Analysis  
This step involves the detailed scrutiny of data identified by the preceding activities. 
The methods applied here will tend to involve review and study of specific internal 
attributes of the data such as text and narrative meaning of readable data Before 
performing a full analysis of preserved sources of digital evidence, it is possible to 
extract data that have been deleted, hidden and not available for viewing using the 
appropriate tools. Missing items are also important but their presence must be inferred 
from other events. For instance, if there is evidence that a certain program was used but 
the program cannot be found, it can be gathered that the program was removed after 
use. This can have important implications in the context of crime, since concealment 
behaviour is a major attribute of a criminal intent. The functionality of a piece of digital 
evidence can give a clue of what happened. Knowing what a program does is important 
for reconstruction. 
2.2.7.4 Reporting 
In order to provide a clear view of the investigative process, final reports should contain 
important details of each step, including reference to protocols followed and methods 
used to seize, document, collect, preserve, recover, reconstruct, organise and search key 
evidence. The major part of the report involves the analysis leading to each conclusion 
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and descriptions of supporting evidence. It is important that no conclusion should be 
written without a thorough description of the supporting evidence. 
2.2.8 Why the Need for Investigative Framework/Model 
Digital evidence is admissible as long as the process used to produce the evidence is 
known to produce reliable results. According to Kruse and Heiser (2001), the basic 
forensic methodology known as “the three ‘A’s” is evidence that must be acquired 
without altering or damaging the original. The investigator must authenticate that 
recovered evidence is the same as the originally seized data and data must be analysed 
without modification. Digital evidence must not be modified or damaged during any 
part of the investigation process (Ademu et al., 2012a). Hash sums should be calculated 
on collected digital evidence data and on the source of the evidence and compared to 
ensure the authenticity and integrity of the data.  
An investigative framework should provide a process for conducting a digital forensic 
investigation. There are multiple factors complicating the investigative process. The 
more clearly the investigative process is defined, the more likely an investigation will 
be successful. An investigative framework, properly thought out and constructed would 
give a step-by-step process for conducting an investigation into a suspected digital 
device (Ademu and Imafidon, 2013). A clear and structured process will allow 
investigators and examiners determine early in the investigation that an attack has 
occurred and it can lead them to a conclusion (Casey, 2002). It is important to know that 
this does not imply that all such conclusions are successful. A worryingly large 
percentage of investigations end with the conclusion that the victim was attacked, but 
that the source of the attack cannot be determined. 
Casey (2004) discussed that the US Supreme Court provides certain criteria in the 
Daubert vs. Merrel case that may be used as guidelines by courts to determine whether 
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evidence is admissible in court. Conventional applications therefore have to adhere to 
the requirements stipulated by the Daubert standard to allow the evidence they collect to 
be admissible in court. Few investigators have the time and skill to evaluate and analyse 
their chosen tools to determine whether they obey the rules of the criteria stated by the 
Daubert standard. Even though the tools obey the rules of the criteria and perform well 
in a trusted environment, they may give inconsistent results in an untrustworthy 
environment (Casey, 2004). This is because software applications rarely contain all the 
operating logic needed to perform basic functionality that can be supplied by external 
drivers or the operating system; the application relies rather on libraries and drivers and 
may be compromised to produce results that are inconsistent with the digital evidence. 
Most commercial forensic tools seem to be very expensive to buy. This creates a 
problem because not every investigation team has the finance to invest in the very 
expensive toolkit and may have to use the available open source tools (Ademu and 
Imafidon., 2012b). It could be better to use the existing functionality supplied by 
commercial forensic tools, since their functionality has been tested and proven, but it is 
virtually impossible because the source code of these tools is not available to the public. 
A solution is needed to allow investigators to perform rapid digital forensic 
investigation on a consistent and structured framework in an attempt to speed up digital 
forensic investigation. 
2.3 Existing Digital Forensic Investigation Framework/Models 
With the increase in digital crime, lots of digital forensic investigation models already 
have been developed. One of the problems with digital forensics is that the procedures 
for accomplishing forensic investigation are not consistent. In the digital investigatory 
practices, there are hundreds of digital forensic investigation procedures developed, 
different countries and organizations tend to develop their own procedures, some 
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focused on the technology aspect, some on data analysis of the investigation. In 
conducting a digital investigation for impending criminal breach of the law the legal 
process depends on the local cyber law. 
2.3.1 Computer Forensics Investigation Process  
Pollitt (2007) proposed an approach where digital evidence can be investigated in a 
manner that the result will be scientifically reliable and legally acceptable. The author 
compared and mapped the computer forensic process to the admission of documentary 
evidence in a court of law. Four different steps are identified as a guide to the admission 
of any evidence into court. The steps are shown in figure 3. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: The digital investigative process (Pollitt, 1995) 
 
2.3.2 DFRWS Investigative Model  
Palmer (2001) discussed that the first Digital Forensic Research Workshop proposed a 
general-purpose digital forensic investigation. The goal of the workshop was to provide 
a forum for a newly formed community of academics and practitioners to share their 
knowledge on digital forensic science. The audience comprised military, civilian, and 
law enforcement professionals who use forensic techniques to uncover evidence from 
digital sources.  
Acquisition 
Identification 
Evaluation 
Admission as evidence 
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The group created a consensus document that drew out the state of digital forensics at 
that time. Among the group’s conclusions was that digital forensics was a process with 
some agreed steps. The framework introduces digital investigation phases. The phases 
defined by the framework serve to categorise the activities of an investigation into 
groups which a list of techniques where provided. They outlined phases such as 
identification, preservation, collection, examination, analysis, presentation and decision. 
(Palmer, 2001). As shown in figure 4 below, the framework is represented as a table, the 
grey boxes at the top of their matrix, which is the column, is identify by the group as 
fundamental phases, and each row contains techniques although many will debate the 
forensic nature of each step of the process. This can be called an enhanced model of the 
DOJ model because it was able to cover stages that were not covered in any previous 
model, such as the presentation stage. The main advantage of DFRWS is that it is the 
first large-scale organisation that is led by academia rather than law enforcement; this is 
a good direction because it helps define and focus the direction of the scientific 
community towards the challenge of digital forensics, but the DFRWS model is just a 
basis for future work.  
 
Figure 4: Digital Forensic Research Workshop (Palmer, 2001) 
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2.3.3 The Scientific Crime Scene Investigation Process Model  
According to Ashcroft (2001) the US National Institute of Justice (NIJ) published a 
process model. The Technical Working Group for Scientific Crime Scene Investigation 
is completely design as a procedure for improving the collection process. The document 
serves as a guide for the first responders. The guide is intended for use by law 
enforcement and other responders who have the responsibility for protecting an 
electronic crime scene. The procedures involve recognition, collection, preservation, 
transportation and storage of digital evidence. The model consists of four phases, and 
started with the Collection phase, which involves the search for, recognition of, 
collection of, and documentation of electronic evidence. This follows by the 
Examination phase, which helps to make the evidence visible and explain its origin and 
significance. It includes revealing hidden and obscured information and the relevant 
documentation. This is followed by the Analysis, which involves studying the product 
of the examination for its importance and probative value of the case. Then finally, 
reporting which involves writing a report, outlining the examination process and 
information obtained from the whole investigation. 
2.3.4 Abstract Digital Forensic Model  
Reith et al. (2002) proposed a model known as the Abstract Digital Forensic model. The 
basis of this model is using the ideas from traditional (physical) forensic evidence 
collection strategy as practiced by law enforcement (e.g. FBI). The authors argued that 
the proposed model could be termed as an enhancement of the DFRWS model since it is 
inspired from it. The model adds supports for tool preparation and the dynamic 
formulation of investigative approaches. The model involves nine components: 
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 Identification – This recognises an incident from indicators and determines its 
type. This component is important because it has impact on other steps but it is 
not explicit within the field of forensics. 
 Preparation – This involves the preparation of tools, techniques, search warrants 
and monitoring authorisation and management support. 
 Approach strategy – This is formulating procedures and approach to use in order 
to maximise the collection of untainted evidence while minimising the impact to 
the victim. 
 Preservation – This involves the isolation, securing and preservation of the state 
of physical and digital evidence. 
 Collection – This is to record the physical scene and duplicate digital evidence 
using standardised and accepted procedures. 
 Examination – This is an in-depth systematic search of evidence relating to the 
suspected crime. This focuses on identifying and locating potential evidence. 
 Analysis – This determines importance and probative value to the case of the 
examined product. 
 Presentation - This is where summary and explanation of conclusion. 
 Returning Evidence – Physical and digital property returned to proper owner. 
 
The three important phases introduced in this model were Preparation, Approach 
Strategy and Returning of Evidence.  In Preparation, phase activities such as preparing 
tools, identifying techniques and getting management support were carried out. 
Approach Strategy was introduced with the objective to maximise the acquisition of 
unaltered evidence. In ensuring that evidence is safely returned to the rightful owner or 
property disposed, the Returning Evidence phase was introduced. 
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Figure 5: Abstract Digital Forensic Model (Reith et al., 2002) 
Using this model shown in figure 5, future technologies and the technical details 
required to analyse them forensically can be instantiated to provide a standard 
methodology for providing electronic evidence (Reith et al., 2002). This will improve 
the science of forensics because it involves a basis for analysing new digital technology 
while at the same time providing a common framework for law enforcement and the 
judicial system to work feasibly within a court of law. 
2.3.5 Integrated Digital Investigation Process Model (IDIP)  
Carrier and Spafford (2003) proposed a model, which is based on previous work with 
the purpose of combining the different available investigative processes into one 
integrated model. They introduce the idea of digital crime scene which refers to the 
virtual environment developed by software and hardware where digital evidence of a 
crime or incident exits. The model known as the Integrated Digital Investigation Process 
was organised into 5 phases as shown in figure 6.  
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Figure 6: Integrated Digital Investigation Model (Carrier and Spafford, 2003) 
The process started with a readiness phase that require the physical and operational 
infrastructure to be ready to support any future investigation. The phase is an ongoing 
phase in the entire life cycle of an organisation. After the Readiness phase is 
Deployment phase, which provides a mechanism for an incident to be detected and 
confirmed. The other phases introduced are Physical Crime Scene Investigation Phase, 
Digital Crime Scene Investigation Phase and finally Review Phase where the whole 
investigation processes are reviewed to identify areas of improvement that may result in 
new procedures or training requirement (Carrier and Spafford, 2003). 
 
2.3.6 End-to-End Digital Investigation 
End-to-end digital investigation consists of 6 phases as shown in figure 7. It combines 
an extended digital forensic investigation process. The model takes into account the 
source of the incident, where the incident happened (Stephenson, 2003). 
 
Figure 7: End to End-Digital Investigation (Stephenson, 2003) 
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2.3.7 Enhanced Digital Investigation Process  
Baryamueeba and Tushaba (2004) investigative model is based on Integrated Digital 
Investigation Model. The Enhanced Digital Investigation Process mode as shown in 
figure 8, introduces two additional phases, traceback and dynamite, which seek to 
separate the investigation into primary crime scene (computer) and secondary crime 
scene (the physical crime scene). The goal is to reconstruct two crime scenes to avoid 
inconsistencies. 
 
Figure 8: Enhanced Digital Investigation Process (Baryamueeba and Tushaba, 2004) 
The Traceback Phase enables the investigator to trace back all the way to the actual 
device used by the criminal to perform the crime. In the Dynamite Phase, investigations 
are conducted at the primary crime scene with the purpose of identifying the potential 
attacker. In this model, the Deployment Phase provides a mechanism for an incident to 
be detected and confirmed. It consist of 5 sub-phases namely Detection and 
Notification, Physical Crime Scene Investigation, Digital Crime Scene Investigation and 
finally Submission (Baryamueeba and Tushaba, 2004). Unlike IDIP, this phase includes 
both physical and digital crime scene investigation and presentation of findings to legal 
entities through the submission phase. 
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2.3.8 Extended Model of Cybercrime Investigation 
Ciardhuain (2004) argues that the existing models are general models of cybercrime 
investigation that concentrate only on the processing of evidence in cybercrime 
investigations. The author proposed an extended model for cybercrime. 
 
Figure 9: The extended model of cyber crime investigation (Ciardhuain, 2004) 
The model shown in figure 9 above provides a good basis for understanding the process 
of cybercrime investigation, tackling certain activities such as presenting the 
information flow in an investigation for allowing deeper understanding of the source of 
evidentiary and other data. Even though the model is generic, it concentrates on the 
management aspect. The author argues that the available models are generic models of 
cybercrime investigation focusing on investigative processes such as gathering, 
analysing and presenting the evidence. This model is designed to assist public and 
corporate forensic investigations.  
2.3.9 A Hierarchical Objective-Based Framework for Digital Investigation 
Beebe and Clark (2004) provide an excellent review of the previous proposed digital 
forensic model and then propose that, why most of the previous models were single tier, 
the proposed one tends to be multi-tier as shown in figure 10. They introduced the 
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concept of objective-based tasks where the investigative goals for each sub-phases 
represent objectives rather than specific tasks. This is a significant and exceptional 
difference from the task-based models discussed so far. Objectives are goals that expect 
activities of a similar nature regardless of the specific case. Tasks directly relates to a 
specific case, type of case and platform. 
 
Figure 10: A Hierarchical Objective-Based Framework for the Digital Investigation (Beebe and 
Clarke, 2004) 
2.3.10 Case-Relevance Information Investigation 
Ruibin et al. (2005) identified the need for computer intelligence technology in the 
current computer forensic framework. It suggests an automatic and efficient framework 
to provide the case-relevance information by binding computer intelligence technology 
to the current computer forensic. The authors explained that computer intelligence 
expects to offer more assistance in the investigation procedures and better knowledge 
reuse within multiple cases and sharing in computer forensics. The first concept that the 
authors introduce is the notion of 'Seek Knowledge', and this is the investigative clues 
that drive the analysis of data. Another concept described by the authors is the notion of 
Case-Relevance. They used this notion to describe the distinctions between computer 
security and forensics, even defining degrees of case relevance.  
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Figure 11: Case-Relevance Information Investigation (Ruibin et al.,  2005) 
The authors argued that the major problem faced for the deployment of computer 
intelligence in digital forensics is the lack of Standard Test Dataset and Evaluation 
Criteria. Some ideas have been given to the formalization of the test and evaluation 
activities of different product. It is very urgent to establish a formal and repeatable test 
dataset and evaluation environment for the data analysis phase. The authors emphasize 
that computer intelligence is extremely computational intensive and need large volume 
of data for training and testing. 
 
2.3.11 Framework for a Digital Forensic Investigation  
Kohn et al. (2006) clearly defined a framework that can be used in a forensic 
investigation and argue that the previous proposed framework revealed that a number of 
activities overlapped one another and that the differences were mainly terminological. 
The authors recommend a clear systematic approach for the collection of evidence 
suitable for a specific application framework for single computer. They stated that their 
required forensic investigation stages were preparation, investigation and presentation 
as shown in figure 12. 
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Figure 12: Framework for a Digital Forensic Investigation (Kohn et al., 2006) 
 
2.3.12 Computer Forensic Field Triage Process Model  
Rodger et al. (2006) proposed Computer Forensic Field Triage Process Model 
(CFFTPM) as an onsite approach providing identification, analysis, and interpretation 
of digital evidence in a relatively short period without the need to take the media back to 
the lab. The model consists of six phases that is further divided into six sub-phases as 
shown in figure 13. 
 
 
 
Figure 13: Computer Forensic Field Triage Process Model (Rodger et al., 2006) 
CFFTPM started with planning phase where proper planning before conducting an 
investigation is done to ensure improving the success rate of the investigation. The next 
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phase is Triage phase, which is where the evidence are identified and ranked in terms of 
priority. Evidence with the most important and volatile need is processed first. Then the 
user usage profile phase which focus its attention to analyse user activity and profile 
with the objective of relating evidence to the suspect. Chronology Timeline phase aims 
at building the crime case from chronological perspective to sequence the probable 
crime activities. In the internet phase, the task of examining the artefacts of internet 
related services are performed. Finally, in Case Specific Evidence phase, the digital 
investigator can adjust the focus of the examination to the specifics of the case, for 
instance the focus in intellectual property would be different than that of the child 
pornography case. 
2.3.13 Common Process Model for Incident and Computer Forensics  
Freiling and Schwittany (2007) proposed a model for the purpose of introducing a new 
process framework to investigate computer security incidents, and its aim is to combine 
the two concepts of incident response and computer forensics to improve the overall 
process of investigation. The framework focuses generally on the analysis stage into 
Pre-Analysis, Analysis and Post-Analysis phases as shown in figure 14. 
 
Figure 14: Common Process Model for Incident and Computer Forensic (Freiling and Schwittany, 2007) 
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2.3.14 Digital Forensic Model based on the Malaysian Investigation Process  
Perumal (2009) proposed a model that clearly states that the investigation process will 
lead to better chances of successful prosecution, as the very most important stages such 
as live data acquisition and static data acquisition have been included in the model to 
focus on fragile evidence. 
 
 
Figure 15: Digital Forensic Model based on the Malaysian Investigation Process (Perumal, 2009) 
In this model as shown in figure 15, it started with the planning phase, and then 
followed by the identification phase. The third phase is the Reconnaissance phase, 
which deals with conducting the investigation while the devices are still running (live 
forensics). The author argued that the presence of live data acquisition that focuses on 
fragile evidence does increase the chances of positive prosecution. In order for the 
analysis of data, secure transportation of data to the investigation site and proper storage 
takes place in the Transport and Storage phase. As soon as the data is available, it is 
analyzed and examines using the relevant tools and techniques in the Analysis phase. In 
the Proof and Defence phase, the digital investigator is required to show the proof to 
support the case. Finally, in the Archive Storage phase, relevant evidence is properly 
stored.  
 
51 
 
2.3.15 Network Forensic Generic Process Model  
Pilli et al. (2010) proposed a generic model for network forensic analysis based on 
various existing digital forensic models as shown in figure 16. This was specifically for 
the network-based investigation. It covers tools, process and framework 
implementation. 
 
Figure 16: Network Forensic Generic Process Model (Pilli et al., 2010) 
 
2.3.16 Systematic Digital Forensic Investigation Model (SRDFIM)   
This model has been developed with the aim of helping forensic practitioners and 
organizations set up appropriate policies and procedures in a systematic manner. The 
proposed model as shown in figure 17 in this paper explores the different processes 
involved in the investigation of cybercrime and cyber fraud in the form of an 11-stage 
model (Agawal et al., 2011). The model focuses on investigation cases of computer 
frauds and cybercrimes. The application of the model is focused on computer frauds and 
cybercrimes, identifying various digital forensic processes but did not discuss on 
security measures on preserving the integrity of digital information. 
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Figure 17: Systematic Digital Forensic Investigation Model (Agawal et al., 2011) 
2.4. Investigative Models/Framework Analysis 
The main objective of examining digital forensic investigation is to ensure that digital 
evidence is collected in a reliable way that can reconstruct an incident or event with an 
investigative value. Digital evidence is admissible in court or to interested parties as 
long as the processes used to produce the evidence are known to produce a reliable 
result. The literature reviewed in digital forensic investigation frameworks/models are 
analysed to discover the gap in the existing models by grouping the common phases of 
the existing investigation framework/model and then identifying the gap. The analysis is 
reported in tabular form. In order to identify the common phases with their activities 
shared by all of the existing models, codes were allocated to them. They were assigned 
with codes and sorted in chronological order. Using model as (M) and combining it with 
number (1) in accordance with the year proposed. For example the computer forensics 
process proposed by Pollitt (2007) is identified as M1. Table 1 below summarises the 
digital forensic frameworks/models explained in section 2.3 
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Table 1: The Existing Digital Investigation Frameworks/Models 
Code Name of Model Originators Years 
M1 Computer forensic 
process 
M. Pollitt 1995 
M2 Generic Investigation 
process 
DFRWS 2001 
M3 Forensic Process Model NIJ 2001 
M4 Abstract model of the 
digital forensic process 
Reith, Carr, 
&Gunsh 
2002 
M5 An integrated digital 
investigation 
Carrier and 
Spafford 
2003 
M6 End-to-end digital 
investigation 
Stephenson 2003 
M7 Enhanced integrated 
digital investigation 
process 
Baryamureeba & 
Tushabe 
2004 
M8 Extended model of 
cybercrime investigation 
Ciardhuain 2004 
M9 Hierarchical, objective 
based framework 
Beebe and Clarke 2004 
M10 Case-Relevance 
information investigation 
Ruibin, Yun and 
Gaertner 
2005 
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M11  Framework for a digital 
forensic investigation 
Kohn, Eloff and 
Oliver 
2006 
M12 Computer forensic field 
triage process model 
Rodger, 
Goldman, Mislan, 
Wedge and 
Debtota 
2006 
M13 Common process Model 
for Incident and 
Computer Forensic 
Freiling and 
Schwittay 
2007 
M14 Digital Forensic Model 
Based on Malaysian 
Investigation Process 
Perumal 2009 
M15 Network Forensic 
Generic Process 
Pilli, Joshi, 
Niyogi 
2010 
M16 The Systematic Digital 
Forensic Model 
Agarwal, Gupta, 
M. Gupta, S and 
Gupta, C  
2011 
 
After identifying the investigation model, the phases with their activities are refined 
from the existing investigation model and assigned codes as shown in Table 2. This is 
done for the purpose of grouping similar tasks/activities together. 
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Table 2: The Identification of Phases 
Code Name of Phases 
P1 Acquisition 
P2 Admission 
P3 Analysis 
P4 Approach Strategy 
P5 Archive Storage 
P6 Authorization 
P7 Awareness 
P8 Case Specific 
Analysis 
P9 Chronology Timeline 
Analysis 
P10 Collection 
P11 Communication 
Shielding 
P12 Deployment 
P13 Detection 
P14 Digital Crime 
Investigation 
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P15 Dissemination of 
Information 
P16 Documentation 
P17 Dynamite 
P18 Evaluation 
P19 Examination 
P20 Hypothesis creation 
P21 Identification 
P22 Incident Closure 
P23 Incident Response 
P24 Internet  
P25 Investigation 
P26 Notification 
P27 Physical Crime 
Investigation 
P28 Planning 
P29 Post-Analysis 
P30 Pre-Analysis 
P31 Preparation 
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P32 Presentation 
P33 Preservation 
P34 Proof & Defence 
P35 Readiness 
P36 Survey & 
Recognition 
P37 Reconnaissance 
P38 Report 
P39 Result 
P40 Returning Evidence 
P41 Review 
P42 Search & Identify 
P43 Traceback  
P44 Transport & Storage 
P45 Triage 
P46 User Usage Profile 
Investigation 
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The next step is refining all the phases with their activites within each investigation 
model. They are refined from the content of the papers. Each column represents a key 
paper explored. The cell in the table indicates if the paper addresses the activity in the 
role. Using the colour indicator shown in the table key, green shows that a particular 
phase in the cell was addressed in the particular model in the column and the grey 
shows that the particular phase in the cell was not addressed to the specific model. The 
objective of this, is to ensure accurate selection of the common phases with similar 
activities that are to be grouped together. The result is displayed in table 3 below:sss 
Table 3: Models Discussed Showing Important Existing Phases 
PHA-
SES 
     
          M
MODEL 
        
M
1 
M
2 
M
3 
M
4 
M
5 
M
6 
M
7 
M
8 
M
9 
M
10 
M
11 
M
1
2 
M
1
3 
M
1
4 
M
1
5 
M
1
6 
M
1
7 
P1                  
P2                  
P3                  
P4                  
P5                  
P6                  
P7                  
P8                  
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P9                  
P10                  
P11                  
P12                  
P13                  
P14                  
P15                  
P16                  
P17                  
P18                  
P19                  
P20                  
P21                  
P22                  
P23                  
P24                  
P25                  
P26                  
P27                  
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P28                  
P29                  
P30                  
P31                  
P32                  
P33                  
P34                  
P35                  
P36                  
P37                  
P38                  
P39                  
P40                  
P41                  
P42                  
P43                  
P44                  
P45                  
P46                  
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Table Key: 
 
 
 
 Finally, phases with similar activities are grouped together using the different colour 
indicators in the table key. For the purpose of the research in this thesis, after exploring 
activities performed in each of the phases, observation was made, and it was identified 
that the phases could be grouped into four layers based on the methodology proposed by 
(Pollitt, 2007). The groupings identified in this research are namely, Preparation, 
Interaction, Reconstruction and Presentation (Ademu et al., 2011b) and as shown in 
table 4 below:  With Interaction phase proposed as a new phase. 
Table 4: The Four Layered Analysis 
Layers Available Phases 
Preparation P4, P6, P7, P11, P12, P13, P16, P23, P26, 
P28,  P35, P36 
Interaction  P8, P9, P10, P15, P16, P17, P19, P21, 
P24, P27, P30, P33, P42, P44, P46 
Reconstruction P1, P3, P5, P14, P16, P18, P20, P22, P25, 
P37,  P39,P41,  P43, P45 
Yes No 
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Presentation P2, P29, P34.  P38, P40 
 
Based on the review of academic and industrial literature the following are the visual 
representation of essential phases required for an investigation process as observed in 
this chapter. 
 
 
 
Figure 18: The layers towards building the new investigation process model (Ademu and Imafidon, 
2012f) 
2.4.1 Gap Analysis 
Examining the result from the tables analysed, it was discovered that majority of the 
analysed models were addressing different phases of the investigation process either 
from one aspect or a few aspects. Given that a number of models already exist, what is 
the motivation for presenting yet another one?. The existing models do not cover a 
Presentation  
   P2, P22, P29, P34 P38, P40, P41                     
Reconstruction  
P1, P3, P5, P14, P16, P18, P20, P22, P25, P37, P39, P43,  P44, P45 
Interaction  
 P8, P9, P10, P15, P16, P17, P19,  P21, P24, P27, P30, P33, P42, P44, P46 
Preparation 
 
P4, P6, P7, P11 P12, P13, P16, P23, P26, P28,  P35, P36 
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major issue of cybercrime or the security threats that may affect digital investigation 
and influence the integrity of digital evidence. The existing models are concerned 
mainly on the processing (collection and analysis) of digital evidence. Although this is 
considered valuable, they are not enough to fully describe the investigative process in a 
way that assist the preservation of digital information. A comprehensive model can 
provide a common reference framework for conducting different digital investigation 
and for the development of future technology, it can support the development of tools, 
techniques, training and certification/accreditation of investigation and tools 
respectively, It can also provide a unified structure for case studies and lesson materials 
to be shared among student, digital investigators and for the development of standards, 
conformance testing and investigative best practice (Ciardhuain, 2004).  
The largest gap in the existing models is that they do not identify digital attack or 
incident and security threat on the integrity of digital evidence. A few of the models 
were found focusing on the part of the process of investigation e.g. the collection and 
examination of the evidence. However, the earlier and later stages must also be 
considered and should be able to apply to any case if a comprehensive model is to be 
achieved, and in particular, as a relevant solution for digital based threats and attacks 
that are identified in digital investigation. The internal technical processes supporting 
the digital evidence processing is a dimension that need to be carefully examined 
(Selamat et al., 2008). There is need for integrating information security guidelines that 
support investigation processes. 
Information technology has spread through  businesses, the world and every operation 
in an organisation involves it to some extend. The importance of information security 
has increased in parallel with the uptake of technology, new system vulnerabilities such 
as poor security measures, inadequate virus protection and badly implemented software 
leaving organisations open to viruses, denial of service attacks, and industrial 
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espinoage. There are indeed different tools and techniques that assist digital forensic 
investigation process, but this tools may be opened to threats and vulnerabilities. There 
is concern in digital forensic investigation where digital evidence can be opened to 
threats and vulnerability that compromise the security objectives (Confidentiality, 
Availability and Integrity) of such evidence hence leading to damaged digital evidence 
(Ademu and Imafidon, 2012g). There is therefore need for security measures that can be 
integrated in investigation process. It is important to ensure the integrity of digital 
evidence is preserved. If the processes taken in gathering digital evidence followed a 
good security measures, it could be argued that the integrity of digital evidence is 
secured. With a good security mechanism, available, digital objects are secured. The 
workstations are secured including the digital information stored on it, hence any such 
digital evidence collected are secured.  
In the research presented in this thesis, based on exploring the various investigation 
models, a model was conceptualised, which is known as the Comprehensive Digital 
Forensic Investigation Model (CDFIM) as illustrated in figure 18 below. 
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Figure 19: The Conceptualised Digital Forensic Model (Ademu et al., 2011b) 
2.5 Digital Forensic Investigation and the Impact of Security Threats/Attacks and 
Vulnerabilities 
Casey (2004) defined digital evidence as any data stored or transmitted using a digital 
device that support or refute the theory of how an offence occurred or which address 
critical element of the offence such as intent and reason. Nelson et al. (2004) explains 
that digital forensics involves scientific examination and analysis of data from digital 
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device storage media so the data can be used as evidence in court. Investigating digital 
devices typically includes securely collecting digital data, examining the suspect data to 
determine details such as origin and content, presenting reliable digitally based 
information. In this thesis, for the purpose of the research, digital forensics investigation 
is define as the process of identifying, maintaining, analyzing and presenting digital 
evidence through the use of information technology to the investigation of digital 
attacks or incidents and preserving such evidence through the application of information 
security. Digital forensics investigates stored or transmitted data from systems and 
networks. Digital evidence is characterised by its fragile nature, and it can be easily 
altered or destroyed, thus rendering it inadmissible in a court of law or to interested 
parties. Digital investigators should, therefore, take care to ensure that evidence is not 
destroyed. One of the major time consuming tasks in digital investigation is the search 
for digital evidence. Different toolkits have been developed that contain tools to support 
digital investigators in the process as much as possible in an attempt to increase the 
efficiency of a digital investigation. 
The rapidly evolving age of information technology is changing our lives without our 
awareness. With the development of information communication technology and 
cybercrime, there is increase need for digital forensic investigation. The use of internet 
and software technologies has resulted in a few legal problems, and most existing 
investigation model/frameworks are inadequate to deal with them. A huge amount of 
activities are done through digital forms, and the major way a digital forensic 
investigator can prove that something happened or did not happen is through digital 
evidence. In as much as digital evidence can easily be compromised by poor handling, 
the value for digital evidence should not be undermined. 
Chaikin (2007) raised the issue of reliability as a limitation of digital evidence. The 
author explained that cyber attackers are rarely held accountable for their illegal actions, 
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and one explanation for the lack of successful prosecution of cyber attackers is damage 
on digital evidence. Digital evidence is different from evidence created, stored, 
transferred and reproduced from a non-digital format. Digital evidence is temporary 
(short-lived) in nature and can easily be altered, and this characteristic of digital 
evidence raises issues as to its reliability. Since courts have become more familiar with 
the vulnerabilities of digital evidence, they scrutinise the reliability of digital evidence 
with specific emphasis on its content and processes of gathering the digital evidence. 
The defence counsels increasingly challenge both the admissibility and the weight of 
digital evidence. There is a need for improved competencies in handling digital 
evidence.  
As the role of information technology expands, so has the importance of information 
security. The increase in the use of information technology has led to the appearance of 
new areas of vulnerability. Although more time and effort is being put into developing 
security products, the potential consequences of security failure are also growing. If an 
organisations computer network crashes, for instance certain parts of the organisation 
can effectively be paralyzed. Considering the alleged case of US v. Gary McKinnon in 
2002; Gary McKinnon was alleged by American prosecutors of illegally accessing top-
secret computer systems in what they claimed to be the biggest military computer hack 
of all times, McKinnon gained an unauthorised access into the US government network 
computer account causing damage that cost the USA some million dollars to repair. 
Having gained access to some of the government computers, he alledgely deleted data 
from them including critical operating system files, the deletion of which shut down the 
entire US Army's military district of Washington, network for 24 hours significantly 
disrupting government functions. On every system, he alledgely hacked he left 
messages but one of the messages came back to haunt him. Casey (2009) discussed that 
an offender encounters the crime scene, leaving something at the scene while also 
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taking something from the scene. People often leave their digital footprints behind from 
which their action and its reason can be inferred. 
From the above discussion, it can be concluded that digital environments can be 
illustrated as a situation in which the executor of a crime may leave traces of the attack 
on the target system while also receiving traces of the actions or activities on the system 
that was used to perform the attack. Therefore, digital evidence may be found on both 
the compromised system as well as on the attacker’s system. Forensic procedures can be 
used to acquire these traces from the targeted system and the attacker’s system in an 
attempt to find or show a relationship in evidence that may help to convict the offender. 
This evidence if not handled carefully can be compromised. One of the negative impacts 
of technical progress has been an increase in new information threat.  
2.5.1 Network Infrastructures  
Digital investigators must understand and increase their knowledge with the 
infrastructure of private and public networks as well as the threats to components of the 
Internet and Local Area Networks (LANs), in order to understand potential digital crime 
scenes. It is necessary for investigators to understand the advanced methods of attack 
used by attackers to exploit the weaknesses of the Internet and thus create damage. 
2.5.1.1. Internet 
The internet is a huge public wide area internetwork that allows any computer to 
communicate with another computer using standard technologies and protocols 
(Tomsho et al., 2007). In order to understand threats to the security of the Internet, it is 
essential that the investigator first achieve a solid knowledge of the components of the 
Internet.  
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The internet has many groups involved in its infrastructure and management, such as 
the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) and the Internet Assigned Numbers 
Authority (IANA). The Network Service Providers (NSPs) provides national and 
international interconnecting Internet services to Regional Network Providers and large 
Internet Service Providers (ISPs).  
1.  Components of the Internet 
The Internet is typically a high-speed connection of networks and it has three main 
components, as listed below: 
 Network Access Points (NAPs) 
These are the actual method by which ISPs and NSPs are connected. Wireless networks 
also require an access point. An access point acts as the base station for the wireless 
network (Ciampa, 2007 p. 171). 
 Internet Service Providers (ISPs) 
An ISP is responsible for connecting actual users to the Internet 
 Domain Name Systems (DNSs) 
This is responsible for translating Internet numbers (Internet Protocol (IP) addresses) to 
Web names. The organisation that keeps track of all the names and numbers associated 
with the DNS is IANA.  IANA functions as the main controller for the assignment of IP 
addresses, and manages the Root Domain Name System. 
2.5.1.2 Local Area Network (LAN) 
LAN is a small network, limited to a single collection of machines and one or more 
cables and other peripheral equipment (Tomsho et al., 2007). Digital investigators can 
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use networks to access different types of digital evidence. For this reason, networks are 
regarded as a critical investigation source.  
1. Components of a LAN 
The main components of a LAN are as follows: 
 Network Hardware 
A main component of a LAN is the network hardware. The hardware is discussed as 
follows: 
1. Network Interface Card (NIC) 
Computers share access to a common network medium to ensure successful 
communication. In order to access any network, computers must attach to the network 
medium by using some kind of a physical interface. The hardware that connects a 
computer to a wired network is called a network interface card (Ciampa, 2009 p. 170). 
For instance, for personal computers the interface that connects it to a wired network is 
usually a network interface card (NIC) or network adapter. The function of the NIC is to 
transport data between a client or server and the shared network media and to listen to 
frame with their MAC address.  
2. Repeaters  
A repeater accepts a signal, cleans it and regenerates it, sending it down the line 
effectively and (Tomsho et al., 2007).  Repeaters operate at the Physical layer of the 
OSI model, function only with bits, and cannot perform any filtering or translation on 
the actual data 
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3. Hubs 
Tomsho et al. (2007) defines a hub as the centre of activity.  The authors explains that 
hubs applied in network is classified as active hub, passive hub and repeating hub. Most 
of the hubs installed in networks are the active hubs also called multiport repeater 
because it has many ports and a repeating hub. A repeating hub is a type of active hub.  
Hubs assist as a connection point for network devices, which allows them to connect 
with each other physically on a LAN. A passive hub is just a central connection point 
and, is used as connection points between a long run of cable and between short runs of 
cable. 
3. Bridges 
It connects two network segments and can connect different physical media (Tomsho et 
al., 2007 p. 484). Bridges limit traffic on each segment reduces bottlenecks and connect 
network architecture. Bridges work with frames as the protocol data unit (PDU). 
Bridges operate in the Data Link layer and frames contain physical address information 
that is also defined in this layer.   
4. Switches 
Switches are multiport bridges as an intelligent device that maintains a switching table 
and keeps track of which hardware addresses are located on which network segment 
(Tomsho et al., 2007).  It is a networking device that connects network nodes as 
network segments. A switch usually has a table that contains the MAC address for each 
node.  
5. Router 
A network device is responsible for moving data between different network segments 
and examining packet headers to determine the best routes for packets to travel. A 
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router directs packets towards their destination (Ciampa, 2007 p. 172). It recognises 
paths to all the segments on the network by accessing information stored in the routing 
table.  
 Network Software 
Another component of a LAN is network software. Computers need network software 
to issue the requests and responses services o f clients and servers (Ciampa, 2009). 
There are two types of network operating system (NOS) architecture in a LAN, which 
are peer-to- peer and client/server.  Computers on the network run NOS that establishes 
what services a computer can offer. Although most operating systems can act as both 
clients and servers, competent of requesting network services (clients) and providing 
network services to clients (server). However, many operating systems have a 
workstation version and server version with the main difference being the number of 
services offered and the level of security that can be compelled on client accessing those 
services. Majority of LANs use client/server NOS because of scalability, centralised 
management and security issues. This research concentrates on client/server NOS 
because it has become a standard model for networking. 
 Network Communication Protocol 
Once a computer is connected to a network through an NIC or another interface, it must 
also be able to communicate with other computers by sharing a common set of rules 
known as network protocols (Stallings and Brown, 2008). In order to communicate 
successfully, computers must not only share a common network medium, but also have 
at least one protocol in common so that they understand each other. The protocol that all 
hosts on the network use is Transmission Control Protocol/ Internet Protocol (TCP/IP).   
(TCP/IP). TCP/IP has four layers. They are discussed as follows: 
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1. TCP/IP Link Layer  
This is responsible for sending data into the physical network and receiving data from 
the physical network. The link  layer  protocol is also known as network  layer protocols 
because it provides services called link services such as  error checking, physical 
addressing and routing information and formatting of data for physical transmission and 
rules for communicating in a network environment (Tomsho et al., 2007) . The most 
commonly known network protocols are discussed as follows: 
 Internet Protocol version 4 (IPv4) 
It is mostly called as IP, and it provides addressing and routing information. IP provides 
unreliable service for connecting computers to form a network and it does not guarantee 
packet delivery (Cole et al., 2007 p. 36). Some security concerns are faced with IP. 
According to Stallings and Brown (2008) by implementing security with IP, 
organisation can ensure secure networking.  
 Internetwork Packet Exchange (IPX)  
It is the Novell's protocol for packet routing and forwarding  
 Internet Protocol version 6 (IPv6) 
It is a new version of IP, which addresses some weaknesses of IPv4. As a solution to 
this, the Internet Architecture Board (IAB) provided authentication and encryption as 
essential security features (IPSec) in IPv6 (Stallings and Brown, 2008). These security 
features are designed for use in both the current IPv4 and the future IPv6. IPSec is used 
to ensure data integrity, authentication and encryption and can also be used to perform 
packet filtering (Cole et al., 2007 p. 37). IPSec is a security protocol that provides  
authentication and encryption across the internet. IPSec is becoming a standard for 
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encrypting virtual private network and it is available on most network platforms and 
considered highly secure (Dulaney, 2009). 
   IPV6 will be discussed later in this thesis. 
2. TCP/IP Internet Layer 
It is responsible for encapsulating transport layer data into packets, and then addressing 
and routing them. The main types of Internet layer protocols are: 
 Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) 
It is responsible for sending error and control messages between systems (Cole et al., 
2007). ICMP is used by the Ping utility to request a response from the system to verify 
its availability for communication. 
 Internet Protocol (IP) 
An internet layer protocol provides source and destination addresses, and routes packets 
between systems and networks as discussed earlier. IP is fast but unreliable protocol 
because it has no method for ensuring that data is delivered to the destination (Tomsho 
et al., 2007). 
 Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) 
It resolves and IP address to a MAC address of a system located on the physical 
network (Cole et al., 2007). 
It is very important for digital investigators to identify and understand the structure of 
an IP address in order to find a particular digital device on a private/public network. 
Internet Protocols are logical addresses (numerical identifications) that are assigned to a 
particular computer. They are divided into two parts, which are networks and hosts. The 
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network part is what is used to identify the network that the host belongs to, whereas the 
host part is used to identify the specific system on the network. 
3. TCP/IP Transport Layer 
This layer is responsible for delivery of data between systems. There are two major 
types of transport protocols, which are discussed as follows:  
 Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) 
TCP provides connection oriented communication; therefore, it provides more reliable 
delivery than only IP (Ciampa, 2009). TCP uses a three-way handshake process in 
which the system initiating a communication sends a packet to the destination indicating 
its desire to create a connection with a specific network service on the destination 
computer; if the requested service is available, an acknowledgement is received. TCP is 
also responsible for message fragmentation and reassembly, by fragmenting large 
message into segments and using sequencing numbers to ensure that received segment 
are reassembled correctly. 
 User Datagram Protocol (UDP) 
UDP is a connectionless protocol, therefore, has no three-way handshake to begin 
communication and it transmits packets (Cole et al., 2007).  It is faster and less reliable 
than the TCP. UDP also does not provide a method of breaking large amount of data 
into segment; it does not re-sequence packets that arrive out of order and it does not use 
acknowledgement to ensure that all the data arrived. 
4. TCP/IP Application Layer 
It is responsible for providing services and utilities that allow client and server 
applications to access network resources. Some application protocols are:  
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 Hypertext Transport Protocol (HTTP) 
It is used to transfer web pages for a web server to a web browser (Tomsho et al., 2007). 
 Simple Mail Transfer Protocol 
It is responsible for transporting mail across the internet (Ciampa, 2007). 
 File Transfer Protocol (FTP) 
It is responsible for providing services for file transfer, directory and file manipulation 
functions (Cole et al., 2007). 
 Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) 
It is a TCP/IP protocol used for managing and monitoring network devices (Ciampa, 
2009). 
2.5.1.3 Network-Based Mobility Management Protocol 
IP is designed to support communication in systems and networks. Also in the mobile 
networks, every device that is willing to connect to the internet should have an IP 
address that is used to identify it. This IP address is called Home Address (HA) and can 
be either IPv4 or IPv6. For the purpose of this research, IPv6 will be studied. Since a 
digital device obtains its IPv6 address from its home network, it roams with this address 
within other network known as the Foreign network (Gundavelli et al., 2013). The 
digital device can obtain a new temporary address known as Care-of-Address from the 
foreign network and the Correspondent node (CN) is still able to reach the Mobile Node 
using the HA. 
Therefore, many IEFT standards were proposed. The current protocols are either host-
based mobility management protocol or network-based localised mobility management 
protocol (NETLMM). The Proxy Mobile IPv6 (PMIPv6) protocol is a network-based 
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mobility management approach designed by the  NETLMM working group of the IETF 
that provides effective mobility to mobile nodes regardless of whether they contain a 
mobility stack A lot of companies, such as Cisco, Nokia Siemens Networks etc. 
continuously implement PMIPv6. Since Proxy Mobile IPv6 (PMIPv6) is the most 
widely accepted NETLMM protocol, it will be discussed in this research.  
PMIPv6 is faced with the problem long handover delay, as the new access network 
needs to register the connection of MN and grant it network access; this allows the 
mobile node to encounter a service disruption due to packet loss. Yokota et al. (2010) 
discussed fast handovers for proxy mobile in an attempt to reduce the impact of the 
issue of handover delay. OpenAirInterface PMIPv6 (OAI PMIPv6) an open-sourced 
under the GNU General Public Licence version 2 is an implementation of RFC 5213 
and developed by EURECOM. Loureiro (2010) discussed localized routing in an 
attempt to solve the route optimization issue in PMIPv6.  
The above literatures attempt to tackle the handover delay and route optimization, but 
there is a need for more effective method for minimizing the issue of handover delay, 
which result to loss of data packets and service disruption. This research proposes an 
attempt to implement PMIPv6 with improved buffering in order to solve the issue of 
handover latency and loss of data, this is discussed in detail in chapter 5. 
2.5.1.4 Systems and Network Security Measures 
Cole et al. (2007) explain that organisations have different best practices and control 
measures for securing systems and networks but in a situation where such control 
measures are not correctly implemented, this can pose a huge risk to an organisation's 
resources. Some types of security controls for systems and networks are discussed as 
follows: 
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1. Secure Application and Content Based Technological Measures 
These are technical security controls such as tools and techniques responsible for 
protecting the system from attacks. Some examples are discussed below:  
 Antivirus 
 This is a software security applications that scan documents and monitor computer 
activity for infections such as virus, if a virus is detected the file can be cleaned, 
quarantine or deleted (Ciampa, 2009). There is a need to update continuously for new 
viruses to be identified.  This will be discussed later because it is one of the security 
mechanism implemented in the experiment conducted in this thesis 
 Firewalls 
This is a software or hardware that prevents malicious packets in and out of computers 
and networks.  This will be discussed later.  
 Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) 
These systems utilize different techniques to attempt the detection of intrusion into a 
computer or network by observing new actions with normal ones, security logs or 
auditing data. While an IDS is used mainly to identify incidents and raise alerts, if an 
incident occurs it can also be used as an evidence gathering and logging tool. The IDS 
attempts to monitor and possibly prevent attempts to intrude into the system. 
 Network Traffic 
This tool is able to analyse the header and content of network packets and is responsible 
for capturing the full communication stream. A protocol analyzer device or computer 
that runs protocol analyzer software can view network traffic (Ciampa, 2009). Protocol 
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analyzer will be discussed later in this thesis because a protocol analyzer was deployed 
for experiment to represent a good security mechanism 
 Cryptography 
Ciampa (2007) explains that cryptography is the science of transforming information for 
the purpose of securing it while it is transmitted or stored. This is done to ensure that 
unauthorised users do not view data. Cryptography can be used to ensure the integrity of 
the data, which is to ensure that data has not been modified or changed in any way. Cole 
et al. (2007) explains that cryptography is best understood by dividing it into different 
areas. The main areas of cryptography are: 
i. Random Numbering 
This is generating random numbers using algorithms that create pseudorandom 
numbers, which are numbers that appear to be random (Cole et al., 2007).  
ii. Private Keys 
A cryptographic key is a mathematical value used to encrypt and decrypt a message. 
Private Key is also known as symmetric or single key encryption where the same key is 
used to both encrypt and decrypt the message (Ciampa, 2007). One major benefit of 
using symmetric encryption is that it is fast, but with the symmetric encryption, the key 
remain secret by all users  in order to get the best result else an attacker that discovers 
the key can read the messages sent. There is difficulty in transporting a private key to 
several users and ensuring its confidentiality. 
iii. Public Keys 
Public key is also known as asymmetric encryption, which requires the use of two keys, 
a public key and a private key to encrypt and decrypt the message respectively. The 
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public key, which encrypts the data, does not have to be kept secret, but the private key 
is kept confidential, therefore, avoiding the need to securely transport keys (Cole et al., 
2007).   
iv. Hash Functions 
These are used to provide better performance when signing large blocks of data using 
asymmetric encryption, to ensure the integrity, in authentication protocols by ensuring 
message is not altered during transmission and to create pseudorandom data (Cole et al., 
2007). A hash function takes a message of any size and computes smaller messages 
known as digest or hash. Message-Digest algorithm 5 (MD5) is an example of a hash 
function. A data always hashes to the same digest regardless of the amount of time 
computed. The only way a created digest is changed, is by changing the data itself. 
Therefore, these features ensure the integrity of the data. 
2. Secured Policies 
The network security measures are responsible for establishing a proper security policy 
to ensure that data integrity, confidentiality and availability are maintained. The security 
policy should include steps to secure the network.  
3. Secure Operational Procedures 
The secure operational procedures are responsible for establishing a proper security 
procedure to ensure that data integrity and availability are maintained. The security 
procedure should include steps to secure the network, equipment to be used and action 
to be taken in the event of incidents.  
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2.5.2 Attacks and Vulnerabilities  
As indicated by the increase in internet usage, there is a great increase in computer 
networking. However, while internal and external networks such as the internet have 
increased productivity and profitability enormously, they have also increased system 
vulnerability. The threats faced by computer networks are obviously linked to 
vulnerabilities. For example, viruses can damage the system if there is inadequate 
protection, while improving security can prevent unauthorised access.  
2.5.2.1 Taxonomy of Attacks 
This section aims to identify suspicious activities that have been performed by attackers 
in order to harm systems and disrupt services. Any computer connected to the network 
is under threat from malicious attacks, such as viruses and attacks from crackers. 
Therefore, a digital forensic investigator and a corporate security investigator needs to 
understand the nature of these attacks in order to be able to determine which types of 
suspicious activity can be expected to occur. To understand how to mitigate the threat of 
malicious software and other threats there is a need to understand their different types. 
The classification of attacks is discussed below: 
2.5.2.1.1 Desktop Attack 
 Malicious Software 
Malicious software or malware is a piece of  software that is implemented for fraudulent 
reasons with the intention of causing damage on personal or corporate computers 
(Ciampa, 2007).  
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 Virus  
A computer virus is a program that secretly attaches itself to a document or another 
program and executes when that document or program is opened (Ciampa, 2007). 
Computer virus replicates itself and attaches itself to a host file; this technique is known 
as self-propagation. The computer viruses infect executable programs.  If the virus has 
attached itself to the application, the code in the virus is run every time the application 
runs (Nelson et al., 2004). Some viruses are able to attach to data files such as 
spreadsheet and word processor files. These viruses are scripts that execute when the 
file is loaded. A script is code written in a scripting language, so it does not need to be 
complied into an executable; instead, it is run by an application that supports such 
scripts (Cole et al., 2007).  
 
A virus might be a simple message. Email viruses move from computer to computer as 
part of the body of the message. When the virus code is executed, a message with the 
virus embedded is sent to other mail clients. In addition to email, viruses can also be 
spread through instant messaging (IM). Using an IM program, such as MSM 
Messenger, AOL Instant Messenger, Yahoo Messenger etc, and users can receive the 
message immediately after they are sent. Like email viruses, IM viruses are malicious or 
annoying programs that travel through IM. For instance, IM viruses can be spread when 
a user opens an infected file that was sent in an instant message (Ciampa, 2007). 
 
In a code attack, such as a virus attack, it is possible many computers are involved. It is 
important for investigators to be always on the alert for infection of the workstation by 
malicious code. The workstation should be automatically scanned all the time during the 
investigation for any code that has past the firewalls and server based antivirus 
programs (Anderson, 2001). Scan should even continue when an infection has been 
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detected. As soon as an infection has been detected, and the malicious code located it is 
important to remove it from the systems, correct all effects and reload backup where 
necessary. 
 
 Trojan Horses   
The Trojan horse is simply a program or application disguised as a useful and important 
program while performing a covert function (Cole et al., 2007). In most instances, users 
believe they are launching a legitimate application. Trojan horses can attempt to violate 
multilevel security by communicating important information to a process to allow an 
intruder gain access to information on the system. In contrast to viruses, Trojan horses 
are more difficult to distribute. A Trojan horse can operate with all the privileges of the 
user, so it is easy for the Trojan horse to obtain copies of information that the user 
processes. Trojan horses can give malicious users access to the system, allowing 
confidential or personal information to be compromised (Nelson et al., 2004).  
 
An important source of Trojan horse programs is the frustrated programmer who has 
signed on with an organisation; such a programmer can implant in the code a Trojan 
horse that performs some malicious function. The routine to carry out the hidden 
function would be concealed in the legitimate code and might not be easily discovered. 
Trojan horses are very powerful threats to the security of a computer, network, and 
organization. They go around most security controls put in place to stop attacks. Trojan 
horses are not stopped by firewalls, intrusion detection systems (IDS), or access control 
lists (ACLs) because a user installs them just as they would any other application (Cole 
et al., 2007).   A Trojan horse will be detected by antivirus software, if it is up to date 
(Anderson, 2001). 
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 Logic Bomb 
Logic bomb is a type of Trojan horse that waits until some event occurs. It performs 
destructive acts based upon a trigger event. The most common trigger is a date, 
therefore, in most cases it is known as a time bomb (Cole et al., 2007). Logic bomb is a 
program that performs an action that violates the organisations security policy when 
some external event occurs (Reichenbach, 2007). A logic bomb is a malicious code, 
which executes and attacks the infected computers when a particular set of condition is 
met. Programmers who formerly worked for the victim create most logic bombs or 
Trojan horses.  
 
 Back Doors 
Back doors in software permit entry without detection. System designers use them for 
ease of entry, and people in a position of trust to permit these people to bypass the 
system’s protective mechanisms insert the back doors in the system. Back doors are 
often rationalised as necessary to permit access when the system has gone into an 
undesirable error state, and all other means of access are blocked. Perhaps Back doors 
are necessary as a development tool, but when they are left in operational systems, it is 
relatively easy for penetrators to find and use them for an unsanctioned entry (Nelson et 
al., 2004). 
 
 Worms  
Worms are similar to viruses, but they have two differences. First a virus must attach 
itself to a computer document, such as an email message and is spread by travelling 
along with the document, a worm does not attach to a document to spread, but can 
spread on its own. Secondly, the virus needs the user to perform an action such as 
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starting a program or reading an email message to start the infection (Stephenson, 
2000). If, for instance, a computer is infected with a worm, it may automatically send 
infected mail attachment to all of the addresses in the address book. A worm does not 
always require action by the computer user to begin its execution. Worms often 
replicate themselves until all available resources such as a hard disk drive, computer 
memory or the Internet network connection are infected. 
 
 Key Loggers 
User monitoring software existed in different forms prior to the personal computing age, 
in the 1970's programs designed to capture logon ID and password information on 
Mainframe dumb terminals were available. Some key loggers are marketed as legitimate 
tools for tracking employees or family members, For instance parents or employers 
monitoring their charges for appropriate internet use, but despite the putative legitimacy 
of some keystroke loggers, this form of spyware continues to be highly prevalent and 
threatening form of spyware, For instance the case of identity theft or outright spying 
(Stafford and Urbaczewski, 2004).   
Key loggers are also used by hackers to capture passwords and infiltrate target 
networks. Often they are installed as part of Trojan Horse attacks. Keystroke loggers 
can also take the form of mechanical devices attached to the computer keyboard. Key 
loggers are used for recording data that a user may enter. They are invisible to the user 
and it is installed as an extension between the keyboard and the port (Pietro and Verde, 
2010).  
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2.5.2.1.2 Network Attack 
There are some attacks or threats that are conducted against networks: 
 
1. Denial of Service (DoS) 
Denial of Service (DoS) attack attempts to consume network resources so that the 
network or its devices cannot respond to genuine requests (Ciampa, 2009). DoS is an 
attempt to shut down an organisation's network by flooding it with automatically 
generated network traffic, the services that support the network eventually become 
overloaded and legitimate users are unable to use the services. In the worst case, 
network services may crash under the strain of such attack. There are many types of 
DoS, which are discussed as follows: 
i. Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) 
One major type of DoS is the distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack, which is 
using normal computers that have been hijacked by attackers to carry out malicious 
network attacks. For instance an attacker breaks into a large computer called handler 
with huge disk space and fast internet connection, special software is loaded onto the 
handler computer to scan thousands of computers, looking for computer with vulnerable 
software in its operating system, immediately a vulnerable computer is found, the 
handler installs software on the computer turning it into a zombie, and then the handler 
looks for another computer to infect. The handler can also link all the zombie computers 
together to form a botnet and instructs it to flood a specific server with a request.   A 
DoS may use hundreds or thousands of zombie computers in a botnet to flood a device 
with request making it practically impossible to identify and block the source of the 
attack.  (Champlain, 2003). 
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ii. Teardrop attack 
Teardrop is a program that sends IP fragments to machine connected to the internet or a 
network. Teardrop exploits an overlapping IP fragment bug present in machines. The 
bug causes the TCP/IP fragmentation re-assembly code to improperly handle 
overlapping IP fragments (Stallings and Brown, 2008). The main problem with teardrop 
attack is a loss of data.  Configuring the ports on which the defence is enabled is a good 
option but because the CPU only examines a sample of the fragmented IP traffic on a 
port, there is no guarantee that the switch will prevent all occurrences of this attack, the 
switch will continue to forward fragmented traffic until an invalid fragment is detected 
(Cole et al., 2007).  
iii. TCP SYN/ACK Attack 
According to Ciampa (2009) in a normal network situation using TCP/IP, a system 
contacts a network server with a request, and this request uses a control message to 
initialize the connection called an SYN the server responds with its own SYN along 
with an acknowledgement (ACK) that it received the initial request, the server then 
waits for a reply ACK from the system that it received the server's SYN, in order to 
allow for a slow connection, the server might wait for sometimes for the reply and once 
the system replies, the data transfer begins.   An attacker can send a number of 
connection requests very rapidly and then fail to respond to the replies. This leaves the 
first packet in the buffer so that other legitimate connection requests cannot be 
accommodated. The packet in the buffer is dropped after a short period without a reply. 
The effect of many such bogus connection requests is to make it difficult for legitimate 
requests for a session to be established. 
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iv. TCP/IP Hijacking 
TCP/IP hijacking involves attacker gaining access to a system in the network and 
logically disconnecting it from the network, the attacker then includes another system 
with the same IP address giving the attacker access to the session and to all the 
information on the original system (Dulaney, 2009). TCP/IP hijacking takes advantage 
of a weakness in the TCP/IP protocol. In TCP/IP hijacking attack, the attacker creates 
spoofed TCP packets to take advantages of the weaknesses. TCP/IP hijacking is 
successful because some protocols, such as File Transfer Protocol (FTP) and Telnet, do 
not check the source IP addresses of the system from which they receive packets, 
therefore, when a system using these protocols receives a spoofed packet from an 
attacker; it is assumed that it has been received from a valid system (Ciampa, 2009).   
v. UDP Attacks 
A UDP attack is conducted on a maintenance protocol or a UDP service in order to 
overload services and initiate a DoS situation. UDP packets are not connection oriented 
and do not require synchronization process and are susceptible to interception. UPD like 
TCP does not check the validity of IP addresses. The most common UDP attacks 
involve UDP flooding in which services, networks and servers are overloaded (Stalling 
and Brown, 2008). For instance, large streams of UDP packets are focused at a target 
system, causing the UDP services on that system to shut down or UDP floods also 
overload the network bandwidth causing a DoS situation to occur. 
vi. Smurf Attack 
Smurf attacks can create damage in the network. A smurf attack uses IP spoofing and 
broadcasting to send a ping to a group of systems in the network (Dulaney, 2008). The 
effect of smurf attacks is utilizing IP broadcast addresses in order to create DoS. ICMP 
echo request packets can be directed to IP broadcast addresses in order to generate DoS 
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attack. The ping command is a common network utility used to test connectivity to the 
specified destination, it sends TCP/IP ICMP echo request packets to the destination and 
measures the time taken for the echo response packet to return (Stallings and Brown, 
2008). In a smurf attack, a TCP/IP ping request is sent to all computers on the network, 
which shows that the server is requesting for a response. Therefore, each computer's 
response to the server, overwhelming it and causing the server to crash or be 
unavailable. Smurf attacks can be prevented by proper configuration of operating 
systems and routers (Ciampa, 2009). 
vii. Buffer Overflow 
According to Stallings and Brown (2008) a buffer overflow also known as a buffer 
overrun is a condition at the interface in which more input can be placed into a buffer or 
data holding area than the capacity allocated, overwriting other information.  Attackers 
exploit such a condition to crash the system or to insert specifically crafted code that 
allows them to gain control of the system. The program writes more data into the buffer 
than can be contained in the space that has been allocated in the memory. An attacker 
can overwrite the data, which controls the program execution path, and hijack control of 
the program in order to execute the malicious code instead of the process code.  
2. Common Attacks 
Majority of attacks are intended to utilize potential weaknesses, which can be either in 
the implementation of programs or the protocols used in networks. Many types of 
attacks require a high level of complexity, but there is a need for digital investigators to 
know about them so that in occurrence investigators can identify what has happened in 
the network.  Some common attacks are discussed:  
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i. Social Engineering  
The simplest way to attack a system requires no technical ability and is highly 
successful.  Social engineering relies on tricking and deceiving someone to access a 
system (Ciampa, 2009). Social engineering is not limited to telephone calls, for instance 
digging through trash to find computer manuals, printouts, or password lists that have 
been thrown away are other ways. 
ii. Data Loss  
Attackers can attempt to break into a system to steal data; other times data can be 
simply lost and attacker can try to locate the lost data. According to Cole et al. (2008), 
Forensics is not limited to analysing evidence from a murder scene; it can also be 
applied to technology. As computers and networks are the foundation for 
communicating and recording information, a new area known as digital forensics can 
attempt to retrieve information, which can be used in the pursuit of an attacker. Digital 
forensics is also used to limit damage and loss of control of data.   
iii. Spoofing  
According to Dulaney (2008) spoofing attack is an attempt by someone or something to 
masquerade as someone else. Spoofing occurs when an attacker uses the identity of an 
organisation's resources such as network computer, in order to gain unauthorised access. 
Spoofing is impersonation that is pretending to be someone or something else by 
presenting false information. For instance, since most network systems keep logs of 
user activity, attackers may spoof their address so that their malicious actions would be 
attributed to a valid user, fake login screen asking for username and password is 
displayed, allowing the attacker to capture valid user credentials.  
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iv. Man-in-the-Middle 
Man-in-the-middle attacks tend to be quite complex. The method used in these attacks 
secretly places a piece of software between a server and the user and the software 
intercepts data and then sends the information to the server as is nothing is wrong and 
the server response back to the software, thinking it is communicating with a legitimate 
client (Cole et al., 2008).  
 
2.5.2.2 Network Vulnerabilities 
There are weaknesses that can be found in networks that make them targets for attacks. 
Network vulnerabilities can be found in both network communication media and 
network devices themselves. Monitoring network traffic is an important task for a 
digital investigator. It helps to identify network attacks, for instance a network interface 
card (NIC) adapter that is faulty and is sending out distorted packets. Monitoring traffic 
can be done using a protocol analyzer, which helps to capture each packet to decode and 
analyze its content (Ciampa, 2009).  Weaknesses in network devices can also be targets 
for attackers. One major network device vulnerability is weak passwords, which is 
unable to protect and prevent unauthorized users from accessing the device and altering 
data (Anderson, 2001). Although passwords are often the major method of security for a 
network device, passwords actually provide weak security. For a password to remain 
secure and prevent an attacker from discovering it, it should never be written down, and 
password must be of sufficient length and complex to avoid an attacker guessing it. A 
basic security measure is to require users accessing the internal computer network to 
have passwords of adequate strengths. Security can be improved by adding further 
levels of protection, such as biometric scans e.g. fingerprint and retinal scans for 
sensitive data (Champlain, 2003). 
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Network device vulnerability is a default account, which is a user account on a device 
that is created automatically by the device instead of by the administration. Default 
accounts are used to make the initial setup and installation of the device easier, without 
the need to create temporary individual accounts; they generally have full administrator 
privileges so as not to slow down the installation process. Although default accounts are 
intended to be deleted after the installation is completed, most of the time they are not 
(Ciampa, 2009). Default accounts are often the first targets that attackers seek. Default 
accounts usually have simple default passwords that are widely known, this makes it 
simple for an attacker to access the system and data. It is important default accounts be 
entirely disabled after the installation is completed. 
In a normal situation, a network administrator would set up an account for a user on a 
network device and assign specific privileges to that account. A backdoor is an account 
that is secretly set up without the administrator's knowledge or permission that cannot 
be easily detected, and that allows for remote access to the devices (Tomsho et al., 
2007). Back door created on the network device can be network vulnerability. For 
instance, an attacker using virus, worms or Trojan horse, that inserts a backdoor 
account, can infect the network device. Also, backdoor accounts are created to allow 
support personnel to connect remotely to a device for troubleshooting, or when creating 
a software program, developers sometimes leave a back door in the program that allows 
them to become the root user should they need to fix something during debugging 
phase, after debugging is done, and before the software goes live, these abilities are 
removed but in a situation where a developer forgets to remove the back door in the live 
version, it leaves the ability for an attacker to take advantage of the system.  
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2.5.3 Adverse Events and Security Incidents    
An event in computer system terms is any discrete incident that can be observed 
(Champlain, 2003). For instance a user logging on, the file being created, an email 
being sent or changes being made to a database. An adverse event is simply an event 
that compromises information security such as an unauthorised user logging in with 
someone else password for instance, in the alleged case of US v. McKinnon (2002) 
alternatively, file being deleted accidentally. A computer security incident is an adverse 
event in which one of the main security objectives, which are availability, 
confidentiality and integrity, are being compromised (Anderson, 2001). The definition 
of a security incident includes event such as denial of service attacks, inappropriate 
usage, malicious software, etc. Security incident can be limited by adopting good 
security mechanism and guidelines. The need for organisations to employ a range of 
security mechanisms and procedures to protect their information cannot be ignored. In 
addition, it is important for digital forensic investigators, security investigators and 
other professionals to employ different security mechanism and procedures to protect 
digital evidence. If this is ignored, digital evidence can be vulnerable to be 
compromised and damaged. If digital evidence is compromised, the confidentiality, 
integrity and availability of the evidence are jeopardized.   
 In the alleged case of US v. Gary McKinnon (2002) this is a typical example of 
distributed denial of service attack (DDoS), alleged Gary intentionally and wilfully 
caused unavailability of the resource through the internet, accessing the installed 
RemotelyAnywhere software and using the stolen passwords, thereby causing damage 
without authorization to the organisation's computers.  
According to Casey (2002) most intrusion cases are full of external events that may be 
used to gain further insight in a case. For instance, a system can be set up to log external 
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IP addresses that attempt to connect to the system or there is an Intrusion Detection 
System (IDS) located somewhere on the victim’s network, and in some situations the 
system may contain a list of contacts or email addresses for users that have an account 
on the system. Any of these factors may allow digital forensic investigators to make 
connections between the system in question and external factors that may be of interest 
in the investigation. In intrusion cases, factors to consider could be: 
 Shell History Log: This log recodes a number of commands issued in a shell 
environment. This can be very useful because it allows a digital investigator to 
track through exactly what commands the intruder issued to the compromised 
system. 
 IP Address: One major type of information obtained in an intrusion analysis 
investigation is a log of IP transactions. For instance, the victim’s system may 
keep a log of all systems that it interacts with. In this situation, any computer 
that uploads to or downloads from the victim’s system may be logged.  In a 
situation where the IP is gained, it is possible for the digital investigator to 
employ commands to find the registered authority for the IP address in question.  
 Classification: This is identifying unknown data. Common examples would be 
deleted files or mass quantities of regular files. Mass quantities of files may be 
classified quickly using a combination of the commands such as find and file. 
The find and file command will send the file name of all files in a given file 
structure to the file command, which will try to resolve the file type. 
 Location: In a relational sense, the physical location in which a network 
intrusion occurs is quickly becoming a non-factor but this is not to say that the 
physical location of a piece of evidence is of no importance. The increase or 
explosion of the internet and TCP/IP as a standard has made it unnecessary for 
an offender to be physically located in the same area as the victim’s system. 
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According to Casey (2002) the location of the victim’s system may be a factor in 
establishing a motive for an attack. If the victim’s system is located in a large 
entity such as a military base, political entity, educational, or corporate 
organisation, there is much risk of attack because the information stored in such 
a system could be of greater value to the attacker. For instance if a corporate 
network is compromised, the attacker may very well be able to extract money 
from the victim.  
 
 
Figure 20: Possible sources of digital evidence for establishing crime 
The alleged case of US v. Gary McKinnon presents the idea of a typical DDOS  security 
attack and vulnerability that can be faced in an organisation. It can be recommended 
that businesses and organisation must follow a good security measures at all times in 
order to secure digital information. 
2.5.4. The Network Security Approach 
Schumacher and Gosh (1998) proposed a network security rating model which its 
objective is to set a rating for the network security across different areas. In this thesis, 
the network security rating approach is adopted to develop the security model that will 
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be incorporated i the new model. The initial step was to identify the characteristics of 
any secure network regardless of the area and independent of any specific threat. Some 
views adopted from  the authors are, physical, communication, operational, personnel, 
application and performance. In this thesis, for the purpose of the research, the views 
where categorised into 4 steps  such as Secure Application and Content based 
Technology, Secure Policies, Secure Operational Procedures and Performance (Ademu 
and Imafidon, 2012f). Each step was identified with threats and assigned codes and 
security measures as indicated in  Table 5. 
Table 5:  Security requirement of the proposed model (Ademu and Imafidon, 2012f) 
Code Attacks/Threats Code Security Measures 
S1 
 
 
 
Virus S1a Anti Virus 
Gaining access to 
information 
S1b Firewall 
Denial of service S1c Protocol Analyzer 
Impersonation S1d Authentication and 
Password 
Altered integrity S1e Cryptography 
S2 Impersonating S2a Password 
Management 
Loss of data S2b Administrative 
policies 
Denial of service S2c Internet 
connectivity 
S3 Gaining access to 
information 
S3a Management tool 
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Loss of data S3b Operational 
procedure 
Denial of service S3c Incident response 
process Loss of data 
S4 Loss of data packet S4a Performance 
monitor 
 
The conceptualised digital forensic investigation model in chapter 2 presented 4 phases. 
There is no doubt that in digital forensic investigation, in order to acheive a successful 
prosecution, the integrity of digital evidence must be preserved. Therefore, secondly, 
attributes of an admissive digital evidence was defined such as integrity, availability, 
accountability and confidentiality. The relationship between the attributes and the 
identified steps determines a good secuirty level of digital evidence. Therefore each 
attributes is protected in each steps in order to provide a goood security level to digital 
evidence. 
According to Dulaney (2009) security topology of a network identify the network 
design and implementation from a security view. Security topology have four main 
areas of concern: 
 Security Design Goals 
The goal of setting any security design is concern with issues of confidentiality, 
integrity, availability, and accountability (Dulaney, 2009). This research in the 
thesis  suggest that addressing these four concerns as a part of digital 
investigation will assist in ensuring a good level of secuirty. According to Cole 
et al. (2007, p. 97) confidentiality, integrity and availability is referred to as the 
CIA of network security. In this thesis, the accountability component is also 
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identified as a very important secuity design goal which must identify who is 
responsible for identifying the digital information and collecing digital evidence 
in a way that preserves the integrity of such evidence. It is important when 
dealing with digital investigation to be clear about who is responsible for 
making sure that data information is accurate in order to ensure its 
admissibility. There is also the need to fulfil the goal of confidentiality which is 
to prevent or minimize unauthorized access to and disclosure of data and 
information (Cole et al., 2007) . Digital forensic investigators must ensure that 
digital evidence is secured and ensures that such evidence do not fall into the 
wrong hands. Integrity  involves making sure that the data or digital information 
identified, collected and examined for digital investigation is accurate and the 
integrity of the digital evidence preserved. Futhermore, data information must 
fulfil the goal of availability. Digital investigation must be able to to protect 
data and prevent its loss. Data that can't be accessed is of no investigative value. 
 Secure Security Zones 
Establishing secuirty zones ensures isolating systems and network from 
unauthorsied users. The internet can be used by anybody with access to an 
internet portal or an ISP (Dulaney, 2009). Hence, digial forensic investigator 
must always safeguard the digital data with the extreme safety measure and 
guidelines.  Any organization can create a secure digital environment, by 
implementing security zones such as intranet (private network implemented and 
maintained by an organization), extranet ( an extended intranet to include 
outside connections to partner), and demilitarized zones (area where public 
server can be placed for access by people not trusted).  
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 State-of-the-art Technologies 
One of the main concern with technology is the continous change. The good 
thing about this, is that these new technologies have become available to assist a 
less vulnerable system. Vitualization technology which allows any single 
physical device  hide its characteristics from users can improve security in the 
network. For instance multiple systems can be run one one device and make 
them appear as if they standalone. Virtualization can present security threats 
though, if an attacker override the physical layer protection (Dulaney, 2009). 
Another technology is a virtual local area network (VLAN) that allows creating 
groups of users and systems and segment them on the network, segmenting assit 
in hiding segments of the network from other divisions and thereby control 
access, this also improves security. Network address translation (NAT) server 
provides IP addresses to the hosts or systems in the network and tracks inbound 
and outbound traffic (Ciampa, 2009). NAT hides the IP addresses of network 
devices from attackers, this can improve security of the systems and network. 
Tunneling is a technology that creates a virtual connection between two systems 
or networks (Cole et al., 2007). Tunneling can be created between the two ends 
of a systems or network by encapsulating the data with a common  protocol for 
transmission. Tunneling protocols usually include data security as well as 
encryption, this can assis in improving security in the systems and network. 
2.6 Digital Forensic Analysis and Acquisition/Imaging Tools 
Previously during digital forensic investigation, most digital evidence examinations 
were performed at the file system level neglecting data from the network and digital 
investigators widely used the evidential copy during analysis. The main risk of this 
method was that operating the evidential copy could alter the evidence in a way that is 
untraceable.  
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2.6.1 Analysis Tools 
According to Palmer (2001) analysis tool refers to the actual media examination. The 
identification consists of locating items present in the device in question and then 
further reducing this set of items that are needed. These items are then subjected to the 
appropriate analysis. The type of analysis carried out can be file system analysis, file 
content examination, log analysis, statistical analysis, etc. The examiner then interprets 
the results of this analysis based on the examiners’ training, expertise, experimentation 
and experience. As more people became aware of the value of digital evidence, the need 
for more advanced tools increased. In order to address this need, integrated tools such as 
Encase and FTK were created to make the digital investigator’s work easier. These tools 
allow more efficient examination, by automating routine tasks and displaying data in a 
graphical user interface to help the user locate important information (Ademu and 
Imafidon, 2012c). Recently Linux has been used as a digital evidence examination 
platform and tools such as The Sleuth Kit and SMART have been developed providing 
a user-friendly interface.  
More advanced tools are available for recovering data from hard drives, but one major 
concern is that these tools are expensive for most purposes. Regrettably, many people 
are still unaware of the need for these tools. Another issue is the training and 
certification in forensic science. According to Moore (2006) a vital problem of digital 
forensics is economics. This is the training of investigators. This places a financial 
weight on the agencies that carry out investigations. These agencies can only employ a 
limited number of investigators, therefore, leading to backlogs in digital forensics. In an 
attempt to solve these problems, some form of automated processing is introduced to 
lessen the problem faced by digital investigators. There are many digital evidence 
analysis tools that are commercially available, these are discussed:  
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1. Forensic Toolkit (FTK) 
 Forensic Toolkit is an easy to use computer forensic application. It is identified as the 
standard in computer forensic software. It is a court-validated digital investigation 
platform that delivers computer forensic analysis, decryption and password cracking 
software all within a spontaneous and customizable interface (Ademu and Imafidon, 
2012c). FTK is a commercial forensic software product that supports both 32-bit and 
64-bit Windows machines. FTK Toolkit is easy to use and understand; it has multiple 
data views that allow users to analyse files in a number of ways and create detailed 
report and output them into native format. According to Jones et al. (2005) recent 
versions of the FTK include acquisition functionality; a forensic information can be 
acquired using FTK imager with the same hardware devices. FTK has unique features 
that index text to produce instant search results, data recovery from a file system, email 
recovery from the leading email services and products along with the recovery of 
deleted messages and file filtering.  
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Figure 21: FTK User Interface 
FTK supports Password cracking tools as follows: 
 Password Recovery Toolkit (PRTK) 
The Password Recovery Toolkit (PRTK) is an AccessData application, which is a 
Graphical User Interface application for Windows. This application helps to find and 
identify encrypted files on handheld, desktop and server computer systems. It can 
interpret the passwords or hashes of the password in applications such as Office 2000, 
WinZip, etc. Recently an advance in the encryption functions in Microsoft Office XP, 
Internet Explorer and Netscape Navigator have posed concerns. A new feature is added 
to PRTK known as the Distributed Network Attack (DNA) application (Aggarwal et al., 
2008).  
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 Distributed Network Attack (DNA) 
DNA is a password recovery tool with a twist. It uses multiple computers rather than a 
stand-alone system to recover a password encrypted file. DNA uses the concept of a 
network to allocate jobs to client machines to work on. DNA uses the power of multiple 
processors to make an exhaustive key space recovery. The larger the network, the 
greater the number of machines and password attempts per second that can be tried. 
With the help of DNA, investigators can crack the passwords of numbers of networked 
workstations, reducing the time needed to crack the most difficult passwords.  
2. EnCase  
EnCase is a commercial forensic investigation toolkit that is largely used within the law 
enforcement agencies (Nelson et al., 2004). According to Jones et al. (2005) EnCase is 
able to acquire data in a forensically sound way in which such data can be reviewed by 
other popular commercial forensic analysis tools. The software can manage a large 
volume of digital evidence, and transfer evidence files directly to law enforcement or 
legal representatives as necessary. It enables attorneys to review an evidence easily and 
also enables a quick report preparation to be made. The EnCase program has initiated 
Graphical User Interface tools for digital investigations.  
A recent feature of DOS is a disk acquisition and preview tool called En.exe, which has 
been added toEnCase. The GUI EnCase and the DOS En.exe programs create images of 
a suspect’s disk drive. EnCase can also acquire a suspect’s disk drive on the network. 
Encase version 2.0 supports some Microsoft file system types such as FAT12, FAT16, 
FAT32, New Technology File System (NTFS), Universal Disk Format (UDF), etc. 
According to Casey (2002) EnCase provides an incredible amount of features and 
functionality but no one tool can do it all in forensic investigation. An important feature 
of the EnCase process is the integrated authentication and verification of evidence files. 
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Throughout the examination process, EnCase verifies the integrity of the evidence by 
recalculating the cyclical redundancy check (CRC) and the MD5 hash values and 
comparing them with the values recorded at the time of acquisition. This verification 
process is documented within the EnCase generated report. It is important to know that 
it is impossible for EnCase to write to the evidence file once it is created. Just like in 
other files, it is possible to alter EnCase evidence file with a disk-editing utility, 
although, if one bit of data on the collected evidentiary bit-stream image is altered after 
acquisition, EnCase will report a verification error in the report and identify the location 
of the registered error. 
3. The Coroner’s Toolkit (TCT) 
The Coroner’s Toolkit (TCT) is designed by Dan Farmer and Wietse Venema. TCT 
aims primarily at investigating a hacked Unix host. It offers tools with useful 
investigative capabilities that are available nowhere else (Kruse and Heiser, 2001). TCT 
is designed to help in reconstruction of events on a compromised network host. The 
most interesting feature of TCT is its ability to analyse activities on a live host and 
capture the current state of information that would be impractical to capture manually. 
TCT comprises a set of tools used to recover deleted Unix files. It contains a tool that 
attempts to reconstruct rational or logical data from a stream of bits, and it includes a 
tool for the Unix environment to create such a stream of bits from a file system. The 
Unix utility is a Unix tool that creates a single object containing everything that is 
within all the unallocated space on a file system, which can be a huge amount of data. 
4. Sleuth Kit 
The Sleuth Kit is an open-source forensic toolkit, which is a suite of file system forensic 
tools designed by Brian Carrier to perform forensic analysis or investigation in the Unix 
environment. The first version of Sleuth Kit was called the @stake Sleuth Kit (TASK), 
105 
 
which was based on The Coroner’s Toolkit (TCT) and was distributed with similar 
command line tools (Kruse and Heiser, 2001). Although Sleuth Kit can be run from the 
command line, many practitioners find it easier to usegraphical user interface.  TCT is a 
very powerful forensic analysis toolkit but its major challenge is the lack of portability 
between systems and lack of supports for non Unix-like file systems. Carrier developed 
the Sleuth Kit to provide a highly portable extensible and useful open source forensic 
toolkit. Since Sleuth Kit is open-sourced, support for any file system can be added. File 
system support may be added by users of the toolkit as required. 
Table 6: Forensic tools, cost and their customisation ability 
ToolKit Scripting Product cost 
EnCase Yes £2450 
Forensic ToolKit No £2700 
Sleuth Kit Yes Free 
 
The Sleuth Kit locally supports processing raw disk images, but it can also import the 
ability to process additional image formats from the LibEWF (Expert Witness Format) 
and AFFLib (Advanced Forensic Format) packages.  
Commercial tools such as Carnivore, NetIntercept, NFR Security, NetWitness and 
SilentRunner have been developed with integrated search, visualisation and analysis 
features to help digital investigators collect information from network traffic. But this 
approach does not provide access to deleted data and may not be possible if the device 
is password protected. Tools such as ZERT, TULP and Cards4Labs have been 
developed to access password protected and deleted data. There has been a progression 
in the development of tools for collecting evidence on embedded computer systems. 
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They are frequently used by digital investigators to read information from pagers, 
mobile phones and personal digital assistants directly from the devices. 
5. Oxygen Forensic Suite 
Oxygen Forensic Suite is a mobile forensic software package for analysis of cell 
phones, smartphones and tablets. Oxygen Forensic Software supports Symbian OS, 
Nokia S60, Sony Ericsson UIQ, Windows Mobile 5/6, Blackberry, Android and Apple 
Smartphones, etc. Oxygen Software invented an advanced agent approach that allows 
Oxygen Forensic Suite to extract much more information from smartphones than other 
logical tools. 
6. Micro Systemation XRY Software 
XRY Software is a digital forensic tool designed by Micro Systemation used to analyse 
and recover information from mobile devices such as mobile phones, smartphones, GPS 
navigation tools and tablet computers. XRY software is developed to recover the 
contents of the device in a forensic manner acceptable by many users. The XRY is a 
complete digital forensic system for mobile devices that can be used on any Windows 
operating system. 
2.6.2 Acquisition/Imaging Tools 
The digital forensic field has created different opportunities for commercial enterprises 
and open-source alternatives. According to Farrell (2009) tools that perform specific 
functions are constantly being developed and distributed in the academic and open-
source communities and these new functions are ultimately integrated into larger 
analysis suites. These suites are usually large graphical user interface-based programs 
that allow an analyst to explore and search for relevant data.  
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In digital forensics, experts or investigators are relied upon to interpret data and 
information retrieved by tools and provide findings by tools that can be trusted. 
According to Altheide and Carvey (2011) the process of digital forensics can break into 
acquisition, analysis and presentation. Acquisition refers to the imaging of digital 
devices to be examined, and these can be physical hard drives, optical media, storage 
cards from digital cameras, mobile phones, chips from embedded devices or single 
document files and network. The acquisition process should consist of creating a 
duplicate of the original data as well as maintaining good records of events carried out. 
The goal of digital evidence duplication is to image the original digital evidence that 
protects and preserves the evidence from destruction, damage, or alteration prior to 
analysis by the digital forensic practitioner.  
Duplication is an accurate digital reproduction that maintains all contents and attributes. 
When duplicating or copying evidence, It is important to ensure that the examiner’s 
storage device is forensically sterile. Write protection should be initiated to preserve and 
protect original evidence. The MD5 or SHA-1 hashing algorithm should be used prior 
to duplication or copying. The write protection can be performed via either hardware or 
software. The Hosted Protect Area (HPA) is defined as a reserved area for data storage 
outside the normal operating file system (Nelson et al., 2004). The Protected Area of 
Run-Time Interface Extension Services (PARTIE.S) is hidden from the operating 
system and file system, and that is normally used for specialised applications.  It is 
important to image the digital evidence to the examiner’s storage device using the 
appropriate software and hardware tools.  
1. FTK Imager 
Graphical User Interface (GUI) tools give an option for the investigator who wants to 
safely preview digital evidence prior to initiating the forensic process. An investigator 
108 
 
can have a quick scan of digital media using read-only tools without altering any data in 
the media. A few software developers have recently introduced digital investigation 
tools that work in Windows. Graphical User Interface forensic tools such as FTK 
Imager do not require a strong understanding of MS-DOS and the various file systems. 
They can simplify digital forensic investigations (Nelson et al., 2004). Some of the 
imaging tools are discussed as follows: 
2. SafeBack  
In the 1990s, tools such as SafeBack were created to allow digital investigators to 
collect all data on a computer disk without altering important data. SafeBack is used for 
bitstream backup. A bitstream backup is different from the regular copy operation. 
During the regular copying activities, files are simply copied from one medium such as 
a hard drive to another, e.g. a tape drive. When performing a bitstream backup of a hard 
drive, bit-by-bit copying of the hard drive is obtained and not just the files. Every bit 
that is on the hard drive is transferred to the backup medium (Carrier and Spafford, 
2006).  
3. GetTime 
GetTime is used to document the time and date settings of a victim’s computer system 
by reading the system date and time from the Complementary Metal Oxide 
Semiconductor (CMOS). Digital forensic examiners should compare the data/time from 
the CMOS to the current time before processing the evidence (Casey, 2004). 
4. GetSlack 
GetSlack is used to capture the data contained in the file slack of the hard drive. In the 
process of filling up clusters on the hard drive with files, the segment of a cluster that 
the file does not completely fill up is called slack space. Slack space is used by the 
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operating system for different things, but the ordinary computer user cannot view it. 
Special tools are required to view slack space. It is important to know that valuable 
information pertaining to an investigation can be found in the slack space (Casey, 
2004). 
5. Deleted Data (DD) 
According to Jones et al. (2005) the most basic non-commercial forensic duplication 
tools are deleted data (DD). One reason examiners use forensic imaging is for 
completeness. In forensic examination, the idea of just examining an active file system 
as presented by the operating system is not sufficient enough. Most volumes contain 
potentially required evidence outside the viewable, allocated files on a mounted file 
system. Deleted files are files that have been unlinked, in which the file name entry is 
no longer present when a user views a directory and the file name, metadata structure, 
and data units are marked as free. However, the connections between these layers are 
still undamaged when forensic techniques are applied to the file system. Therefore 
recovering the files consists of recording the relevant file name and metadata structures 
and then extracting the data units. 
Bugs have been found in different digital evidence processing tools, potentially causing 
evidence to be missed or misinterpreted. To avoid such errors, it is desirable to assess 
the reliability of commonly used tools. The National Institute of Standards and Testing 
(NIST) is making an effort to test some digital evidence processing tools. However, this 
could be time-intensive due to the advancement in tools. However, it looks impossible 
that only a single group such as NIST can test every tool in addition to those used to 
collect evidence from networks and embedded systems. An important approach 
suggested in this thesis such as following and utilizing simple security mechanism and 
guidelines can assist in improving security level and integrity of digital information. 
Studying the complexity of computer systems and the tools used to examine them, it is 
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not possible to eliminate or even quantify the errors, uncertainties and losses, therefore, 
digital investigators can proof the integrity of digital information using relevant security 
mechanism and guidelines (Ademu and Imafidon, 2012f). 
2.7  Intelligent Software Agent 
Russell and Norvig (2010) describe an agent as anything that can perceive its 
environment through sensors and act upon that environment through actuators. For 
instance, a human agent has eyes and ears for sensors and hands and legs for actuators; 
a robotic agent might have cameras and infrared range finders for sensors and various 
motor for actuators. A typical example is Letizia, an intelligent agent used for reading 
documents off the world wide web (WWW). Most of the time when the user is 
accessing the WWW, the computer is idle, waiting for instructions from the user to 
retrieve a new document. Letizia uses this otherwise idle time to look for other 
documents somehow related to the document being read, so that the user, after having 
read the document, will get suggestions for other documents that might be of interest. 
Letizia thus bases its search on the contents of relatively recently read documents 
(Lohani and Jeevan, 2007). Wallace (1997) defined an intelligent software agent as 
software that uses artificial intelligence (AI) in the pursuit of the goals for its clients. AI 
is the imitation of human intelligence by mechanical means. In the terms of this 
research, the word “agent” generally indicates intelligent agent (IA). The following 
features and properties are very important in defining an intelligent software agent:  
According to Williams (2004) an agent is anything that can perceive its environment 
through sensors and act upon that environment through effectors. The criterion that is 
used to evaluate and draw a conclusion as to whether an agent is successful or not is 
performance measurement, and a critical success factor is based on how an agent could 
perform a particular task. The intrinsic part of an agent is being autonomous, adaptive 
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and cooperative in the environment in which it operates. The most desirable attribute of 
an agent is that it is autonomous, meaning the agent should not be under the control of 
another agent.  
2.7.1 Properties of an Intelligent Agent 
 Autonomy: The agent possesses the capacity to act independently from its user, 
both in chronological terms and in the sense of adding intelligence to the user’s 
instructions. It needs to exercise control over its own actions (Williams, 2004). 
 Reactivity: The agent senses and acts on its own surroundings. The agent also 
reacts to changes in the surroundings that are the result of its own actions 
(Bradshaw, 1997). 
 Proactivity: This refers to the agent’s ability to exhibit goal-directed behaviour 
and take initiatives by itself to get closer to the defined goal, out of an external 
instruction by its user (Russell and Norvig, 2010). It can predict, or at least make 
good guesses about the consequences of its own actions, and in this way use its 
reactivity to come closer to its goal. This should happen simultaneously, and on 
a periodic basis, which is an enormous help in saving time. 
 Adaptability: The agent’s capacity to learn and change according to the 
experiences accumulated. This has to do with the feature of having memory and 
learning. An agent learns from its user, from the external world and even from 
other agents, and progressively improves in performing its tasks, independently 
from external instructions (Lohani and Jeevan, 2007). 
 Continuity: An agent does not necessarily work only when its owner is sitting 
by the computer; it can be active at all times. It is thus a temporally continuous 
process (Lohani and Jeevan, 2007).  
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 Social Ability: An agent is a piece of social software that interacts with other 
agents to do its job. It can be talking to other similar agents to exchange 
information, or it can talk to other kinds of agents to request and offer services. 
Communication with the owner is also important. It is through this that the agent 
is praised or punished for its work, and the owner can give further directions to 
the agent for how it can do its job better (Hermans, 1997). 
 Flexibility: The agent works proactively; that is, directed by goals, but how it 
goes about reaching these goals may vary. As opposed to a script that performs 
the same sequence of commands each time it is run, an agent can do the same 
job in many different ways, depending on the situation and the surroundings 
(Lohani and Jeevan, 2007). 
 Cooperation: The notion of cooperation with its user also seems to be 
fundamental in defining an agent, different from the one-way flow of 
information of ordinary software; intelligent agents are, therefore, true 
interactive tools (William, 2004). 
2.7.2 Classification of Agent 
According to Hermans (1997) a common classification of an agent is the weak and 
strong notion of agency. In the weak notion of agency, agents have their own will 
(autonomy); the agent operates without the direct intervention of humans or other 
agents; agents interact with other agents and humans (social ability), agents do not 
simply act in response to their environment (proactively), agents perceive their 
environment and respond to stimulus (reactivity). In the strong notion of agency, an 
agent has the ability to move around an electronic network (mobility), agents do not 
have conflicting goals (benevolence) and an agent will perform in an optimal manner to 
achieve goals (rationality). However no particular agent possesses all these abilities, but 
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these types of characteristics distinguish agents from ordinary programs (Ademu and 
Imafidon, 2012d).  
According to Jennings and Wooldridge (1997) agents can be classified by the type of 
the agent, by the technology used to implement the agent, or by the application domain 
itself. For the purpose of this research, agent application will be classified as follows: 
 2.7.2.1 Classification by the Type of Agent 
Nienaber and Barnard (2005) classified an agent into two, namely, stationary agents and 
mobile agents. A stationary agent can be seen as a piece of autonomous software that 
permanently resides on a particular host. An example of such an agent is one that 
performs a task on its host machine, such as accepting mobile agents, allocating 
resources, performing specific tasks, etc. A good example of a stationary agent is 
Clippit (Clippy), the Microsoft Office Assistant where its settings are for programs in 
the Microsoft Office Suite. A mobile agent is a software agent that has the ability to 
transport itself from one host to another in a network (Ademu and Imafidon, 2012d). 
The ability to travel allows a mobile agent to move to a host that contains an object with 
which the agent wants to interact, and then to take advantage of the computing 
resources of the object’s host in order to interact with that object. An example of a 
mobile agent is a flight booking system where a logged request is transferred to a 
mobile agent that on its part negotiates the web, seeking suitable flight information 
quotations, as well as itineraries. 
 2.7.2.2 Classification by Agent Application Domain 
 Commercial Application: Shopping Assistant uses intelligent agent technology 
to help the internet shopper to find the desired item quickly without having to 
browse from one page to another. A good example is the trading and negotiation 
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agent, which negotiates with other agents to buy or sell shares on behalf of their 
users and the auction agent at eBay (Patel et al., 2010). 
 Information Management Agents: These agents help to selectively retrieve 
appropriate information (Bradshaw, 1997). For instance instead of hiring a help 
desk consultant to help customers search through the internet for an answer to a 
question, with an intelligent agent the customer describes the problem and the 
agent automatically searches the appropriate databases, e.g. CD-ROM, or 
internet, then presents a united answer with the most likely first. The diversity 
of information available to us has increased, and the need to manage this 
information has also grown. The large volume of information available through 
the internet and the World Wide Web (WWW) represents a very real problem. 
Even though the end user is required to constantly direct the management 
process, there is a need for such searches to be carried out by agents, acting 
autonomously to search the web on behalf of users, which is so important in the 
digital forensic investigation (Ademu et al., 2011a). 
An intelligent agent has been proposed in some distributed applications as a 
useful mechanism. It is very applicable in digital forensic investigation. As 
Solomon and Lattimore (2006) mentioned, in many digital crimes, the 
procedures of accomplishing forensic science are neither consistent nor 
standardised, instead there are some elementary guidelines  and need for 
automated tools for specific situations.  
 Web Browser Agent: This is an intelligent agent that helps keep track of what 
website is visited and customises one’s view of the web by automatically 
keeping a bookmark list, ordered by how often and how recent one visits the 
site. It also lets you know by notifying you when sites you like are updated, and 
it could also automatically download pages for browsing offline (Jennings and 
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Barnard, 2005). A good example is the IBM Web Browser Intelligent, a web 
spider that is used for collecting data to build indexes to be used by a search 
engine. 
 Data Mining – This is where information-specific agents provide a context for 
data searches in vast databases or other information sources such as the web 
from which cooperating intelligent personal agents will extract a selection of 
useful information. This field is one of the fastest-evolving ones at the moment 
given the explosive growth of the amount of accessible information via 
networks and communications (Ralha, 2009). 
 Broker Agents: Another type of agent that act as mediators or facilitators by 
matching user requests against information or known solutions in databases or 
provided by database agents (Lohani and Jeevan, 2007). 
 
2.7.2.3 Classification by Technology used to Implement the Agent 
 Interface Agents: Interface agents emphasise autonomy and learning in order to 
perform tasks for their owners (Ademu and Imafidon, 2012d). Interface agents 
support and provide proactive assistance to a user learning to use a particular 
application such as a spreadsheet or an operating system (Jennings and 
Wooldridge, 1997). The user’s agent observes and monitors the actions taken by 
the user in the interface, learns new short-cuts and suggests better ways of doing 
the task.  
 Personal Assistant Agent: This is an agent that contains personalised learning 
algorithms developed for a single, specialised application or task. Information 
filters for browsing tasks belong to this class of agents (Bradshaw, 1997). 
 Mobile Network Management Protocol: This is where collaborative agents 
collect and exchange local information on network statistics in order to achieve 
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automation and optimization of decisions on network administration tasks such 
as routing, access, service provisions, monitoring and statistical evaluation, 
within a global view (Ralha, 2009). In MIPv6, which is a host-based mobility 
management protocol a Home Agent (HA) provides consistent network 
connectivity services for  MN even during MN handover and manages the 
mobility of the MN (Gundavelliet al., 2013). 
 
2.7.3 The Need for an Intelligent Agent and Programming Language Applied to 
Digital Forensics 
An intelligent agent has been proposed in some distributed applications as a useful 
mechanism. The intelligent agent is very applicable in digital forensic investigations. As 
Solomon and Lattimore (2006) mentioned, in many digital crimes, the procedures for 
accomplishing forensic science are neither consistent nor standardised, instead there are 
some elementary guidelines and automated tools for specific situations. There are 
different intelligent agent-based frameworks, but none have brought all the important 
digital forensic processes together into a single consistent framework. Rekhis et al. 
(2009) mentioned that digital investigations should integrate the use of formal 
techniques that are useful to develop results and proof that cannot be disproved, and that 
can avoid errors. There is a need to consider the development of more enhanced 
automated tools for imaging and analysis and presentation of digital evidence. 
The advancement of the digital forensic investigation requires a new design, improved 
security mechanism and investigative processes. Forensic experts are faced with growth 
in data. The amount of data has expanded hugely in recent years and attempts to 
consume the storage space available. The problem created by this trend is that our 
ability to analyse and filter data has not grown at nearly the same pace and also the loss 
in data. Roussev and Richard (2006) explains that computing and human resources are 
117 
 
incapable of accurately analysing that huge amount of data efficiently with present 
tools. Although computing resources are improving, the distributed computing field has 
made a major contribution for improvement. By coding tools with the use of intelligent 
agent programs that can harness the resources of computers, things such as searches can 
happen quicker, and loss data can be highly reduced. 
During the early years of artificial intelligence (AI) development, there were no useful 
tools for developing AI applications and part of the reason was that the whole field of 
computer programming was itself a new concept, even object-oriented programming 
was not yet born (Kossiakkoff, 2003). Later new languages such as LISP and PROLOG 
were developed to assist AI developers. Although these languages are still in use, many 
programmers have turned to C++ or Java. 
Visual Basic.Net and C# including C++ and Java are object-oriented. They share some 
of the essential features that have led developers to choose those languages. Visual 
Studio.NET has developed into a relatively robust tool and offers performance 
advantages not available in earlier versions. These advantages, along with the fact that 
many developers have already adopted .NET, and especially Visual Basic, make it an 
excellent choice for developing the applications applied in digital forensics. Visual 
Studio is a professional tool that provides a fully Integrated Development Environment 
(IDE) for visual C++, Visual C#, Visual J# and Visual Basic. IDE integrates all kinds of 
different codes written in C++, C#, J# or the Visual Basic programming language to 
create Windows applications. The IDE also provides a wide range of productivity 
enhancements, such as intelligence, code validation, an assortment of wizards that write 
code and elements to create and manage databases (Schneider, 2004). 
Digital forensic investigators must also keep pace with new developments in areas such 
as .NET Framework. The .NET Framework can be considered as an operating system 
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within an operating system. It is an execution environment similar in concept to Java 
that is designed to run on Windows 98/ME/NT/2000/XP, etc. operating systems and to 
provide a common environment for programs. This enables programmers to write 
applications in their preferred language, such as visual Basic, C++, Perl, etc and 
compile them for the .NET environment, providing greater flexibility and functionality. 
Figure 22 shows an integrated development environment which provides greater 
flexibility and functionality, enabling programmers to write applications in their 
preferred languages and compile with ease and less time consumption. The integrated 
development environment can be a digital forensic suite for future development (Ademu 
and Imafidon, 2012b).  
 
Figure 22:  Visual Basic Express Edition 
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2.7.4 Current Status of the Intelligent Agent Application in Digital Forensics 
According to  Conotter (2011) the digital multimedia contents as a source for visual 
information has brought important technical and economical benefit and also 
problematic issues regarding their authenticity due to forger's ability to easily 
manipulate digital images or videos in area where sensitive data are dealt with such as 
digital forensic investigation. The author presented a forensic approach to authenticate 
photographs depicting text on sign and billboard. Applying forensic methods on the 
network is done by eavesdropping bit streams with tools called monitoring tools or 
sniffers. Network traffic can be viewed by a device or software known as protocol 
analyzer (Ciampa, 2009). A protocol analyzer captures each packet to decode and 
analyze its content. The analyzer is responsible for determining if an intrusion has 
occurred and the output of this device may include evidence supporting the conclusion 
that an intrusion occurred and the analyzer may provide guidance about what actions to 
take as a result of the intrusion (Stallings and Brown, 2008).  The most common 
network protocol analyser is Wireshark formerly called Ethereal; it is used to filter data 
in the network . For instance website, email attachment and other activities that have 
been transmitted over the network can be reconstructed.  
The New Technologies Inc. (NTI) developed an intelligent filter program known as the 
Filter_1, which has the ability to make binary data printable and to extract potentially 
useful data from a large volume of binary data (Middleton, 2004). The intelligent filter 
program or Filter_1 tool helps to reduce the size of the bitstream files without 
sacrificing useful information. IP Filter is an interesting and useful forensic utilities. It 
was developed by NTI to help law enforcement track down and investigate child 
pornography cases. It has a simple DOS user interface, and it is used in almost the same 
way as the Filter_1 (Stephenson, 2003). IP Filter, unlike Filter_1 is used for searching 
email addresses, Web URLs, and graphic or Zip file names. TextSearch Plus is another 
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utility for searching a disk for text strings. It can search both allocated space and 
unallocated space (slack space). When used to search the physical disk, it can be used 
on any file system. TextSearch Plus makes an excellent tool for parsing very large logs 
in an internet backtracing investigation. It uses fuzzy logic and is designed to process a 
large amount of data in a relatively short time. 
The problem of consistency in the digital forensic process is a major weakness 
(Solomon and Lattimore, 2006). Biros et al. (2007) designed the National Repository of 
Digital Forensic Intelligence (NRDFI) to address the knowledge management issues 
across many law enforcement and intelligence agencies through an integrated system 
that allows investigators to access and share information with other agencies. Their 
research emphasize on the need for consistent security guidelines and investigative 
process that can improve digital investigation. Ralha (2009) proposed an application 
that integrated distributed multi-agent application and data mining which the author 
proposed that agents perform mining tasks locally and should merge their results into a 
global model. In order to achieve that, the research shows that agents cooperate by 
exchanging messages aimed to improve the process of knowledge discovered and 
generating accurate results. Another piece of research was carried out by Roussev and 
Richard (2004), which proposes the case for distributed digital forensics and presents 
some examples where they proposed a distributed framework that shows the advantages 
of distributed approach. The authors designed a prototype based on distributed 
processing and open protocol, where they presented a prototype where searches can be 
performed. Ruibin et al. (2005) proposes the application of a case-relevance indicator to 
the evidence. The research recommends a framework that provides the case relevance 
information from absolutely irrelevant to probably case-relevant by binding computer 
intelligence technology to the current computer forensic framework. Gonzalez and 
Javier (2009) developed a procedure to enable forensic police to extract metric data 
121 
 
from crime scenes using just a single photograph, and this is an improvement in 
documenting, analysing and visualising crime scene. 
Rekhis et al. (2009) developed a system for digital investigation of network security 
incidents using techniques known as “intrusion response probabilistic cognitive maps” 
that are constructed to analyse the attacks performed against the network. In their work 
the authors emphasised that focusing merely on restoring the system is disadvantageous; 
valuable information and traces that allow understanding of the attack could be 
removed. If the compromised system is formatted or reinstalled, this weakness points up 
the need for conducting a post-incident digital forensic investigation. And in dealing 
with the problem faced with collecting and analysing of large amount of data, digital 
forensic investigation should reconcile both the expertise of the incident response team 
and the use of formal reasoning techniques. This allows the better filtering of the data to 
be analysed and the source of evidence to be explored and also validate the results of the 
formal techniques by the incident response team before presenting them. The 
recommendation by these authors relates to this present research where emphasis is 
placed on  good standard security mechanism to be applied to digital investigative 
process. 
2.8 Summary 
This chapter reviewed existing digital forensic investigation model. The models were 
compared and analysed. The common investigative phases were initially grouped into 
four layers. A structured and consistent framework is vital for a comprehensive 
investigation model. There was a need to identify all the phases of existing investigation 
model/framework  in a clear and logical manner that can assist in better understanding 
digital forensic investigation process. A review of the literature led to different ideas on 
how to pursue the construction of the new model. By Analysing the strength and 
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weakness of literature models, the conceptualised model was designed to address the 
impact of security threats and vulnerabilities in digital investigation process. Digital 
forensic analysis and acqusition tool and other investivative tools were discussed. Also 
the application of intelligent software agent to digital forensic were also discussed. The 
initial structure of the model and its four layers and the security requirement was the 
output of this chapter. The model evolved from the segmented process to a matrix view 
reflecting all the layers and sub layers of the investigation process. 
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Chapter Three: Research Methodology 
Objectives: 
 to discuss the research design 
 to explain the implemented research process 
 to discuss the various steps of the research process 
 
This chapter begins by discussing  the  research design and explaining the implemented 
research process and its various steps.  The objectives of the research as mentioned in 
chapter 1 were the backbone of the research methodology, and the research process was 
implemented to achieve them. The researcher  provides recommendations and then 
concludes with a chapter summary highlighting all the key findings of the research 
methodology and future work. 
3.1 Research Design  
Research methodologies vary from qualitative to quantitative  or both (Robson, 2002). 
Each method assists the researcher to achieve objectives and goals of the research with 
tools that enable the researcher to obtain data, analyse it, and present the output. 
Creswell (2003) discussed three main elements that will need to be addressed in order to 
come up with a structured and well-designed piece of research. The knowledge claim, 
the research strategy, and method of the data collection are strong pillars of good 
research. The researchers make claims about what the knowledge is  (ontology), how 
we know it (epistemology), what values go into it (axiology), how we write about it 
(rhetoric), and the processes for studying it (methodology) (Creswell, 2003). In this 
research context, the knowledge is digital forensic investigation process and security 
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threats and vulnerabilities and the need to contribute to a good security level of. 
Through an extensive literature review and evaluation with modern technologies, the 
security requirement is established. The value of this research will be reflected through 
the new model developed and how the  technologies assist in digital investigation 
process. 
This chapter of the thesis reflects the overall research process and all the relevant 
research steps taken. The author adopted a methodological approach in reaching the 
final digital forensic investigation model. The methodology used in this research 
involves performing a literature study to identify a key aspect that affects the digital 
investigation process.  An extensive search of the literature relating to digital forensics, 
particularly with impact of security threats and vulnerabilities has been undertaken. The 
data collection method of this research involves the use of journals, conference 
proceedings, books, websites, workshops and seminars understanding the issues on the 
digital forensic and security threats and vulnerabilities. A test image was created and 
populated with realistic data.  
Some researchers  follow the quantitative approach and use the post-positivism 
knowledge claim. The qualitative approach reflects the constructivism knowledge claim 
and it uses narrative, ethnographies, grounded theories, autobiography, participatory 
action research, phenomenology (each grounded in a specific discipline and 
philosophical assumption) and case studies as strategies of inquiries. The pragmatic 
approach is a mixed-method approach between the quantitative and qualitative (Robson, 
2002). Data collection and analysis was conducted in a method that avoids any data 
bias. A case study is a method of choice when the phenomenon under study is not 
different from its context (Gray, 2004). The case study method is used for a wide 
variety of issues. Case studies can prove very useful in adding to the understanding, 
extending experience and increasing conviction about a subject. Case studies explore 
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subjects and issues where relationships may be ambiguous or uncertain (David and 
Sutton, 2004). The case study approach is considered valid for this research. Marshall 
and Rossman (2006) explain that the survey is a type of research strategy that collects 
the same set of information about all the cases in the same data. Survey involves 
systematic observation or systematic gathering.   
Blaxter et al. (2006) argues that action research is a complex and dynamic activity 
involving the best effort of researchers and practitioners and placing emphasis on 
promoting change within an organisation. It involves the generation of new information 
and analysis together with actions aimed to transform the situation in question. Action 
research is a way of producing desired results for the people involved and it generates 
knowledge for both the researchers and the participants. Action research is carried out 
by individuals, professionals, and academia. It involves research, systematic, critical 
reflection and action. It aims to improve educational practice and is undertaken to 
evaluate change. The focus group is an example of a research technique that can be used 
in action research. 
Experimental design is a situation in which an independent variable is carefully 
manipulated by the investigator under known controlled conditions. The experimental 
and control groups are investigated under the same conditions in order to minimise 
differences between them (Blaxer et al., 2006). According to Gray (2004), experimental 
design processes are divided into planning and operational stages. At the planning stage, 
research questions may be posed and the relevant literature and theories investigated. 
From this, it should be possible to formulate a hypothesis. The dependent variables are 
the subject of the research and the independent variables are variables that affect the 
dependent variables. In this research, experiments were conducted. 
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The field of forensic science is a convergence of different scientific and social sciences. 
Digital forensics is a branch of forensic science involving the recovery and investigation 
of material found in digital devices often in relation to computer crime. Digital forensics 
was originally used as a synonym for computer forensics but has developed to cover 
investigation of all devices capable of storing digital data (Casey, 2004). Digital 
forensic investigations have different applications, the technical aspect of investigation 
is divided into several sub-branches, relating to the type of digital devices involved, 
such as computers, networks, databases and mobile telephones. 
The different parts of the most common three knowledge claims (post-positivism, 
constructivism, and pragmatism) were used. The post-positivism was used due to the 
reason that the theories, hypotheses, background knowledge of the researcher can affect 
and influence the observations of the research (Robson, 2002). In this research, 
knowledge background in the digital forensics and the impact of secuirty threats and 
vulnerabilities has helped to focus on the area needed for improvement in the digital 
investigation process.  
The critical evaluation done in this research  by establishing the requirement of the new 
model through the OAI PMIPv6 and the FTK follows the constructivism approach of 
the knowledge claim. This approach as stated above may be viewed as qualitative. It can 
also be argued that since the analysis of the data was based on both qualitative and 
quantitative approaches, the pragmatism school of thought was adopted during the 
research process. According to Bryman (2004) a qualitative approach was used when 
scenarios for applicability or confirming a phase in the model were required. The 
thematic analysis was practiced and results explained explicitly. A quantitative 
approach was used where numeric analysis was required for the correlation question 
relating to which requirements were needed to developing the new digital forensic 
investigation model. 
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This research is exploratory in nature. There are different ways of exploring research 
methodologies. The choice of methodology is determined by different factors, such as 
research questions asked, what the researcher thinks about the question asked and what 
the perspectives of people are about the research question. The outcome of exploratory 
research is not predictable and outcomes can sometimes be quite unexpected. There are 
different ways of exploring research methodologies. The choice of methodology is 
determined by different factors, such as research questions asked, what the researcher 
thinks about the question asked and what the outcome of experiment are about the 
research question. The research design is related to the fundamental research question. 
The research journey is mostly not straightforward, and a researcher always has to re-
evaluate the first design and re-arrange it to fit current events during the research 
process. This research journey follows the same path as other research. The first 
intention was a rigorous approach, sketching a traditional picture of the general research 
work, literature review, collecting data, drawing conclusions and writing them in a 
thesis.  
3.2 Implemented Research Methodology  
There is need to summarise the steps used as the basis of the research process of this 
thesis. The following explains the steps: 
Step 1: Formulate a Research Problem 
The research problem was formulated in the initial stage of the research study for the 
thesis. The main objective of the research was to present a Comprehensive Digital 
Forensic Investigation model which can be used when conducting digital investigation 
and preserve the integrity of digital evidence by considering factors which can alter the 
integrity of digital evidence when conducting such investigation. The initial stage of the 
research problem was to address the important need of information technology and its 
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problems in organisations and private lives and then it was narrowed to address digital 
forensic investigation and digital incident and attacks faced that can alter integrity of 
evidence when conducting digital investigation. The research problem was thought of as 
a security challenge and the researcher started to analyze what would be the best model 
developed for such a challenge. The main output of this phase was the identification of 
the research challenge. 
Step 2: Conceptualising, and the Research Design 
During this stage, the researcher studied and reviewed the literature explaining the 
existing digital forensic investigation model addressing various activities carried out in 
digital investigation, and different types of the models were analyzed. The researcher 
searched for models, theories, journals, and previous research addressing the factors 
such as digital attacks and  security threats which may have a direct or indirect effect in 
altering the integrity of digital evidence. The researcher then started to analyze the 
factors which can alter the integrity of digital evidence when conducting digital 
investigation. Literature and models reviewed are explicitly explained in Chapter 2. A 
review of the literature led to different ideas on how to pursue constructing the new 
model. It revealed several key requirements the new model will need to incorporate to 
be comprehensive such as the link between the security mechanisms and guidelines and 
the need to preserve digital evidence when conducting digital investigation. It was 
established that the existing models and frameworks address one or two aspects of the 
information security, not all, needed in digital investigation. 
The majority of the literature was addressing approaches for collection and analysis of 
digital evidence. These approaches as solutions were presented as models required   for 
digital investigation. The review presented the gap that there is no comprehensive 
model which addresses approaches to solve issues related to data integrity. Analysing 
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the strength and weakness of literature models, the structure of the new model was 
designed to address this issue. The initial structure of the model and its four phases was 
the output of this phase.  
Step 3: Constructing Instrument for Data Collection and Collecting the Data 
In the first experiment, a testbed was created to collect data packets based on the OAI 
PMIPv6 implementation. In the area of mobile network, the research proposed and 
implemented PMIPv6 with improved buffering to minimize performance issue which 
the research identified as able to assist in providing reliable services and in turn assist in 
digital investigation. The research identified that current approach of managing 
network-based IP mobility which is the standard PMIPv6 is identified with performance 
problem of handover latency and loss of data packet which can influence the integrity of 
data, therefore, the research proposed and implemented PMIPv6 with improved 
buffering in order to minimize this effect on data packets. A network experimental test 
was set up to carry out incident such as loss in data packets. This has led to creating an 
experimental network environment in which 3 nodes were connected to the same 
collision domain. Then packet traffic is transmitted between nodes for the purpose of 
comparing the PMIPv6 and PMIPv6 with improved buffering for solving handover 
latency and loss of data packet which are performance issue that can influence the 
integrity of the data as identified in the research. Also, another testbed was populated 
with real data and collection and analysis of data was carried out with the use of FTK. 
CDFIM was applied to conduct experimental test digital investigation to test the 
research hypothesis, and the applicability of the model. Related research papers such as 
journals, and industrial white papers were researched, collected, indexed. The objective 
of this step was to have a good repository of journals and conference proceeds 
addressing the topic of digital forensic investigation models and information security. 
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Step 4: Selecting a Sample  
Based on the reviewed literature in chapter 2, the requirements for the model were 
identified. PMIPv6 with improved buffering was proposed and implemented based on 
the OAI PMIPv6 implementation. The PMIPv6 with improved buffering and the test 
case investigation conducted with Forensic Toolkit (FTK) will be explained in detail in 
chapter 5 and 7. The main objective of the experimental process were to the test the 
hypothesis of the research and the easiness applicability of the requirement of the new 
model. 
Step 5: Processing the Data 
The collected data for both experiments were analysed based on the real testbed 
environment. The data was examined against the model built in order to identify areas 
of support and areas that do not support the model. The correlation between the security 
measures and guidelines with investigative process were conducted between the 
different sections of the model in order to construct the final conclusion of the 
experimental results.  
Step 6: Developing the Final Model 
This stage of the research focused on processing the information which was collected 
from the real testbed, compare the results with the initial conceptual model developed in 
the initial stage of the research, and confirm the layers which are used to construct the 
final model. As a result of this stage, the final version of the model is presented in this 
thesis document. 
 Step 7: The Validation Phase 
The validation was achieved based on the following:  
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 Observation from the collected data and the analysis results has shown the 
confirmation of the layers initially constructed as part of the conceptual model in 
the early stage of the research.  
 The use of Open Air Interface PMIPv6  showed the strong interest of internet 
and security practitioners to have a common interest to have a secure protocol as 
reference which can identify the security level of data packet. This was observed 
from the experiment result of the  standard PMIPv6 and the PMIPv6 with 
improved buffering.  The PMIPv6 demonstration (PMIPv6D) was first 
developed and validated under Linux UBUNTU 10.04 by EURECOM. 
 The final model was evaluated by conducting investigation on two real digital 
crime cases based on CDFIM 
Step 7: Writing the Research Document 
The research document was written in parallel to each step of the research process. The 
research document structure is explained in chapter 1, it covers the literature reviews, 
findings from the data analysis, the structure of the new model, an explanation of each 
layer in the new model, and the detailed validation process followed for this research. 
3.3 Summary 
The major aspect covered in the research methodology chapter is the scientific 
background of the research methodology, knowledge claims adopted, the implemented 
research processes, the methods of data collection, and the validation process followed 
during the construction of the thesis for the new model. The researcher used the post-
positivism, constructivism, and the pragmatism knowledge claims. The research 
analysis of the data was using both qualitative and the quantitative research strategies. 
The qualitative and quantitative data analyses were applied on the data collected. The 
qualitative analysis was mostly interpretive using the researcher’s intuition and it was 
mainly for the analysis of the human factors in selecting or rejecting security 
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technologies, committing computer crimes (creating of information threats), and 
interactions with security systems which include technologies and policies. On the other 
hand, the quantitative analysis was applied to study security technologies implemented 
in the areas, number of security incidents experienced.  
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Chapter Four: The Comprehensive 
Digital Forensic Investigation Model 
Objectives: 
 to discuss the different areas of digital forensic investigation model 
 to explain the step by step process of developing CDFIM 
 to provide a comprehensive model for digital investigation 
  
The principle of digital forensics and investigation is to discover, obtain, analyse and 
preserve digital evidence as discussed in Chapter 2. The Chapter also mentioned that 
there is no model that identified security threats and provide security measures for the 
relevant digital forensic investigation process.  This research argues that information 
security guidelines integrated in the digital investigation process can assist in 
establishing integrity of digital evidence. 
In this chapter the step by step design of the investigative process for discovering, 
distributing, reconstructing and maintaining digital information by identifying factors 
that can influence the integrity of digital information will be described and a 
Comprehensive Digital Forensic Investigation Model (CDFIM) that improves on 
previous digital forensic investigation process is created. In addition, the chapter 
examines the area of application of digital forensic investigation and impact of security 
threats and vulnerabilities. 
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4.1 Digital Forensic Investigation 
To relate the security technologies and guidelines proposed by the researcher with the 
digital forensic investigation process, different digital forensic investigation model and 
security threat and vulnerabilities has been reviewed. A good description was given in 
the literature about different digital forensic investigation model. Security requirement 
for digital forensic investigation was also found in the literature. Many cases were 
studied which are stressing on the need of applying the right technologies and 
guidelines in order to protect the digital information and digital evidence. The alleged 
case of US v.Gary McKinnon and how Gary McKinnon was alleged to intrude the 
computers indicated the effect of a technical and operational security issues on the 
corporate infrastructure. The implementation of security technologies and guidelines 
will play a major role in protecting and alleviating such risks. However, identifying the 
necessary technologies is not effective enough. The selection and implementation of the 
appropriate technology is important to the security plans of any organization and digital 
forensic investigation. The objective of the new approach is to turn the digital forensic 
investigation process into a comprehensive digital investigative process, which 
addresses the threats and vulnerabilities related to different digital technologies. The 
new approach can be considered as a tool to think about the threats of digital forensic 
investigation process and a method, which can be used by investigators to highlight a 
risk and manage its effect.          
There are different aspects of digital forensic investigation, for the purpose of this 
research in this chapter, computer forensics, network forensics and Email forensics will 
be discussed:  
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4.1.1 Computer Forensics 
Computer forensics is the science of computer crime investigation (Ruibin et al., 2005). 
The main purpose of digital investigation is to collect digital evidence without altering 
or damaging it (Kruse and Heiser, 2001). Computer systems and other electronic 
devices have been widely used in the past two decades and a large amount of 
information produced, accumulated, and distributed through electronic means. The 
majority of organizations interact with electronic devices every day for this purpose, 
there is a need to find digital evidence in computer systems and other electronic or 
digital devices. 
Since digital devices such as computers are vulnerable to attack by criminals, digital 
forensics is very important. Understanding digital forensic procedures will help to 
capture vital information, which can be used to prosecute an intruder that compromises 
a digital device or network. Also, deciding on the specific tools for computers or other 
digital devices that is needed to correctly analyse evidence is crucial (Ademu et al., 
2011b).  
Data location is the process of finding relevant data stored in hard drive or other 
devices. Relevant information is often stored inside files, handled by the operating 
system of the computer that the mass storage devices are attached to, and there are still 
many cases in which information is stored on the hard drive without the recognition of 
the operating system. Storage devices are usually divided into one or more partitions, 
each of which has at most one file system associated with it (Nelson et al., 2004). Some 
of the locations data can be found are discussed as follows: 
 Log Files: Operating systems and some applications and services store 
information about events in log files. Log files on the computer are important 
locations when searching for information about the potential attack (Cole at a., 
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2007). For instance Windows Security log, identifies security events that have 
occurred, as long as the system is configured to log those events. Other log files 
can be viewed through Event Viewer and also the Application log is a log file 
used by a number of applications.   
 Cluster Tips: Clusters are physical entities of a hard drive. Many operating 
systems, such as Linux and all Windows versions etc, share one rule known as 
“one cluster, one file”, that is, each cluster will have information inserted 
belonging at most to a single file (Kruse and Heiser, 2001). The cluster tip 
technique involves reading clusters filled with data belonging to the RAM. 
Keeping in mind that the data are stored on a disk because of the operating 
system’s limit to write a full block at once, they could be located by looking for 
an end-of-file character and then reading whatever follows. When a user deletes 
a file, such file will be moved to the Recycle Bin, however, even though the 
Recycle Bin is emptied, deleted files still remain on the hard disk. This is 
because a file is written to the hard disk in clusters For instance when a file is 
deleted, the area of the hard disk where the data was stored becomes available, 
some of the file contents remains available until the bits of the hard disk are over 
written with other data. The data left can be analyzed using some forensics and 
data recovery applications. 
 Hidden Files: An attacker might try to hide their activities by hiding malicious 
files by changing the name or file extension of a file so that it looks like 
something genuine. Hidden files can be viewed using appropriate tools.  
 Free Space: The operating system uses the free space only to store new data, 
since if there is no file associated with a block then there will be information to 
handle (Ademu and Imafidon, 2012e). Data contained in free space will be 
transparent to nearly all the applications. It is important to notice that operating 
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systems provide functionality to read arbitrary blocks from the file system, 
whether they are marked as free space or not, so data stored in free space are not 
transparent to the operating system. A skilled user could hide sensitive 
information inside blocks considered as free space by the file system and these 
data are not associated with any files, so they cannot be found by a common file 
searching utility (Pietro and Verde, 2010).  
 Registry: System and application settings in the Windows operating system are 
usually stored in a database known as the system registry. Nearly all the 
operations in the Windows operating system involve reading from and writing to 
the system registry. Searching for data through the registry is a good way to 
reconstruct the history of actions taken by users of the computer system. The 
registry technique consists in reading sensitive data from the registry, even 
looking for deleted or undeleted data before they have been updated (Pietro and 
Verde, 2010).  
 History and Temporary Files: Applications provide a special functionality to 
provide easy recovery of unsaved data after a boot crash by saving periodically. 
Such temporary file is created by some applications, such as Microsoft Word, 
although applications sometimes delete the temporary files they create but some 
do not. These type of files might contain valuable information. Also, temporary 
files are useful in internet applications, and users commonly visit some websites 
more frequently than others. Storing information from a website, such as images 
or a hypertext document, will speed up a browser since data are present locally 
and need not be requested from the website (Pietro and Verde, 2010). Some 
websites download temporary files to the user's hard disk to allow a web page to 
load more quickly on subsequent requests. Therefore, the temporary internet 
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files cache can be a possible location to look for digital evidence, mostly when 
examining a suspect computer where an attack was launched. 
 Swap File: This is a Windows file used for virtual management. If a user is 
working on a file or document, Windows can copy all or part of it in an open 
unencrypted form to the swap file on a storage device. Encryption keys, 
passwords and other important information can be changed on the storage 
device, although, if a user uses all the security features in the updated versions 
of Windows, merely investigating the swap file in DOS mode with readily 
available tools may allow for important data protection. 
4.1.2 Network Forensics 
Digital forensic investigators need a basic understanding of networks to interpret digital 
evidence found onnetwork and system sources such as web browsers and file transfers. 
An understanding of fundamental network technologies is essential to track down 
unknown offenders through networks and related criminal activities to the networks 
(Ademu and Imafidon, 2013). For instance when digital investigators  are not faced with 
attack launched on  computer but faced with attack on the network, evidence can be 
reconstructed using digital information and digital evidence on the networks. The 
current state of the system might need to be documented. Victims may be persuaded to 
make available their live system, sources of evidence on the internet that may reveal 
with whom the victim was communicating, which involve log files on the victim’s 
Internet Service Provider’s system and backup tapes (Casey, 2004). Mobile telephone 
records may help verify with whom the victim was communicating and where the 
victim went.  
4.1.2.1 Sources of Digital Evidence on the Network 
The sources of digital evidence on the network may include the following: 
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 Listening Ports 
Information can be viewed about listening ports using special application and command 
line utility,by displaying the protocol, the local address and the foreign address (Cole et 
al., 2007). 
 Network Connections 
Information on network connections can also be viewed using special applications and 
command line utilities which can assist in establishing whether the network connection 
is listening. 
 Live Applications 
Information can be saved on running applications on a computer. For instance in 
Windows, Task Manager allows viewing the processes running on the computer. The 
tasklist commnad line utility can assist in outputing a lsit of processes running on the 
computer (Dulaney, 2009). 
 Log Server 
The networked computers create log files that contain data or information on activities, 
connections and other transaction (Tomsho et al., 2007). Timestamping plays an 
important role in identifying the times at which activities were conducted (Kossiakoff, 
2003). Log files for example use timestamps to indicate when an activity was added. A 
digital forensic or security system investigator should protect log files from misuse or 
alteration (Ademu and Imafidon, 2012e). These files should be kept locally by using a 
centralised log server. The log server prevents an attacker from altering the logs.  
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 Contents of Network Devices 
A routers can be used to facilitate exchanging data between networks. When the router 
receives a packet, it analyzes the packet's destination network address and looks up that 
address in the routing table, routers are brilliant source of digital evidence (Casey, 
2004). Firewalls can keep detailed logs of successful and unsuccessful attempts to reach 
hosts that they protect. Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) are used to collect 
information from a variety of system and network sources, then analyse the information 
for signs of intrusion and misuse. In the network-based intrusion detection architecture, 
the system is used to analyse network packets (Anderson, 2001). Network-based 
architectures are used to detect access attempts and denial of service attempts 
originating outside the network. This architecture consists of sensors deployed 
throughout a network. These sensors then report to a central command console. 
 Traffic on Both Wired and Wireless Networks 
Peer-to-peer networking has been advanced by wireless technology that uses radio 
frequency, infrared, lasers and microwaves such as Bluetooth-enabled computers, 
personal digital assistants, mobile phones, etc. When a Bluetooth-enabled device is on, 
it attempts to communicate with other devices around it. The majority of the 
components of networked systems contain information about the activities of the people 
who use them. Routers are at high risk of attack and computer intruders target them to 
eavesdrop on traffic and disrupt or gain access to networks (Casey, 2002). 
 Network Communication Technologies 
A computer connected to a network is generally known as a host, and uses a modem or 
NIC to send and receive information over wires or through the air (Casey, 2004). In the 
past tap was used to connect a host to the network. But because this approach was 
difficult to maintain, devices called hubs were developed to reproduce the single 
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network cable configuration. In order to increase network security and efficiency, 
switches replaced hubs. Transport Control Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP) is used 
to communicate with computers connected to the internet. Routers are an important 
component of computer networks, essentially routing d data to the correct place, they 
are used to connect hosts to two or more networks and direct traffic between them. 
Firewalls are similar to routers in the way that they direct traffic from one network to 
another. These security devices are designed to block traffic by default and must be 
configured to permit traffic that meets certain criteria. The services that networks 
enable, such as sending and receiving emails, rely on the client/server model. Telnet 
provides client/server communication, enabling remote users to log into a server and 
execute commands. Two hosts using different network technologies cannot 
communicate directly. There are two methods of enabling communication between 
hosts using different network technologies: translators and common languages. When 
connecting different networks, it is more efficient to join them using devices with the 
necessary network interface cards and then use a common internet protocol such as 
TCP/IP that every host can understand (Tomsho et al., 2007).  
The most widely used internet protocols are the Transport Control Protocol (TCP), the 
User Datagram Protocol (UDP), and the Internet Protocol (IP). These protocols, 
including a few supporting protocols, are collectively referred to as the TCP/IP internet 
protocol suite (Dulaney, 2009). In order to identify and deal with digital evidence on the 
internet, digital investigators need a concrete understanding of TCP/IP and identify 
method of avoiding data loss (Ademu and Imafidon, 2012f). 
Mobile communications is in reality part of our daily lives. With the increase in PDA 
devices and ever-present availability of access network, IP Mobility is now a key aspect 
of mobile communications. Mobile IPv6 (MIPv6) protocol is a host-based mobility 
management protocol that has been developed by the Internet Engineering Task Force 
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(IETF), it requires the participation of the host in all aspects of mobility management 
(Gundavelli et al., 2013). 
The Proxy Mobile Internet Protocol version 6 (PMIPv6) is designed  to resolve the 
problems of MIPv6 and provide mobility management  support to a mobile node 
without requiring its participation in any mobility related signaling (Gundavelli et al., 
2013). 
4.1.2.2 Network Technologies 
Network technologies enable multiple hosts to share a single transmission medium such 
as wire or the air (Ciampa, 2009). In the process of the host sharing a transmission 
medium, only one host can use the medium at a particular time, but there would be an 
interference with each other if two hosts were allowed to use the transmission medium 
at the same time. There are many different network technologies but for the purpose of 
this research, three of them will be discussed (Ademu and Imafdon, 2012e) as follows: 
 Ethernet 
Ethernet is one of the most used network technologies because it is fast and inexpensive 
(Col et al., 2007). One of the most recent forms of Ethernet uses wires similar to the 
telephone cord. Ethernet uses Carrier Sense Multiple Access with Collision Detection 
(CSMA/CD) to synchronise communication.  
 Asynchronous Transfer Mode (ATM) 
ATM uses fibre optic cables and ATM switches to enable computers to communicate at 
very high rates (Tomsho et al., 2007). ATM uses technology similar to the telephone 
system to establish a connection between two hosts. The hosts are connected to a main 
ATM switch and these switches can be connected to form a larger network. One of the 
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hosts contacts the main switch when it wants to communicate with the other host. The 
switch contacts the other host and then establishes a connection between them. 
 Wireless 
According to Stallings and Brown (2008) hosts connected using one of the IEEE 802.11 
standards do not require wires, and they transmit data through the air using radio 
signals. Commonly used standards and their spectrums are IEEE 802.11a (2.4) and 
IEEE 802.11b (5GHz). Computers, personal digital assistants, mobile devices  and other 
devices with a compatible wireless NIC use access points to communicate with each 
other. Access points are also generally connected to a wired network, such as an 
Ethernet network, to enable communication with wired devices and the internet. The 
main limitation of 802.11 networks is that a computer must be within a certain distance 
of an access point to achieve reliable connectivity and, even then, data are only 
transmitted at a limited speed (Ademu and Imafidon, 2012f).  
Most of the available mobile devices are equipped with multiple radio interfaces. These 
mobile nodes can possiblly attach to the network using one or more interfaces and be 
using all of those interfaces simultaneously for its data sessions. A mobile operator can 
also potentially be managing more than one access technology in their main network, 
these  access networks can be running any IP protocol version such as IPv4, IPv6 or 
both (Gundavelli et al., 2013).   
4.1.3 Email Forensics 
There are no much difference in an email forensic investigation process from other 
areas of digital forensic investigations, except that email forensic may require different 
tools and techniques in its investigative process to achieve a convincing evidence. 
According to Palmer (2001) digital forensic investigation is the applciation of scientific, 
systematic and proven methods towards the preservation, collection, validation, 
144 
 
identification, analysis, interpretation, presentation of digital evidence  derived from 
digital sources for the purpose of facilitating or furthering the reconstruction of events 
found to be criminal. By this definition, it is important to demonstrate proofs of 
intergrity of digital crime objects beyond the presumptions of the occurence of a crime 
by employing consistent and methodical processes to establish the crime. Therefore, it 
is imperative to prove the integrity of digital evidence at any time in digital 
investigation (Ademu and Imafidon, 2012g).  Since email crime can be as a result of 
forged and genuine messages with malicious purpose or even email messages sent in 
ways that can violate an organisation security policy. 
Emails may be recognised by their header at the beginning of the message providing 
useful information of the IP address of the relaying mail servers, the names of any 
attachements included in the email, the time and date the email was sent (Ademu and 
Imafidon, 2012e). An email header can assist in viewing its path from its source to its 
destination. Email forensic investigation aims to identify details of the system that sent 
the email invloved in the crime, the authorship of the identified systems and to establish 
if the email messages are encoded according to some stardard, such as Multipurpose 
Internet Mail Extensionm (MIME), Binary to ASCII encoding scheme (Bin Hex), Unix-
to-Unix encode (Uuencode), and transported through such protocol as Simple Mail 
Transfer Protpcol, Internet Massage Access Protocol (IMAP) and others (Ademu and 
Imafidon, 2012g). Hadjidi et al. (2009) argues that one limitation that exposes email 
communication to illegitimate uses is that the widely used email SMTP protocol, lacks a 
source authentication mechanism and that the data in the header of an email containing 
information about the sender and the path along which the message has travelled can 
easily be forged or anonymized. Information can be gathered through email if the attack 
was based on malware distributed through email, a spam and phishing attack. Also 
email can be used as evidence if the attacker is an employee. There is need also for 
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digital forensic investigation to be employed in a manner that can collect credible 
evidence by preserving information from email. 
4.2 Threats Impact on Digital Forensic Investigation 
Networks contain digital evidence that can establish that a crime has been committed, 
determine how a crime was committed, reveal links between an offender and the victim, 
disprove or support witness statements and identify likely suspects (Ademu and 
Imafidon, 2013). For instance child pornography on the internet has led digital 
investigators to the victim, an email of a missing person has created links between the 
victim and the offender.   
In dealing with evidence on the internet, digital investigators are faced with some 
challenges. One major problem is that data on the networked systems are dynamic and 
volatile, making it difficult to take a snapshot of an entire network unlike with stand-
alone computer systems and data are also easy to be lost (Dulaney, 2009). Shutting 
down a network will result in the destruction of most of the digital evidence it contains. 
An attacker can be in many places on the network at a particular time. This distribution 
of criminal activity and associated digital evidence makes it difficult to isolate a crime 
scene on the network. But having evidence distributed on numerous computers or 
networks can be an advantage in an investigation. The distribution of information makes 
it difficult to destroy digital evidence because if digital evidence is destroyed on a 
particular computer or network, a copy can be found on various computers on the 
network or on backup tapes. It is a good practice for organisations to back up their 
information regularly and store copies of all backups in a different location (Ademu and 
Imafidon, 2012e).  
In some situations, digital evidence exists on networks that were not directly involved in 
a crime. There are always more sources of digital evidence on the network than even the 
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digital investigators realise. Therefore, to ensure that relevant data is located, digital 
investigators must use their understanding of networks in general. Collecting digital 
evidence from a large network requires significant preparation and planning. Planning is 
important in cases that involve digital devices. If possible, when generating a search 
warrant, care needs to be taken in researching the search site in order to determine what 
digital device to expect, what the system is used for and if it is a network environment 
or not. If the digital equipment is used for business purposes, this will influence the 
planning and preparation process. It is also important to know that without this 
information, it is difficult to know what expertise and evidence collection tools are 
required. At this stage proper preparation needs to be done for tools and storage 
capacities that will be used. In order for plans and procedures for investigation to be 
successful, it is important to provide an adequate acquisition process (Casey, 2004).  
Digital evidence must be preserved as soon as it has been identified and collected and in 
a way that it preserves its integrity. The empirical law of digital collection and 
preservation states that if only one copy of the digital evidence is made, that evidence 
will be damaged or completely lost. Therefore, at least two copies of the evidence are 
taken. One of these is sealed and then placed in secured storage. This is the original 
copy and will only be opened for examination under instruction from the court in the 
event of a challenge to the evidence presented after forensic analysis on the second copy 
(Sommer, 2009). The main challenge of preserving digital evidence is collecting it in a 
way that does not alter it and also during the transmission process in the case of digital 
evidence from the network.  
Most amount of digital evidence is a rich and often unexplored source of information. It 
can enable an investigator to create an incredibly detailed picture of events surrounding 
a crime. When an event happens, it is good practice to note the time it occurred, for 
example the time an individual logged on using a password, this can assist an 
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investigator in reconstrucitng the event. Digital devices can be useful for reconstructing 
the sequence of events or activities. The position of digital evidence in relation to other 
objects can be very informative. Determining where an object or individual was in 
relation to other objects or individuals is useful when investigating digital crimes 
mainly in a networked environment (Casey, 2004). In a large digital fraud case for 
example thousands of people and computers can be involved, making it difficult to keep 
track of the many relationships between objects. Creating a diagram visualising the 
associations between the objects and users can assist in analysing the activities. 
Analysing digital evidence from networks frequently needs specialised knowledge of 
tools and the underlying technology. There should be duplicates of digital evidence 
from a compromised systems, strict use of write-protection technology, and a positive 
legal chain of custody can be maintained. Hashes and checksums should also be 
maintained on duplicates and duplicate copies should be made and used during analysis. 
Presenting the findings to non-technical individuals can be challenging but remains one 
of the most important stages in a forensic examination because a digital forensic 
examiner’s findings needs to be understood in order to be used (Ademu et al., 2011). 
4.3 Towards a Comprehensive Model for Digital Forensic Investigation Process 
and its Security Guidelines 
Based on the review of academic and industrial literature, a comprehensive approach 
that could be used to examine digital investigation process addressing security threat 
was not found. Most of the literature studied emphasized the collection and analysis of 
the evidence. There is no doubt that the process of evidence collection and analysis are 
major parts of the process of digital forensic investigation, but there is need to 
emphasize on the countermeasures of security threat of  the process of digital forensic 
investigation. Digital forensic investigation processes are not in every steps supported 
by fully automated processes nor are offered through a common technological 
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infrastructure. Digital forensic investigators might have different levels of 
competencies, but there is need for them to follow appropriate security guidlines and 
measures and processes during digital investigation (Ademu and Imafidon., 2012f). The 
new Comprehensive Digital Forensic Investigation process includes two parts. Firstly, 
the new digital forensic investigation processes which are divided into four phases are 
discussed (Ademu et al., 2011b). Secondly, the security requirement layers and 
sublayers that are incorporated in the digital forensic processes are discussed (Ademu 
and Imafidon., 2012f). 
4.3.1 Selection Criteria of the Layers of the New Model 
The following criteria are used for the selection of the layers and sublayers in the 
model:  
 The layer must address a security requirement in digital forensic investigation 
process 
 The security sublayer must be recognised by information security service 
providers. 
4.3.2 The New Digital Forensic Investigation Process 
Having more than one layer of any model gives the model a robust structure. A 
literature review and an extensive research were conducted in order to prove the 
requirement and need of the layers discussed in this chapter. The literature review 
analysis indicates four main phases such as preparation, interaction, reconstruction and 
presentation of digital forensic investigation process (Ademu et al., 2011b). The 
proposed model contained different layers of digital forensic investigation process in 
four phases. The following are discussed below: 
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4.3.2.1 Preparation Phase 
In order for a digital forensic investigator to acquire digital evidence, there are a number 
of things to consider. It is important  for the investigator to ensure that the search will 
not violate any law, and all types of risk assessment needs to be carried out. For 
instance, in the case of stored email there are strict privacy laws protecting such digital 
evidence. If this law is violated, the evidence can be severely weakened. It is 
recommended as best practice for investigators to collect written instructions and 
authorisations from their legal representatives before conducting digital investigation 
(Ademu etal., 2011b). In this research, as mentioned in chapter 1 this area is beyond the 
scope and the research assumes that authorisation for investigation has been given. 
As shown in Table 2 of chapter 2 where the phases refined from the existing 
investigation model were assigned an ID to identify the layers that will form the phases 
of the new model as shown below: 
 
Figure 23: The Layer contains digital forensic investigation process of the preparation phase of the 
new model 
The objective of the Layer shown above is to identify the different digital forensic 
investigative processes collected to make up the preparation phase. The activities shown 
in figure 23 making reference to the collated phases in Table 2 are discussed as follows: 
 
 
 
Preparation 
 P4 P6 P7 P11 P12 P13 P16 P23 P26 P28 P35 P36  
150 
 
  Approach Strategy (P4) 
This activity is introduce in order to maximize the acquisition of pure 
evidence and at the same time to minimize any negative impact to the 
victim and surrounding people (Reith et al., 2002) 
 Authorization (P6) 
Ciardhuain, (2004) proposed authorization as where once the need for an 
investigation is identified; the next activity is to obtain authorization to 
carry it out. Authorization is interaction with both external and internal 
entities to obtain necessary authority. Depending on the type of 
investigation, in one extreme an IT security department or system 
administrator may require only a simple verbal approval from 
organization's management to carry out an investigation of the 
organization's computer system. At another extreme, law enforcement 
agencies require formal legal authorization, setting out in precise detail 
what is permitted in an investigation. 
 Awareness 
This activity is the creation of awareness that investigation is needed, 
which is usually the first step in an investigation (Ciardhuain, 2004). 
  Communication Shielding (P11) 
Agarwal (2011) proposed communication shielding. In this activity, all 
possible communication options or capabilities of the devices should be 
disabled. There is need for all unused port to be disabled. In a situation 
where the device appears to be in off state, some communication features 
like Wireless or Bluetooth may be enabled, resulting in overwriting the 
existing information. In other situations where the device is in the cradle 
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connected to a computer, synchronization mechanisms using ActiveSync 
might be enabled leading to corruption of evidence. 
  Deployment (P12) 
This provides a mechanism to detect and confirm an incident or event 
(Carrier and Spafford, 2004). 
  Detection (P13) 
This activity assists in detecting an incident (Pilli, et al., 2010) 
  Documentation (P16) 
This phase involves proper documentation of the crime scene. 
Documentation is a continuous back and forth activity required in all the 
stages of the investigation and required for maintaining proper chain of 
custody. 
  Incident Response (P23) 
Beebe and Clark (2004) explained that the incident response phase 
consists of the detection and initial pre-investigation response to a 
suspected computer crime related incident. For example, breach of 
computer security, using computer to view child pornography. The 
incident response activity detects, validate, assess and determine a 
response strategy for the suspected security incident. 
  Notification (P26) 
According to Ciardhuain (2004) notification is an activity that informs 
the subject of an investigation or other concerned parties that the 
investigation is taking place. In some investigations where surprise is 
needed to prevent destruction of evidence, this activity may not be 
appropriate. 
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  Planning (P28) 
Planning is important in any investigation case that involve digital 
devices, what the systems are used for and if it is a network environment 
or not (Rodger et al., 2006). If the digital equipment is used for business 
purposes this will influence the planning and preparation process. At the 
preparation stage proper planning needs to be done for tools and storage 
capacities that will be used. The alert in a breach of security policy can 
show the importance of security measures in place in any organisation. 
  Readiness (P35) 
Carrier and Spafford (2003) integrated digital investigation process 
started with readiness phase, which requires the physical and operational 
infrastructure to be ready to support any future investigation. In this 
phase, the equipment must be ever ready and the personnel must be 
capable to using it effectively. This activity is best identified in the 
preparation phase. 
 Survey and Recognition (P36) 
This activity is recognising the need for an investigation (Agawal et al., 
2011) 
4.3.2.2 Interaction Phase 
 This is a major phase introduced in this research. Interaction is the distribution and 
maintaining of information during and after the investigation (Ademu et al., 2011b). 
The collection, transportation and maintaining the integrity of information is a major 
key aspect of supporting the work of investigators and it can be a fruitful area for the 
development of advanced applications involving techniques such as data mining and 
expert system (Harrison and Aucsmith, 2002). Interested logs, networks and computers 
involved in the incident or which hold investigative information are gathered. 
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Figure 24: The digital forensic investigation process of the Interaction phase of the new model 
The objective of the Layer shown above is to identify the different digital forensic 
investigative process that is collected to make up the Interaction phase. The activities 
shown in figure 24 are discussed as follows: 
  Case Specific Analysis (P8) 
This enables the investigator to adjust the focus of the examination to the 
specifics of the case (Rodger et al., 2006). For instance, the focus of the 
case can be on email content investigation, child pornography, identity 
theft cases etc. 
 Chronology Timeline Analysis (P9) 
This is building the crime case from chronological perspective to 
sequence the probable crime activities (Rodger et al., 2006). For instance 
using the computer time to identify the sequential order of crime activity 
  Collection (P10) 
This is where digital investigator collects relevant data based on the 
approved methods utilizing various recovery techniques (Pilli et al., 
2010). 
  Dissemination of Information (P15) 
Some information may be made available only within the investigating 
organisation, while other information may be more widely distributed, 
this can be determined by the policies and procedures in place 
(Ciardhuain, 2004). This can assist good chain of custody. The 
Interaction 
 P8 P9 P10 P15 P16 P17 P19 P21  P24 P27 P30 P33 P42 P44 P46 
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information will influence future investigations and may also influence 
the policies and procedures.   
 Documentation (P16) 
Documentation is important at all the stages of handling and processing 
digital evidence (Agawal et al., 2011)  Documenting every process of 
digital evidence handling is required to maintain the chain of custody. In 
the investigation every stage in the investigation was documented. 
  Dynamite (P17) 
In this phase, digital investigator conducts investigations at the primary 
crime scene with the purpose of identifying the potential offender 
(Baryamueeba and Tushaba, 2004). 
 Examination 
This activity involves identification and location of the potential 
evidence from the data collected (Reith et al., 2002). 
 Identification (P21) 
This involves activity to identify the digital component from the acquired 
evidence and converting it to the format understood by human (Perumal, 
2009) 
  Internet (P24) 
In this phase, the activity of examining the artefacts of internet related 
services are performed (Rodger et al., 2006). 
  Physical Crime Investigation (P27) 
This is where physical evidence is collected and analysed (Carrier and 
Spafford, 2003). 
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 Pre-Analysis (P30) 
This contains all the steps and activities that are performed before the 
actual analysis starts. 
 Preservation (P33) 
After all potential evidence has been seized and is available to the digital 
investigator, duplicate copies of all data are made to ensure integrity of 
the original evidence (Pilli, et al., 2010) 
 Search and Identify (P42) 
This activity deals with locating the evidence and identifying what it is 
for the next activity.  
  Transport and Storage (P44) 
Data must be securely transported and properly stored (Perumal, 2009) 
  User Usage Profile (P46) 
This focuses its attention to analyse user activity and profile with the 
objective of retaining evidence to suspect. 
4.3.2.3 Reconstruction Phase 
This phase involves bringing together the result of relevant information/activities from 
the earlier parts of the process and any other relevant information which investigators 
may have obtained to provide a detailed account of the events and actions at the crime 
scene (Ademu et al, 2011b). These activities are reviewed, and deleted hidden and 
protected data are retrieved. Investigator also ensures that data are not lost. In addition, 
the relationship between these activities and the offenders aim is ascertained in this 
phase. 
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Figure 25: The digital forensic investigation process of the Reconstruction phase of the new model  
The objective of the Layer shown in figure 25 is to identify the different digital forensic 
investigative process that is collected to make up the Reconstruction phase. The 
activities shown above are discussed as follows: 
 Acquisition (P1) 
In dealing with digital forensic investigation so that the results will be 
scientifically reliable and legally acceptable one phase of the computer forensic 
investigative process is known as Acquisition (Pollitt, 2007). In acquisition 
phase, evidence is acquired in acceptable manner with proper approval from 
authority. 
  Analysis (P3) 
The process of determining the importance of evidence and drawing conclusion 
based on the evidence found is done in this phase (Perumal, 2009). 
  Archive Storage (P5) 
This is where relevant evidence is properly stored for future references 
(Perumal, 2009) 
 Digital Crime Investigation (P14) 
This focuses on collecting and analysing digital evidence in digital environment 
(Carrier and Spafford, 2003) 
  Documentation (P16) 
As per discussed in previous phases, this stage involves proper documentation of 
the crime scene to assist in maintaining good chain of custody. 
 
Reconstruction 
P1 P3 P5 P14 P16 P18 P20 P25 P37 P39 P43 P45  
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  Evaluation (P18) 
This involves task where the digital component identified is relevant to the case 
being investigated and can be considered as a legitimate evidence. 
  Hypothesis Creation (P20) 
In hypothesis creation, based on the examination of the evidence the investigator 
must construct a hypothesis of what occurred (Ciardhuain, 2004). The creation 
of this hypothesis depends on the type of investigation. For example, an internal 
investigation by a company's systems administrator will result in a less formal 
report to management while a police investigation will result in the preparation 
of a detailed hypothesis with carefully documented supporting material from the 
examination suitable for use in court. 
  Investigation (P25) 
During the investigation of the digital attack, different types of evidence relevant 
to the attack are gathered (Phlli et al., 2010). For instance, host or network based 
evidence are collected in order to reconstruct the events that comprise the digital 
crime committed. This reconstruction should provide explanations.  
 Reconnaissance (P37) 
This phase involves conducting the investigation while the devices are still 
running; it is similar to performing live forensics (Perumal, 2009). 
  Result (P39) 
This is the findings of the investigation. The findings or results are properly 
documented (Agawal et al., 2011). 
  Traceback (P43) 
This is tracking down the source crime scene, including the devices and location 
(Baryamueeba and Tushaba, 2004) 
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 Triage (P45) 
This is a phase where evidence are identified and ranked in terms of importance 
or priority (Rodger et al., 2006). This process ensures that evidence with the 
most important and volatile need will be processed first. 
4.3.2.4 Presentation Phase 
In this  phase analysed data are presented. Presentation is when the digital investigator 
or examiner shares results of the analysis with interested professionals (Ademu et al., 
2011b). This involves generating a report of actions taken by the digital investigator, 
uncovered evidence and the meaning of the evidence.  
 
Figure 26: The Layer contains digital forensic investigation process of the Presentation phase of the new model 
The objective of the Layer shown in figure 26 is to identify the different digital forensic 
investigative processes that are collected to make up the presentation phase. The 
activities shown above are discussed as follows: 
 Admission (P2) 
This activity involves presentation of the acquired and extracted evidence 
(Pollitt, 2007). 
 Incident Closure (P22) 
The activities in this phase involves, to conduct a review of the entire process 
and investigation, makes and act upon decisions that result from the final 
findings, dispose the evidence and collect and preserve all information related to 
the incident (Beebe and Clark, 2004). 
 
Presentation 
 P2 P22 P29 P34 P38 P40 P41  
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 Post-Analysis (P29) 
The first stage of post analysis phase is concerned with documentation of the 
whole activities during the investigation in a written report (Freiling and 
Schwittany, 2007). In this phase, all activities regarding the collection and 
analysis of digital evidence have ended, and the objectives set by the response 
strategy for the analysis phase have been fulfilled. 
 Proof/Defence (P34) 
This activity enables the investigator to prove the validity of the hypothesis and 
defends it against any criticism and challenge (Reith et al., 2002). 
 Report (P38) 
After the investigation of digital crime is finished, all the findings and results 
have to be documented in a written report. In the report, all investigative 
activities have to be written and conclusions drawn have to be explained. 
 Returning Evidence (P40) 
This is to ensure that evidence are safely returned to the rightful owner or 
properly disposed. 
 Review (P41) 
This activity involves reviewing the whole investigation processes to identify 
areas of improvement that may result in new procedures (Carrier and Spafford, 
2003). 
4.3.3 The Security Layers of the new Comprehensive Digital Forensic Investigation 
Model 
As systems and network play an increasingly important role in businesses and for digital 
investigation, so have been the dangers of malicious software. In addition, as the 
computing industry has grown larger, the market has become dominated by a few 
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leading brands. A malicious program that exploits bugs or vulnerabilities in some 
market leaders is a threat to thousands of organisations (Champlain, 2003). Since digital 
investigators are using digital devices such as computers and networks there is need for 
investigators to understand the dangers of malicious code or the practices that carry a 
risk of digital evidence being contaminated and leading to unacceptability in the court 
or during internal hearings. Infection of a workstation by malicious code can usually be 
traced back to some instances of careless or risky behaviour, for instance a floppy disk 
or other storage device infected with a virus can infect an investigation workstation. 
Once the workstation such as system or network is infected, the virus can spread either 
by itself or with human assistance to other workstation in the network. If a computer is 
infected with a worm for example, it may automatically send infected mail attachment 
to all of the addresses in the address book. Malicious code is an increasing problem 
because the increasing complexity of programs has made more susceptible to attack. In 
addition, a few program suites dominate the market, so viruses can spread very quickly. 
Malicious code can enter the local network through a single workstation, but most 
attacks come through a network gateway. There are many different types of malicious 
code, including variety of vulnerability some of which have been discussed in chapter 2. 
The network can come under attack in different ways, but one common way is 
importation of executable code into the network. Digital devices connected to the 
internet are also vulnerable to attack through their internet connections.  
One of the most important elements of information security is protecting the computer 
network and users from malicious code. The internet is infested with viruses and worms 
that can do a lot of damage to the computers and most importantly to the data, they 
store. Increasingly is the continuous experience of cybercrime threats. The growth of 
threats indicates that more types of threats will be faced in the near future. Also, there 
will be continuous need for countermeasures of security to control them. The nature of 
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these countermeasures might be technological, operational, personnel etc. Based on the 
review of academic and industrial literature, a model that integrates security measures in 
digital investigation process was not found. In this aspect of the research important 
security measures required for digital forensic investigation as observed from chapter 2 
are discussed. 
 In this research, the security layer will identify the threats related to a digital forensic 
investigation process which can influence the integrity of digital information. The 
application and content based technology for example will address technological threats 
and the operational procedures will address the threats on digital forensic investigation 
process related to the human aspect. The aim of the research in this thesis is to explore 
the use of modern technologies and establish security threats in digital forensic 
investigation process in an attempt to present solution that contributes to a good security 
level and as a measure for integrity of digital evidence. There are four areas that this 
research argues that it contributes in building strong security mechanism. It can be 
observed that each area is a broad concept of the information secuirty field and can be 
broken to smaller sub layers which collectively contribute to the positive effect of the 
security plan or guidelines of digital forensics or any organisation.  The security 
requirement/guidelines were considered in all the phases of the new model. The 
following are the important security requirement/guidelines needed for digital forensic 
investigation process as observed from the literatures reviewed in chapter two: 
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Figure 27: The security layer contributing to the development of the new model 
4.3.3.1 Step1: Secure Application and Content Based Technology 
Security technologies have important role in securing the systems and applications 
supporting the major aspect of digital forensic investigation processes. Technologies 
such as Antivirus, Firewalls, Cryptography, Security and Network Protocol (Anderson, 
2001) contribute to the success of the digital forensic investigation process by providing 
those involve in digital investigation high trust for the digital evidence collected. In the 
case of not having all, some or any of the security measures will have a negative impact 
and can be considered a threat on the digital evidence (Ademu and Imafidon, 2012f). It 
is important all attachment for example email attachment be scanned before being 
opened. Attachment may contain code that will infect other files; care must be taken in 
working on attachment and executable files. 
 
Different security layers contributing to the 
development of the new model 
Step4 (S4) 
Network and System Performance 
S4a 
Performance Monitor 
Step3 (S3) 
Secure Operational Procedures 
S3a 
Management tool 
 
S3b 
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S3c 
Incident Response Process 
Step2(S2) 
Secure Policies 
S2a 
Password Managment 
S2b 
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S1a 
 Antivirus component 
S1b  
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S1c  
Protocol Analyzer 
S1d 
Authentication and Password 
S1e  
Cryptography 
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Figure 28: The layer of application and content based security requirement 
A brief description is provided on the need of these technologies. The categorization of 
the technologies was derived from the literature reviewed for this layer. The main sub 
layers as shown in figure 28 found out of the review process are:  
 Step1a (S1a): Antivirus 
Virus and worms can be used to infect a system and modify a system to allow an 
attacker to gain access, many viruses and worms carry Trojans and backdoors 
through this a virus or worm is a carrier and allows malicious code such as Trojans 
and backdoors to be transferred from one system to another and in turn affects the 
integrity of the data (Graves, 2010). 
Anti viruses are tools, which perform a health check of the technical body of the 
organisation and prevent viruses from being transferred through many channels that 
can cause harm to the organisation. Having antivirus systems distributed in the 
organisation will reduce the risk of huge damage or loss to digital information 
Ademu and Imafidon, 2012g). 
 Step1b (S1b)  Firewall  
A firewall also known as packet filter, is designed to prevent malicious packets 
from entering or leaving the computer (Dulaney, 2009). A firewall can be 
software or hardware. A personal software firewall runs as a program on a local 
system to protect it against attack. For instance, many operating systems now 
come with personal software firewalls or they can be installed as separate 
programs. 
 
Step1 (S1) Secure Application and Content Based Technology  
S1a 
 Antivirus component 
S1b  
Firewalll 
 
S1c  
 Protocol Analyzer 
S1d 
Authentication and 
Password 
S1e  
Cryptography 
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 Step1c (S1c) Protocol Analyzer 
Network protocols provide addressing and routing information, error checking, 
retransmission request and rules for communicating in the networking 
environment (Tomsho et al., 2007). The new version of IP is called the IPv6. 
The Internet Protocol version 6 (IPv6) is the network community's solution to 
resolving some of the issues in IPv4 such as lack of built-in security. IPv6 
integrates the IP Security (IPSec) protocol that must be added to an existing 
IPv4 network (Tomsho et al., 2007). IPSec provides authentication and 
encryption in which authentication ensures that the sender and receiver of data 
packets are known to each other and have permission to send and receive data, 
while encryption makes the underlying data in packets unreadable except to the 
computers involved in the transmission. 
According to Ciampa (2009) protocol, analyzer can fully decode application-
layer network protocols, such as Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) or file 
transfer protocol (FTP). When using protocol analyser technology, network 
intrusion detection system or network intrusion prevention system could detect 
any unusual activities that may be malicious.   
 Step1d (S1d) Authentication and Password 
Authentication is the process of verifying that the sender is who they say they 
are (Dulaney, 2009). One of the methods of establishing authenticity is using 
secret words that have been agreed on in advance such as password.  
 Step1e (S1e) Cryptography 
According to Dulaney (2009) cryptography is the art of concealing information. 
Cryptographic is a system, method, or process that is used to provide encryption 
and decryption. One major reason for implementing a cryptographic system in 
this research is that it provides data integrity, which is assurance that a message 
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was not modified during transmission. Modification can render digital evidence 
inaccurate.  
4.3.3.2 Step2: Secure Policies 
A secure policy determines what controls are required to implement and maintain the 
security of systems, users and networks (Ademu and Imafidon, 2012f). This policy can 
be used as a guide in system implementations and evaluations. As shown in figure 29 
are the sub layers: 
 
Figure 29: The layer of secure policies security requirement 
 Step2a (S2a) Password Management   
A lot of attacking attempts are made with identifying a password to a target 
system. Passwords are the key piece of information needed to access a system 
and users often select passwords that are easy to guess. Many reuse passwords 
or select a simple one to help them remember it; because of this human factor, 
most passwords are easy to guess (Graves, 2010). Once a password is guessed or 
cracked, it can be a security threat such as escalating privileges, executing 
applications, hiding files etc. It is important for digital investigators to manage 
password securely. 
 Step2b (S2b) Administrative Policies 
It is common for security flaws to be identified in software that has been 
released for sale to the public. Some of these flaws can leave the system open to 
attacks by malicious code (Champlain, 2003). Software vendors offer free 
patches to eliminate known flaws. Patches can also be installed against TCP 
SYN to avoid denial of service attack.  Digital Investigators should ensure that 
S2 
Secure Policies 
S2a 
Password Management  
S2b 
Administrative Policies 
S2c 
Internet Connectivity 
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all relevant software is updated with patches as soon as they are made available. 
Occasionally, a number of patches may be issued together as a service pack. 
 Step2c (S2c)  Internet Connectivity 
The best solution for many of the vulnerabilities that exist on the internet is to 
implement secure internet connection. There are two common methods that 
provide secure connections between an internet client and server. Firstly, Secure 
Sockets Layer (SSL) and Transport Layer Security (TLS), the SSL protocol uses 
an encryption scheme between the two systems. TSL is a newer protocol that 
merges SSL with other protocols to provide encryption (Dulaney, 2009). 
Secondly, Hyper Text Transfer Protocol Secure (HTTP/S) is a protocol used for 
secure connections between two systems that use the internet, it protects the 
connection and all traffic between the two systems is encrypted. HTTP/S uses 
SSL or TLS for connection security. 
 
4.3.3.3 Step3: Secure Operational Procedure 
A good security guideline will have incident response process, security operational 
procedures (Ademu and Imafidon, 2012f). 
 
 
Figure 30: The layer of secure operational procedures security requirement 
 Step3a (S3a) Management Tool 
There is need for investigators to be able to mange investigative tools properly 
and in a secured manner (Ademu and Imafidon, 2012g).  
 
 
Step3 (S3) 
Secure Operational Procedures 
S3a 
Management tool 
 
S3b 
Operational procedure 
S3c 
Incident Response Process 
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 Step3b (S3b) Operational Procedure 
There should be secure operational procedures in place. Operational procedures 
need to address authorisation, access and methods used to monitor 
organizational computer systems and applications. Due to the need of 
exchanging files and digital information between the investigators, the lack of 
having proper security plan/guidelines will increase the probability of having the 
digital information infected with viruses due to unsecure file exchange over the 
internet (Dulaney, 2009). The use of unsecured Windows shared folders should 
be avoided. Some worms for example can spread across the network through 
such unsecured shares, infecting all hosts that have unsecured shared folders. 
 Step3c (S3c) Incident Response Process 
Incident response process is the process on how the digital investigator will 
respond to an incident such as an attempt to violate a security policy, any 
unauthorized access to information, a compromised system etc. Initial 
investigation must be carried out to eliminate any further damage. 
 
4.3.3.4 Step4: Network and System Performance 
The following sub layers as shown in figure 31 are: 
 
Figure 31: The layer of performance security requirement 
 Step4a (S4a) Network and System Performance 
It is important to monitor networks and systems performance to ensure that the 
devices are operating normally (Tomsho et al., 2007). Some tools for monitoring 
system's performance are Event Viewer, Task Manager, Performance Monitor 
and Network Monitor. Performance monitor keeps track of activities by 
Step4 (S4) 
Network and System Performance 
S4a 
Performance Monitor 
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monitoring performance on a server or system; this can assist in identifying any 
case of abnormality. 
Table 7: The security measures and guidelines of the new model (Ademu and Imafidon, 2012f) 
Steps Measures Threats 
Secure Application and 
content-based technology 
Step 1 (S1) 
Antivirus component Viruses 
Personal Firewalls  Gaining access to 
information 
Protocol analyzer Denial of Service 
Authentication and password  Impersonating 
Cryptography  Altered integrity 
Secure Policies 
Step 2 (S2) 
Password management Impersonating 
Administrative policies Loss of data 
Internet connectivity Denial of service 
Secure Operational 
procedure 
Step 3 (S3) 
Management tool Gaining access to 
information 
Operational procedures  Loss of data 
Incident response process Denial of service 
Network and  System 
Performance 
Step 4 (S4) 
Performance monitor Denial of service 
Loss of data packet 
 
Table 7 shows the security requirement and mechanism as security measures and 
guidelines incorporated with the investigation process in the new model. 
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4.4 The new Comprehensive Digital Forensic Investigation Model Incorporating 
the Security Mechanism 
As seen in table 7 showing steps in the security guidelines with its measures and 
possible threats, each step will diminish group of threats related to a digital 
investigation process.  A literature review and extensive research were conducted in 
order to prove the need of the measures discussed in this chapter.  
 
Figure 32: The layers of digital forensic investigation process integrating security measures for 
development of new model (Ademu and Imafidon, 2012f) 
The idea of the model is to come up with a solution that contributes to the security level 
of digital investigation process  by integrating security mechanism that assist reviewing 
the security needs and requirements for any digital investigation process. For simple 
visual representation, the model is represented in a matrix view as illustrated below:  
Presentation 
 
P2, P22, P29,  P34, P38, P40, P41 
Reconstruction  
P1, P3, P5, P14, P16, P18,  P20, P25, P37,  P39,  P43, P45  
  S1, S2, S3.S4 
Interaction  
 P8, P9, P10,  P15, P16, P17, P19, P21, P24, P27, P30, P33, P42, P44, P46 
S1, S2, S3,S4 
Preparation 
P4, P6, P7, P11, P12, P13, P16,  P23, P26, P28,  P35, P36,  
S1, S2, S3, S4  
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Figure 33: The Comprehensive Digital Forensic Investigation Model (Ademu and Imafidon, 2012f)  
4.5 Summary 
This chapter presents the concern of security threats in digital forensic investigation 
process, the need of having a model addressing these threats and an application of this 
concept. This security threat concerns is considered as the foundation of the need of a 
new comprehensive digital forensic model. The chapter discussed the systematic 
approach for the development of the new model. 
Preparation Interaction 
Reconstruction Presentation 
 
Security 
Mechanism/Measures 
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Chapter Five: Experiments 
Objectives: 
 to test the hypothesis 
 to conduct experiments 
 to discuss the result of experiments 
 
This chapter aims at testing the hypothesis by conducting experiments, which will either 
support or refute the hypothesis. It also evaluates the results of the experiment. Digital 
devices are becoming more technologically advanced and specifically the area of 
mobile network require support for IP mobility in order to maintain its connectivity with 
its peers while they move across networks and to minimize their service disruption.  
In this section of the research, the CDFIM is applied to two different areas of digital 
investigation. The area of mobile networking and email content. It has been recognised 
in the research that loss of data/packets can be a threat to the integrity of digital 
evidence. Therefore, the recent localized mobility protocol known as PMIPv6 is 
explored. In this section, in order to minimize handover latency and provide reliable 
service buffering function is implemented to minimize packet loss during mobile node 
handover. Furthermore, an experiment is conducted in a real testbed environment to 
compare and analyze standard PMIPv6, the buffering scheme and the improved 
buffering scheme applied to PMIPv6. In addition, an experiment on digital investigation 
is conducted using Comprehensive Digital Forensic Investigation Model (CDFIM) with 
FTK in investigating email content.  
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5.1 Hypothesis 
This research proposes that the integration of security mechanism and intelligent 
software in digital forensic investigative process can serve as a measurement tool for the 
integrity of digital evidence. 
5.2 Data Integrity 
Data integrity ensures providing guarantee that data was not altered in storage or during 
transmission. Data integrity can be achieved by adding information such as checksums 
that can be used as part of the decryption process and using cryptographic approach. 
Another way of establishing data integrity identified in this research is the use of 
PMIPv6 with buffering function. 
5.3 Experiment 1  
Ruibin et al., (2005) explains that obtaining or simulating real case data for a stand-
alone system is not difficult but fetching data from network of a large organisation or a 
large volume of legal cases is very complex and not applicable in many situations. Law 
enforcement agencies have the best-maintained document systems but for reasons of 
security and privacy protection, these documents are not usually accessible to 
researchers. Researchers in Intrusion Detection areas are also face with the issue of 
protecting the sensitive data, but they have already worked out some standard datasets 
and test beds and are still working to improve this. In order to support research and 
implementation, in both digital forensic and computer intelligence, the authors suggests 
adopting the method from information technology to build and publish a standard 
datasets for digital forensic where raw data from selected cases are reorganised and 
filtered, adding some manually created events if the need arise in order to carefully 
examine, locate and categorise events and private and sensitive information removed.  
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5.3.1 Experiment Design 
This section covers a possibility of digital attack investigation. The possibility of 
data/packets loss during handover in a mobile node, which is an attack that can 
influence the integrity of digital information (evidence). An experiment was designed to 
conduct a digital investigation into integrating security mechanism and intelligent 
software in digital forensic investigation process in order to preserve the integrity of 
digital evidence.  
5.3.1.1 Type of Attack 
This experiment considers packet loss during handover, resulting in lost packets with    
longer handover latency. MN handovers delay can lead to more packets lost. This is 
common attack during handover, resulting to lack of integrity on digital information. 
5.3.1.2 Collection of Data 
The Wireshark is used to collect packets. The libipq library is provided as part of the  
IP6Table and it is used to store the packets for the investigation. The aim of carrying out  
this investigation is to establish how preventing packet loss can assist the integrity of  
Digital evidence.  
5.3.1.3 Method of Investigation 
The investigation is conducted based on the Comprehensive Digital Forensic 
Investigation Model (CDFIM). The objective of this is to test the hypothesis and to 
present the applicability of CDFIM. 
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5.3.2 Experiment Component 
This section discusses the network infrastructure, software and tools used in the 
experiment. This experiment is designed in order to minimize MN handover latency, 
and provide reliable service, fast handover schemes have been proposed and 
implemented. These schemes apply buffering function to prevent packet loss during 
MN handover. The integrity of digital evidence can be preserved by implementing 
security mechanism and intelligent software to prevent data loss. Thus, the research 
hypothesis will be tested. Table 8 summaries the component of the experiment's 
infrastructure. 
Table 8: Component of the Experiment's infrastructure 
Infrastructure Description  
Linux-Ubuntu 10.04 Operating system 
OAIPMIPv6 version 0.3.1 OpenAirInterface 
C Language 
Wireshark 1.10.3 Network Protocol analyzer 
 
Table 9: Component of Buffering Function Implementation 
No. Infrastructure 
1 Netfilter Framework 
2 Libipq 
3 Hash and List Library 
4 IP6 Tables Utility 
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5.3.3 Implementation of Buffering 
This section presents the implementation of buffering function to minimize packet loss, 
basic buffering operation, buffering function design, and implementation is explained 
then proposed an improved buffering function. Table 9 shows the component of 
implementing the buffering function. 
 
5.3.3.1 Fundamental Buffering Operating Principles 
During MN handover, handover latency is caused by the connection in a wireless 
setting, the authentication procedure with an authentication, authorization, and 
accounting (AAA) server, and binding update in Mobile Access Gateway (MAG) and 
Local Mobility Anchor (LMA). It is impossible to prevent packet loss during MN 
handover in standard PMIPv6 (Rasem, 2011). Therefore, a buffering function is 
necessary to prevent packet loss during MN handover. There is also a problem when 
applying route optimization without a buffering function. The out-of- sequence problem 
occur, in which packets arrive out of order because of the gap of transmitting time 
through existing and optimized paths (Filipe and Santos, 2011). This problem increases 
network load and service delay or setback with packet retransmission in TCP. It also 
provides unreliable services because of out-of-sequence data in User Datagram Protocol 
(UDP). In PMIPv6, the buffering function must be implemented to provide reliable 
mobility to MNs.  
In order to perform buffering in PMIPv6, either MAG or LMA should support a 
buffering function (Egli, 2013). If the buffering is performed in the MAG, the previous 
MAG (pMAG) should perform buffering during the MN handover. When the MN 
attaches to a new MAG (nMAG), pMAG should forward all the packets stored in the 
buffer to the nMAG so that it can prevent packet loss. If the LMA performs buffering, it 
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stores packets in the buffer during the MN’s handover and forwards all the buffered 
packets to the nMAG after the handover. Most of the schemes, which use the buffering 
function, provide reliable services with these procedures. 
In this research, a PMIPv6 buffering function is implemented based on the open -source 
OpenAirInterface (OAI) PMIPv6. OAI PMIPv6 has recently been developed most 
actively out of the PMIPv6 open - source codes. Before implementation of the buffering 
function, a test bed was established using OAI PMIPv6. OAI PMIPv6 version 0.3.1 was 
used and referred to the method of establishment provided by OAI. The operating 
system is Ubuntu 10.04, and C language is used. To implement the buffering function, 
Netfilter framework, Libipq, Hash &List library, and the IP6Tables utility were used. 
The implemented buffering function can be applied to LMA and/or MAG. An 
experimental environment was established in which LMA performs buffering. 
5.3.3.2 Function Design  
In the testbed in this research at LMA, the NF_IP_PRE_ROUTING hook point is 
provided a hook handler from IP6Tables in the user space to buffer the packets. To 
provide a hook handler to the NF_IP_PRE_ROUTING hook point of Netfilter in the 
kernel space, IP6Tables adds a rule that includes the IP information of the roaming MN. 
The Libipq library is used to store the packets, which is provided as part of IP6Tables. 
This library provides an Application Programming Interface (API) set that can assist in 
communicating with the IP6_Queue module in the kernel space, so that it can push and 
pop packets from the queue during buffering and forwarding, respectively. 
5.3.3.3 Packet Buffering Module 
In this research a new module, Packet Buffering, is added to the existing OAI PMIPv6 
in Figure 34. The Netfilter framework and IPTables tool are used to hook and buffer the 
packets. The Libipq library is included in the IPTables tool, so that the Netfilter can 
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push the hooked packets to the queue in the Packet Buffering module. A NETLINK 
socket is used for transferring information between the Netfilter in the kernel space and 
IPTables tool in the user space. Some few existing modules, such as the Handler, Finite 
State Machine, and Message modules, are also modified to add functions to evaluate 
whether or not forwarding and buffering occur. The Finite State Machine calls the 
buffering module by obtaining the event from the handler when an MN roams. The 
buffering module inserts the hook rule, as a hook handler for a hook point of Netfilter, 
into the IP6Tables using the IPTables tool, and controls the address information of the 
packets, which should be buffered. Then, the Netfilter refers to the data in IP6Tables 
and hooks the packets in the kernel space. 
 
Figure 34: OAI PMIPv6 including buffering module 
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Figure 35: Operation of Packet Buffering Module 
Figure 35 represents the Packet Buffering module, which is the heart of buffering 
implementation. The Packet Buffering module is classified into two parts: 
 Kernel space, 
  User space. 
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 The part in the kernel space is responsible for hooking packets and passing them to the 
user space (Egli, 2013). The packets, which should be buffered, are hooked at the 
NF_IP_PRE_ROUTING hook point in the Netfilter (line1). The IP6Table module 
controlled by the IPTables tool in the user space contains the handler for the hook point. 
The hooked packets are passed to the user space through the IP6_Queue module (line2 - 
line4). The other part in the user space stores the packets received from the kernel space 
to the buffer, and passes the buffered packets to the kernel space. The IPTables tool in 
the user space adds other rules to the IP6Table module to hook packets (line5). The 
Packet Buffering module stores the packets received from the kernel space in the buffer 
using the Libipq library. It pushes and pops the packets from the buffer by using a 
Listening thread and a Re-inject thread (line6 - line7).  
If the LMA performs buffering, the start time of the buffering is the time when the 
LMA receives a De-Registration Proxy Binding Update (DeReg PBU) from pMAG 
after the MN’s detachment (Egli, 2013). If the pMAG cannot communicate with the 
MN nor transmit packets to the MN for a certain time during an MN handover, the 
pMAG sends a DeReg PBU to LMA to notify that the MN has been detached. On 
receiving the message, the LMA identifies that the MN is undergoing handover and 
buffers all the packets for the MN. When the LMA receives the DeReg PBU, the 
Handler module detects it and sends the result of detection to the Finite State Machine 
module. The Finite State Machine module passes the message using the Message 
module, and then sends the MN’s information by calling the Packet Buffering module. 
The Packet Buffering module calls the IPTables tool to include the MN’s address 
information to the IP6Tables rule, and the Netfilter refers to the information to buffer 
the packets for the MN. After the MN attaches to the nMAG and the LMA receives the 
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PBU message, LMA sends the PBA message and all the buffered packets to the nMAG. 
In this way, the packet loss that can occur during the MN handover is prevented. 
5.3.3.4 Buffering Function Implementation 
The implemented buffering is operated in the LMA. Therefore, when pmip_lma_init() is 
executed for LMA initialization, it calls pmip_buffering_init() to initialize the buffering 
function. Figure 36 shows the main lines of the pmip_buffering_init() function. The 
function pmip_buffering_init(), that initializes the buffering function, creates a queue to 
store packets(line 1), defines the mode(line 4), and creates a thread that performs packet 
buffering(line 10). In this research in order to buffer the payload of the packets as well 
as the metadata, the mode was defined with IPQ_COPY_PACKET. The thread calls 
pkt_bufering_listener() to buffer the packets hooked in the kernel space and passed to 
the user space(line 10). After the initialization, if the Handler in the LMA receives the 
PBU message, pmip_lma_recv_pbu(), that is existing in OAI PMIPv6 , is called. The 
function, pmip_lma_recv_pbu(), calls the lma_fsm() function, that is the Finite State 
Machine of LMA. Then, the Finite State Machine finds out whether or not the MN is 
attached, and calls  pmip_buffering_start() to start buffering if the MN has detached, or 
calls pmip_buffering_reinject() to start forwarding if the MN has attached.  
 
Figure 36: Main lines of pmip_buffering_init() function 
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If the Finite State Machine in the LMA receives a DeReg PBU from the pMAG, it 
checks the MN ’s IP address in the message and prepares packet buffering for the MN . 
Figure 37 shows the main lines of the pmip_buffering_start() function. This function get 
ready to start packet buffering during the MN handover. It includes two parts, firstly, to 
include a rule that carries the MN ’s address to the IP6Tables to hook the packets for the 
MN (line 8, line 11), secondly, to assign the memory to store the packets in the hash 
table (line 2 - line 7, line 10). The function, pkt_buffering_add_rule(), is made to 
include a rule adding the MN ’s address to the  IP6Tables. The Netfilter  hooks packets 
for the MN by using this rule as a handler in the kernel space and passes the packets to 
the user space. The passed packets are buffered by the thread that the 
pkt_buffering_listener() function calls. 
 
Figure 37: Main lines of pmip_buffering_start() function 
When the MN attaches to the nMAG, the nMAG sends PBU to the LMA. The Finite 
State Machine in the LMA that has received the PBU checks the MN ’s address from 
the message and prepares to forward the packets for the MN. Figure 38 represents part 
of the function source code, pmip_buffering_reinject(), which searches for the hash item 
related to the MN, and calls the function for packet forwarding. It searches the hash 
tables where the packets for the MN are stored by using the MN ’s address(line 2). After 
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that, it creates a thread that performs the pkt_reinject() function and forwards the 
packets to the MN until the buffer is emptied(line 5). Figure 39 shows the part of 
pkt_reinject() where the packets are forwarded to the MN from the hash table(line 1- 
line 9), and the MN ’s address is erased from the IP6Tables after the buffer is 
emptied(line 10). It forwards all the packets for the MN that has roamed using the 
ipq_set_verdict() function in the libipq library. The ipq_set_verict() function forwards 
the packet to the kernel space repeatedly until the table gets empty. Therefore all the 
buffered packets are forwarded to the MN after the MN handover. 
 
Figure. 38 Main lines of pmip_buffering_reinject() function 
 
Figure. 39 Main lines of pkt_reinject() function 
The implemented packet buffering function prevents packet loss during the MN ’s 
handover so that it can provide a reliable service. However, an MN that moves quickly 
may roam before all the packets are forwarded to the MN. In this case, the LMA does 
not forward the buffered packets and holds them, because the MN is not connected. In 
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addition, since the packets for the MN are buffered during the MN ’s hand over, more 
memory space in the LMA is required, which increases the load in the LMA. In order to 
resolve this problem and perform buffering effectively, this research proposes an 
improved forwarding scheme. 
5.3.3.5 Performance Improvement Implementation 
Most of the schemes that use buffering functions, packets buffered during the MN 
handover are flushed to the MN (Rasem, 2011). Packet flushing, that does not consider 
network bandwidth is the reason behind rapid network load and packet loss. Therefore, 
in this research a method is used in which the packet forwarding rate is adjusted 
according to the packet arrival rate, and the packets are forwarded to the MN instead of 
packet flushing. However, if the packet arrival rate and forwarding rate are the same in 
the LMA, the load of LMA is increased, because the amount of the packets in the buffer 
is increased when the MN moves quickly. In order to prevent the buffer from keeping 
packets longer, the packet forwarding rate is adjusted in order to be faster than the 
packet arrival rate in the LMA. So, the LMA increases the packet forwarding rate by the 
given rate of increment according to the calculated packet arrival rate, and forwards the 
packets. In this way, the LMA empties out its buffer, forwarding the packets more 
quickly than receiving them. 
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Figure 40: Flow chart of the improved buffering scheme 
Figure 40 is a flow chart of the proposed buffering scheme to improve the buffering 
performance. The LMA calculates the packet arrival rate by using the interval of 
received packets during the MN handover. In order to make the packet forwarding rate 
higher than the packet arrival rate, the packet arrival rate is multiplied by a constant 
between 1 and 2 and obtain the maximum packet forwarding rate. After the MN 
handover, the LMA forwards the buffered packets to the MN. As packets are forwarded 
to the MN, the amount of the forwarded packets is increased. If the amount of the 
forwarded packets does not exceed the maximum packet forwarding rate (bps), the 
LMA continually forwards packets to the nMAG(line1 - line3). If the amount of the 
forwarded packets exceeds the maximum packet forwarding rate, the LMA checks if the 
measured time for the packet forwarding exceeds 1 second(line1, line4). If it exceeds 1 
second, which means the LMA forwards packets within the limit of maximum packet 
forwarding rate, the amount of the forwarded packets is initializes and packet 
forwarding is continued(line4, line5). If it does not exceed 1 second, which means it 
reaches to the limit of the maximum packet forwarding rate, it stops the packet 
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forwarding and waits(line4, line6). Figure 41 shows a part of the control_bytesrate() 
function for performance enhancement of the implemented buffering function. Figure 
42 shows a part of the modified pmip_buffering_reinject() function called when the 
packets in the buffer are forwarded. The packet arrival rate is multiplied by 1.2 to 
forward packets 20% more quickly to prevent excessive network load due to the 
increment of the packet forwarding rate(line 13).  
 
Figure 41: Main lines of Control_bytesrate() function 
 
Figure 42: Main lines of modified pmip_buffering_reinject() function 
In this research the buffering function was used to provide reliable service in PMIPv6. 
However, when the MN moves more quickly, handovers occur regularly and the LMA 
performs packet buffering before it forwards all the packets in the buffer to the MN. 
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This research proposes and implements a buffering scheme to resolve this problem and 
manages the buffer in the LMA more effectively. After the MN handover, the LMA 
forwards the packets to the MN more quickly than the packet arrival rate. The packet 
forwarding rate can be obtained  by multiplying the packet arrival rate by a constant 
between 1 and 2. Packets can be sent more quickly to the frequently roaming MN by 
implementing the proposed buffering scheme, and reduce the load of the LMA by 
managing the buffer effectively. 
5.4 Conducting the Experiment 
The literature review analysis indicates four main investigative phases such as 
preparation, interaction, reconstruction and presentation of digital forensic investigation 
process, and the incorporation of security requirement/guidelines were considered in all 
the phases of the new model. The investigation was based on CDFIM. 
In this aspect of this research, an experiment of a real testbed environment is performed 
to compare and analyze standard PMIPv6, the buffering scheme and the improved 
buffering scheme applied to PMIPv6. Packet loss during the MN handover are 
performed in each case, also the performance of the buffering and improved buffering 
schemes when the MN moves quickly. 
5.4.1 Preparation Phase 
At this stage, the strategy of approach on how to conduct the investigation was 
established. During the investigation Wireshark was used for data collect and to detect 
and confirm potential incident that can alter the data. Proper planning is conducted on 
the use of tools. The physical and operational infrastructure where made ready to 
support investigation. While conducting the investigation, consistent use of  antivirus 
was in place and firewalls configured to ensure minimized risk of security threat to 
digital information. Authorization and authentication was established by applying 
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methods such as using username and passwords when using the systems and when the 
MAG detects mobile nodes, it checks for the host authorization.  Secure policies were in 
place to implement and maintain the security of systems and digital information. The 
password used was securely managed to avoid any attampts of attack on the digital 
device and information. Proper check was made to ensure that software used was not 
identified with any security flaws. Secure internet connection was implemented each 
time there was need to connect to the internet. The security guidelines were 
demonstrated as applicable in the four phases.  
 The PMIPv6 testbed was established and experiment conducted to observe the 
performance of the implemented buffering scheme.  Figure 43 represents the topology 
of the PMIPv6 testbed. The testbed is based on OAL PMIPv6 v0.3. The experiment was 
conducted by establishing an OAI PMIPv6 v0.3 testbed for standard PMIPv6, and 
including the buffering function. The testbed consists of an LMA and two MAGs. A 
free RADUIS was installed in the LMA and an AAA server rather than using a separate 
AAA server. A hub was used instead of an Acess Point (AP) for the wireless link, and 
connect the MN to an MAG with a cable. Although the same results can be obtained in 
a wireless environment as a wired environment, a cable was used in order to minimize 
signal interference and the effect of signalling size in a wireless environment. Unified 
handover time was  also regarded by clarifying the start and end points of the handover 
in each cases and provide the same environmental conditions. The performance was 
evaluated with the testbed to obtain more reliable results from any performance 
evaluation.  
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Figure 43: The topology of PMIPv6 test bed 
 
5.4.2 Interaction Phase 
The focus of the investigation was adjusted to the specifics of the case which is loss of 
data packets. The main goal of all activities carried out at this stage ensures the 
discovering, distributing of digital information and maintaing the integrity of the data.  
The performance of standard PMIPv6, and PMIPv6 with buffering and the improved 
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buffering scheme applied was evaluated. In this performance evaluation, the MN moves 
from MAG1 to MAG2 . A program written in python for packet transmission between 
the MN and Correspondent Node (CN) was used. The packet transmission program uses 
UDP protocol and consists of a server and client. The client transmits packets with the 
amount the user has set in the given data rate. Upon receiving the packets, the server 
checks the information in the data received. In the experiment, the CN is the client and 
transmit data to the server, the MN. The MN moves to MAG2 to MAG1 while receiving 
data, and the performance is evaluated by measuring packet loss. 
The most important performance improvement of applying the buffering function is to 
prevent packet loss during the MN handover. In this performance evaluation, packet 
loss is compared in standard PMIPv6 and PMIPv6 with buffering applied, and show the 
superiority of the implemented buffering scheme by observing the packet sequence 
number change. The amount of packet in LMA is also compared in PMIPv6 with 
buffering and the improved buffering applied for performance comparison. Through this 
comparisons, this research proves the provision of reliable service by applying the 
buffering scheme, and the decrease in load of the LMA by applying the improved 
buffering scheme thus assisting in the integrity of digital data. Hence proving the 
integrity of digital evidence. 
5.4.3 Reconstruction Phase 
This phase involves bringing together the result of relevant digital information (data) 
from the earlier part of the process and any other relevant information which 
investigator may have obtained to provide a detailed account of the events or incident. 
Figure 44 shows the results of the MN handover in the standard PMIPv6, and PMIPv6 
with buffering and improved buffering applied. The horizontal and vertical axes are 
time and packet sequence number that the MN has received, respectively. The MN 
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begins and finishes handover at 2 seconds and 4 seconds, respectively. The handover 
latencies are 2 seconds in each case. In the standard PMIPv6, about 250 packets are lost 
during the MN handover, as was observed during the experiment through the packet 
sequence number. However, in PMIPv6 with the buffering and improved buffering 
applied, packet loss does not occur, because the MN receives all the packets buffered in 
the LMA. In addition, the slope of the PMIPv6 with improved buffering applied is 
steeper than that of the PMIPv6 with buffering applied, because the packets are 
transmitted more quickly. Through Figure 44, it was observed that packet loss is 
prevented during the MN handover if a buffering function was used. It was also 
observed that if the improved buffering scheme was used, the buffered packets arrive in 
the MN more quickly. 
 
Figure 44: Handover results 
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5.4.4 Presentation Phase 
In the presentation phase, the results of the case analysis are presented and the 
documentation of the whole activities during the investigation in a written report is 
conducted.  
The packet loss in the standard PMIPv6 and that with buffering applied was checked to 
determine the differences in packet loss. In the experiment of this research, the client 
transmits 5 Megabytes of data to the server at 32~512Kbps. The number of packets was 
measured and sent from the CN to the MN. Figure 45 shows the amount of packets that 
the MN receives, depending on the handover latency. If  the handover latency is longer, 
fewer packets arrive at the destination in the standard PMIPv6. If the data rate is higher, 
fewer packets arrive at the destination as well, because the amount of packets sent 
during the MN handover is larger. In the PMIPv6 with the buffering function, the 
amount of packets arriving at the destination is constant, depending on handover 
latency, although it is decreased as the data rate becomes higher. Figure 46 shows the 
packet loss depending on the handover latency.  
The packet loss is in reverse proportional to the amount of packets arriving at the 
destination. When the data rate is 512 Kbps and the handover latency is 5 seconds, 
packet loss is prevented by 98.16%. It can be expected that if the handover latency is 
longer, it will prevent more packet loss. After the MN detaches from the pMAG, the 
pMAG sends a DeReg. PBU to the LMA and the LMA prepares packet buffering. 
During that time, the packets sent to the MN are lost, and the buffering function cannot 
prevent it. In Figures 45 and 46, it was observed that packet loss can be minimized 
during the MN handover using the buffering function, and it is effective if the handover 
latency is long. 
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Figure  45: Total amount of packets arriving in MN 
 
Figure 46: Total amount of packets dropped for MN 
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If  the buffering scheme is used, packets are left in the buffer after the MN handover. If 
the packet arrival rate and forwarding rate at the LMA are the same, the amount of 
remaining packets in the buffer is constant. But if the packet forwarding rate at the 
LMA to the MN is higher than the arrival rate, the amount of packets gradually 
decreases, and the buffer will be empty after the MN handover. Figure 47 shows a 
comparison between two schemes, firstly, where the packet forwarding and arrival rate 
are the same, secondly, where the packet forwarding rate is higher than the arrival rate. 
After the handover latency for 2 seconds, the amount of packets in the buffer is constant 
in the buffering scheme. After that, it is increased again during the next handover for 2 
seconds. However, in the improved buffering scheme, the amount of packets in the 
buffer is gradually decreased after the MN handover. Figures 47, 48, and 49 shows how 
the amount of packets in the buffer is changed when the packet forwarding rates are 
1.05, 1.1, and 1.2 times the packet arrival rate, respectively. The times required to 
empty the buffer are 32 seconds, 16 seconds, and 9 seconds for each case, respectively. 
In the improved buffering scheme, the amount of forwarded packets is higher than the 
amount of received packets at the LMA for a while. Therefore, the amount of packets in 
the buffer and the load of the LMA can be reduced, but the required time depends on the 
packet forwarding rate. 
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Figure 47: The amount of remaining packets in the buffer (5% improvement) 
 
Figure 48: The amount of remaining packets in the buffer (10% improvement) 
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Figure 49: The amount of remaining packets in the buffer (20% improvement) 
PMIPv6 with improved buffering function, provides a solution that can reduce the 
latency in IP handovers by limiting the mobility management within the PMIPv6 
domain, therefore, it can largely avoid remote service which not only cause long service 
delays but consume more network resources which can cause DoS attack. 
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5.5 Experiment 2 
5.5.1 Experiment Design 
This section covers another possibility of digital attack investigation. 
5.5.1.1 Type of Attack 
This is a case of violation of an organisation's IT policies. The IT security discovers that 
an employee violated the organization's IT policy by illegally using his personal email 
account during office hours. A digital investigation needs to be conducted in order to 
identify the activities of the employee, there was need to collect evidence of activity by 
the employee from the employee's email box. This activities were then examined to 
provide the interaction and reconstruction process with information about the 
employee's activities. This examination also demonstrates the applicability of the 
investigative process proposed in this research.   
5.5.1.2 Collection of Data 
To examine the case in order to confirm the need of proposed security requirement and 
digital forensic investigation process of the new model, a test image with realistic data 
was created. In a hypothetical scenario, an email message is sent in a way that breaches 
a security policy, the computer is acquired and there is need to investigate the case to 
confirm the use of the personal email box during office hours. The test image is a 
Virtual Machine (VM) running Microsoft Windows XP with messaging and 
communication applications installed. The image has a user labelled dommyuser1. The 
user account was created with a default administrator account and labelled dommyuser1 
with no administrator privileges. Once the user account was created, communication 
software was installed. A gmail account was created with the same username. Outlook 
was configured using IMAP and synchronised for the account. The dommyuser1 sent 
email to the account. To capture the initial state of the source data to ensure that copy 
that can be used for data processing is available when needed. The copy of email 
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content (gmail account) from Outlook was saved in a folder called "U" and kept safely 
to be used when needed for data processing. 
5.5.1.3 Method of Investigation 
In this case, security violation is established therefore, a systematic and scientific model 
of investigation is employed to examine and analyse the crime. Using the 
Comprehensive Digital Forensic Investigation Model (CDFIM) an investigation is 
conducted. The objective of this is to test the hypothesis and to present the applicability 
of CDFIM. 
5.5.2 Experiment Component  
 Windows XP 
 Internet Explorer 
 Firefox 
 Google Chrome 
 Internet Massage Access Protocol (IMAP) 
 Outlook 
 Google Mail 
 Wireshark 
 
5.5.2.1 Toolkits 
The Forensic Toolkits (FTK) was used in this investigation. FTK establishes the 
perception of relationship of the security requirement with digital forensic investigation 
process. The analysis will show how the phases of the comprehensive model address 
cases during digital investigation.  
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The protocol analyzer known as Wireshark was deployed and used to detect and 
confirm any incident that may disrupt the investigation and influence the integrity of 
digital evidence while conducting the investigation. 
5.5.2.2 System Requirement 
o Windows XP 32/64-bit 
o Minimum RAM of 2GB 
o  Hard disk space 6GB 
o FTK Version 1.81.6 
5.5.3 FTK Interface 
The FTK interface is divided into a number of tabs. Each tab is filled with individual 
panes that can be defined by the user. Each tab in FTK is a customizable frame in which 
individual panes can be moved, added or deleted. 
Every tab contains only one tree pane such as Explorer, Graphics, Overview, Email, or 
Bookmark. It can also contain other panes such as File List, File Content, Properties, 
Hex Value Interpreter or Thumbnails. The report can be extracted and presented 
constructively at the end of the case analysis. The following are: 
Search Tab 
In AccessData FTK 1.81.6 Version the Search tab is a specific tab that, once tabbed, is 
divided into Index Search Tab and Live Search Tab. The Index Search allows for fast 
searching based on keywords. The evidence must be indexed in order to perform 
indexed searches. The Live Search tab allows searching of any word, hex value, or 
number entry throughout the case. 
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Figure 50: The search tab 
Overview Tab 
The overview tab provides a general view of a case. From the test conducted  as shown 
in Figure 51,  it can be confirmed the items that exist in the various categories, view 
lists of items and look at individual files. FTK categorises file types based on the file 
header. File types are organised in a tree structure rather than containers, FTK can 
categorise file types on a granular level. As confimed during the test at the root level, 
the overview tab groups case items in the categories of File Items, File Extension, File 
Category, File Status and Bookmarks. 
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Figure 51: Overview of the case 
Explore Tab 
The Explore tab gives access to the evidence item’s original directory structure. From 
the test result as shown in figure 52 the Explore tab viewed folders in specific locations 
and perform searches based on the layout created by the user. 
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Figure 52: The Explore tab 
Graphic Tab 
The Graphic tab is a variation of the Explore tab with an emphasis on graphics files. 
Like the Explorer tab, it includes the Evidence tree but during the test conducted, 
filtering is applied so that the Graphic tab shows only graphics files.  
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Figure 53:  The Graphic tab 
Bookmark Tab  
The FTK bookmark features provide an excellent way to organise and track items of 
interest. After an item is bookmarked, it was indicated that the bookmark and their 
associated files/items in the bookmark tab as shown in figure 54 can be viewed.  
Bookmark can also be used to generate case reports.  
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Figure 54: the Bookmark tab 
 
Evidence Processing 
In FTK options can be selected to calculate file hashes and perform the Known File 
Filter (KFF). FTK provides a number of filtering options, including a Slack/Free space 
button on the main screen that will provide a list of file slack, file system slack, and 
unallocated space. The File slack and drive free space (unallocated space) are located on 
the Overview tab, then File Status and then Slack/Free Space. They can also be found 
on the Explore tab under the appropriate tree node.  
In FTK Evidence Processing defines the default processing options for all evidence 
items added to the current case as shown in figure 55. These processes can shape the 
scope of the analysis and the outcome of the case. 
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Figure 55: Case processing option 
Filtering capabilities are built into FTK in the form of a File Filter Manager, enabling to 
select which types of files to exclude. For instance in ignoring duplicate files, click on 
the Filtered button on the main FTK screen and then uncheck file system artefacts that 
are unwanted or have been exported. In FTK File Duplicate Files Option helps to 
generate an MD5 hash for each file and identifies duplicate files based on a comparison 
of MD5 hash values. 
Evidence processing shows the default processing options for all evidence items added 
to the current case. These processes can shape the scope of an analysis and the outcome 
of the case. 
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5.5.4 Conducting the Experiment  
The digital investigation is conducted based on CDFIM 
5.5.4.1Preparation Phase 
 The first step taken to examine this case was  to ensure that the search will not violate 
any law and risk assessment was conducted. As identified in this research, it is 
recommended for investigators to collect written instructions and authorisations from 
their legal representatives before conducting digital investigation. As mentioned 
previously this is beyond the area of scope  and the research assumes that authorisation 
for investigation has been given. 
The preliminary investigation showed that the employee had used a personal email 
during office hours but denied the allegation of using personal email. In this case, an 
incident was detected and confirmed and there was need for an investigation. Therefore, 
further step was to collect evidence of suspicious activity from the employer's computer. 
This activity was then examined in order to provide the reconstruction process with 
information about the employer's activities. All possible communication capabilities of 
the system were disabled to avoid corruption of evidence. To maintain chain of custody, 
there was proper documentation of the processes.  
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Figure 56: Creating a New Case 
In this test phase, the equipment was ready and used effectively for the investigation. 
For the test, a new case within FTK with the following steps are: 
 Log into FTK Case Database Manager with a user account that has 
administrative rights to create a case. 
 Click on File and then New Case  
 Complete the New Case Option dialog as shown in Figure 56. 
The FTK deployed contains security component that was not ignored but considered 
during the investigation. Authorization and authentication were established while 
conducting the investigation. Identification and Passwords were properly managed. 
Cryptographic options were considered and applied in order to ensure the integrity of 
the duplicate files of the digital evidence. Operational procedures was followed on how 
to use and manage tools, also security procedures on how to protect tools from threats 
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and vulnerabilities were also considered. Security component such as antivirus, personal 
firewalls and secured protocol were made available. Antivirus software was 
implemented in order to detect any known malicious code and stop them from infecting 
a workstation . The Antivirus software's virus definition files was kept up to date, so 
that it can detect the most recent viruses. A personal firewall  protected the workstation 
from intruders. An intrusion detection system known as wireshark was made available 
for port sanning to detect signal of  imminent attack and alert during investigation. Care 
was also taken to ensure that software flaws are identified and relevant update with 
patches are applied. 
 
5.5.4.2 Interaction Phase 
 This is a major phase introduced in this research. The Interaction phase ensured the 
following: 
The gathered evidence is added to the case for  analysis. 
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Figure 57: Adding Evidence in FTK 
In order to add an evidence, a dialogue box will pop up as shown in Figure 57. 
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Figure 58: Selecting an image destination 
The Evidence dialogue box allows the adding and removal of evidence items from the 
case.  
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Figure 59: Selecting the image folder 
As shown above, FTK works with different evidence source types. 
 Acquired image of a drive: Any supported forensic image 
 All images in the directory: all supported forensic images located in the specific 
folder 
 Content of a folder: A specific folder and accompanying subfolders and files 
 Individual files: A specific file or files 
 Mobile Phone: for a mobile phone to appear as an evidence source, the Mobile 
Phone Examiner Software (MPE) must be installed and the MPE licence must 
be present on the CodeMeter dongle. 
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Figure 60: Identifying the evidence 
Figure 61 shows that the test focused on the specific of the case. The digital 
investigation focused on email content. The relevant data was collected. At every stage 
of handling and processing the digital evidence documentation was a continuous 
process, which was required to maintain a good chain of custody. 
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Figure 61: Viewing the Email messages 
In the test conducted the Email tab helps narrow the focus to display only email-related 
files. The Case overview pane displays email-related containers to give quick access to 
email databases within the evidence. From the test conducted when an email file was 
selected from the file list, it indicated that the File Content Viewer displays the email 
message in HTML format and the Email Attachments pane displays email attachments 
associated with the current message as shown in Figure 61. 
Baesed on the result shown above, a chronological timeline analysis was conducted in 
order to identify the employer's activities, it was confirmed that the employee used his 
personal email from 13:34pm until 14:08pm. This time confirmed that the employee 
used his personal email during office hours. The digital evidence is securely transported 
and properly stored.  
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Figure 62: Case processing options 
Figure 62 shows the preservation of the evidence conducted by applying the evidence 
processing options. This assist in verifying the integrity of files which contains 
evidence.  
In the Interaction phase all the security giudelines also needed to be considered and 
ensured its continous availability. In the investigation, security guidelines such as using 
a secure protocol and ensuring that all available unused network ports were closed to 
avoid external communication that may lead to vulnurability. An important step when 
collecting evidence is to image the data in a way that will not alter the integrity of the 
data. Adequate process was in place for making available safe media on which to image 
the data to be processed. The FTK used to examine the case in the test is able to recover 
a lot of raw data, files, folders, streams and metadata. Without doubt identifying the 
data on its own generates value in an investigation. There are pages and pages of file 
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names, attributes and other details, but none of this information is enough to ensure the 
integrity of the evidence though. It is important that data is analysed in a step by step 
approach that ensures the integrity of the information collected.   
5.5.4.3 Reconstruction Phase 
In this phase, the result of relevant information from the earlier part (interaction phase) 
of the analysis process were gathered with other relevant information which have been 
obtained to provide a detailed account of the activities of the employee.  
Based on the evidence found, more analysis is made and conclusion is drawn. When an 
evidence item is selected in FTK, relevant information about the item can be displayed. 
To view the properties of any file item, select the item in the File List pane, and the file 
properties will show as seen in Figure 63. 
The digital component identified is evaluated and ensures that it is relevant to the case 
being investigated and can be considered as a legitimate evidence. The findings or 
results are properly documented. 
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Figure 63: Viewing the file properties 
 
This is where relevant evidence is properly stored for future references 
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Figure 64: FTK Evidence item overview 
During the examination process, the security component were made available. In the 
email content examination, there ensured the availability of antivirus software which 
automatically scan system and files at times  to avoid the the infection of security 
threats and vulnerabilities.   
5.5.4.4 Presentation Phase 
After completing the digital investigation, all the findings and results is documented as 
a report. In the report, all investigative activities have to be written and conclusions 
drawn have to be explained. In this investigation FTK presented a good documentation 
process by generating a custom formatted report that shows the content of the case 
including the relevant email content as shown in the Appendix. 
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5.6 Summary 
This chapter discussed security threats and vulnerability impact on investigation 
process, and the step by step approach of developing the new model. The chapter aimed 
to test the hypothesis by running two digital attacks investigation on different areas such 
as mobile network and emails using CDFIM to demonstrate the digital investigation. 
The researcher found that the integration of security mechanism and intelligent software 
when conducting digital forensic investigation could preserve the integrity of digital 
evidence.  
In the area of mobile network, the research proposed and implemented PMIPv6 with 
improved buffering to minimize performance issue on handover latency and loss of data 
which the experiment's result identified, as able to assist in providing reliable services 
and in turn assist in digital investigation. 
Loss of data/packet and violation of organisation's IT policy were used as methods of 
attack, in both cases, data were collected. The resulting data were analysed and 
examined using CDFIM. The researcher also found that when CDFIM was applied, 
regardless of the digital envioronment, the digital investigation could be conducted 
based on CDFIM  
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Chapter Six: Validation  
Objectives: 
 to comparatively analyse CDFIM 
 to present case studies that used CDFIM in real digital devices attack 
 to discuss the limitations of CDFIM 
  
In chapter 2 and 4 the conceptualised model was introduced. The objective was to 
establish the digital forensic investigation process and security requirments needed in 
the new model. The main purpose of this chapter is to justify the digital forensic 
investigation process and its security requirement as  a good model for digital 
investigation process and as a measurement for ensuring the integrity of digital 
evidence. It is important to demonstrate not just that a crime has been committed, but to 
demonstrate proofs of the intergrity of digital evidence (Pilli et al., 2010). By employing 
a consistent and methodical processes to establish the crime, it is important to prove the 
integrity of the originality of the digital information.  
The conceptualised model derived from the literature review and analysis is used as a 
measure to identify good security level applicable to the different digital investigation. 
The validation  process was part of the research methodology used.  
6.1 Comparative Analysis 
The proposed model is compared with other digital forensic models; the research finds 
that the main differences between CDFIM and others are as follows: 
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6.1.1 Preparation  
 CDFIM is designed for dealing with security attacks and vulnerabilities identified when 
conducting digital investigation, which poses threat to the integrity of digital evidence, 
where as other models, are general model that do not take adequate cognisance of 
possible threats on the integrity of digital evidence in the conduct of investigation. In 
the preparation phase, an organised working environment is in pace before and during 
digital investigation. While conducting the investigation, proper security components 
are made available that can avoid the occurence of security incident which can alter the 
integrity of digital evidence. 
6.1.2 Interaction 
This phase is a major advancement in the developement of digital forensic models.  In 
CDFIM  interaction phase has been designed to deal with digital information when 
conducting digital investigation to ensure the integrity of digital evidence collected. In 
this phase, the digital information is identified, maintained and distribution in a secure 
manner.  The network protocol analyser known as Wireshark applied in the research is 
used as a security mechanism to monitor the network in order to ensure that, there are 
no abnormal activites that can distrupt the investigation and cause damage to digital 
evidence. Also in the area of mobile communication network, the research proposed a 
network-based mobility management known as the PMIPv6 with buffering function in 
order to deal with performance issues of handover latency and loss of data packet which 
can affect the integrity of digital evidence. 
6.1.3 Reconstruction 
CDFIM has employed reconstruction as a method of further analysis to examine the 
digital information collected in the previous phase (interaction) in order to identify the 
relationship between these pieces of digital information. Also it ensured that the 
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transport and storage approach to the digital evidence are conducted in a way that will 
secure the integrity of digital evidence. However other models do not prescribe how to 
securely analyse collected digital information in a way that will ensure its integrity. 
6.1.4 Presentation 
CDFIM emphasized on consistent documentation of the various activities conducted 
during digital investigation. More emphasis was made to providing detailed report 
which are gathered from the initial stage of the investigation to the finish. While other 
models do not identify at this phase presenting standard and consistent documentation 
of the whole process of the investigation. 
6.2 Criteria of Success 
The proposed model was derived from the extensive research and literature review, and 
result of the experiment and analysis. The development of the layers was done based on 
a scientific approach and each layer and sub layer was justified and backed with an 
academic literature. The critical success factors considered during the development of 
the model are: 
 Applicability: The model must be applicable to any organisation for its 
information sharing. It can be observed that the model presented in this thesis is 
applicable to any organization. Any digital investigator can apply this model. 
 Simplicity: The model must be clear to the intended users such as digital 
forensic investigators, security investigators, system administrators or 
individuals. The layers of the model must be explicit to non-digital forensic or 
security expert. 
 Flexibility 
The model must be flexible and can be implemented in phases. 
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 Doable   
The model must be doable to the intended users. 
 
6.3 Case Study 
Since the case studies used in  this research are life case scenarios the validation process 
was crucial to confirm model applicability.  
6.3.1 Case Study 1 
6.3.1.1 Background 
A company relies on computer systems to perform, process, transmit, store and retrieve 
data. The company uses a client/server operating system. The company's IT security is 
responsible for securing IT resources and conducting computer forensic investiagtions. 
6.3.1.2 A case of Teardrop Denial of Service Attack    
A system administrator of a server in a company identified that the server was suddenly 
generating a large amount of network traffic, consuming considerable bandwidth. The 
company therefore isolated the server's portion of the network until the situation was 
resolved. 
The initial findings of the IT security, which conducted an analysis of its system found 
that there was initiated teardrop denial of service attack. Figure 65 demonstrates the 
result of the electronic evidence using wireshark to sniff and monitor the packet on the 
network as shown below: 
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Figure 65: The result of the electronic evidence of the teardrop denial of service attack 
6.3.1.3 CDFIM Findings 
The  CDFIM was used to conduct the investigation. The researcher identified the need 
for an investigation and then investigated the situation. The initial activity that was 
conducted by the researcher is deploying a security mechanism (protocol analyzer) 
called wireshark which is a packet sniffer software on the network. The wireshark was 
used to look at all traffic coming from or going to the suspect machine and it was also 
used to detect and confim incident while conducting the investigation. The digital 
evidence was collected using wireshark.  
Proper planning is conducted on the use of tools. The physical and operational 
infrastructure where prepared to support the investigation. The investigative tools were 
properly managed  and in a secured manner. While conducting the investigation, 
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consistent and steady use of  antivirus was in place and firewalls configured to ensure 
minimized risk of security threat to digital information. Authorization and 
authentication was established by applying methods such as using username and 
passwords when using the systems. Secure policies were in place to implement and 
maintain the security of systems and digital information. The password used was 
securely managed to avoid any attampts of attack on the digital device and information. 
Proper check was made to ensure that software used was not identified with any 
security flaws. Secure internet connection was implemented each time there was need to 
connect to the internet. In order to minimize the risk of having the digital information 
infected with digital attacks and threats unsecure file exchange and opening of unsecure 
shared folders were avoided.  The security guidelines were demonstrated as applicable 
while conducting the investigation. 
The investigation revealed that packet 8 and packet 9 shows the overlapping IP 
Fragments in a teardrop attack. In packet 8 as seen in figure 66, result shows that a 
machine with the IP address source 10.1.1.1 was sending packets to the IP address 
129.111.30.27. The result also shows the time rate at which these packets were being 
sent. A more detailed look at the contents of the packets showed the following: 
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Figure 66: Packet 8 analysis result 
Breaking down the packet shows that these are valid IP packet, but inside the long 
string of zeroes is the hexadecimal string which shows the reassemblying of the data. 
 
 
Figure 67: A detailed bit view of analysis result 
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Figure 68: Using details to show security issue Teardrop DoS attack in packet 9 
Figure 68 shows that in packet 9, data packets are reassembled with confusing OFFSET 
fields and a malformed payload sizes or length. Further analysis showed confused data 
fragment occurring at different sizes, this is potentially problematic to the target system. 
Subsequent examination of the server showed the protocol as user datagram protocol 
(UDP) source port as 31915 and destination port as 20197.  
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Figure 69: A detailed hexadecimal view of the reassembled packet 9 
The result in this investigation identified that the target system will have no idea as how 
to handle this kind of data packets and reassembling the data packets according to 
TCP/IP or IPv4 will result in system crash or reboot. Based on the result of a 
reassembled packet showed in figure 69, in this research it was concluded that if a 
system has been exploited there is no way to know how badly it has been compromised, 
once the exploit is discovered, it should be assumed that the best option for the system 
is to be rebuilt rather than merely cleaning the server.   For instance simply using 
"remote sysadmin" to clean the server of the known rootkit is not enough; more 
malware can be left in the system. With the use of a secure communication protocol, 
which is the IPv6, the digital evidence from this investigation, was safely transported 
and securely stored.  
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6.3.2 Case Study 2 
6.3.2.1 Background 
An organisation relies on computer systems to perform, process, transmit, store and 
retrieve data. The organisation uses a client/server operating system and performs huge 
daily operations on the system.  
6.3.2.2 A Case of Unauthorised Access 
An individual was allegly accused by an organization of illegally accessing top secret 
computer systems in what they claimed as the biggest military computer hack of all 
times. The alleged individual using his home computer, through the internet identfied 
the organisation's network computers with an open Microsoft windows connection and 
extracted the identities of certain administrative accounts and password. Having gained 
access to those accounts he installed unauthorised remote access and administrative 
software called "Remotely Anywhere" that enabled him to access and alter data upon 
from the organisation's computers at any time and without detection by virtue of the 
programme masquerading as a Windows operating system. He installed software 
facilitating both further compromises to the computers and concealment of his 
activities. Using this software, he scanned the organisation's computers for other 
computers and network susceptible to similar compromise. He was able to move from 
network to network in different location. Due alleged individual's actions, data were 
delected from the organisation's databases, including critical operating system files, this 
lead to system shut down in the organisation, disrupting the organisattion's functions.   
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6.3.2.3 CDFIM Findings 
The  CDFIM was used to conduct the investigation. Upon having knowledge of this 
case, the researcher identified the need for an investigation and then investigated the 
situation. The initial activity that was conducted by the researcher was applying the 
Wireshark in order to look at all traffic coming from or going to the workstation and it 
was also used to detect and confim incident on the workspace while conducting the 
investigation. Proper planning is conducted on the use of tools. The physical and 
operational infrastructure where made ready to support investigation. While conducting 
the investigation, consistent use of  antivirus was in place and firewalls configured to 
ensure minimized risk of security threat to digital information. Secure policies were in 
place to implement and maintain the security of systems and digital information. The 
password used was securely managed to avoid any attampts of attack on the digital 
device and information. Proper check was made to ensure that software used was not 
identified with any security flaws. Secure internet connection was implemented each 
time there was need to connect to the internet. Also to minimize the risk of having the 
digital information infected with digital attacks and threats unsecure file exchange and 
opening of unsecure shared folders were avoided.  
It can be observed that the log entry showed the downloading of files containing 
username and password, deleting of approximately 300 user accounts, and deleted files 
necessary for the operation of the computer from an FTP server with IP address 
160.168.10.45 from a remote directory on the FTP server named “/home/GaryM”.  
Timeline analysis conducted shows one of such activity carried out on the 22 February 
2002 at 1600 hours as shown: 
Feb 22 16:00:00 2002 160.168.10.45 780800/home/GaryM/uname.pdf a_o r user 
Modem logs on the computer may show that the computer was connected to the internet 
at the time in question. The server logs at the alleged individual Internet Service 
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Provider (ISP) may show that a specific address was assigned to the alleged individual 
user account. 
Routers connecting to the alleged individual's computer to the internet may have related 
NetFlow logs containing additional information about the alleged individual's 
connection to the FTP server logs on the FTP server may confirm that files were 
downloaded to the slleged individual’s IP address. For instance the following FTP 
server transfer log entry shows a file with the same name and size as that found on the 
alleged individual’s computer being downloaded to the IP address that was assigned to 
his computer account at the time in question. CDFIM also observed that the IP address 
as an identifier can be used to identify the attacker in this case. In dealing with this case, 
during investigation it was identified that security measures were needed to be properly 
followed and  care was taken to ensure that digital evidence was not altered. The 
documentation is shown in the Appendix. 
6.4 Comprehensive Digital Forensic Investigation Model (CDFIM) Limitation 
It is not possible to always guarantee the success of CDFIM, because digital analysis 
usually depends upon output from protective security components.  The basic issues 
confronting digital investigators in ensuring the preservation of the digital evidence is 
therefore as follows: 
6.4.1 Mis-Configured Security Components  
Security components such as firewalls or Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) are 
hardware or software used to protect an organisation's system by filtering out unwanted 
network traffic and recording suspicious computer events. This record is essential if one 
is to comprehend the computer incident and the behaviour of the attacker. For example, 
if an IDS cannot correctly detect Trojans or any tools of hacking a loss of evidence of 
an attempt to attack access will result. 
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6.4.2 The Model's Inability to Enforce Human Intervention 
Even though CDFIM can sufficiently combat security threats and vulnerabilities in its 
investigative process, human intervention can hugely influence the integrity of digital 
information. Digital investigators that ignore security guidelines and policies can affect 
the integrity of digital evidence. 
6.4.3 Lack of Preservation of the Log Files  
Digital investigators sometimes face a problem if the log files are not preserved 
correctly done, because the integrity of log files is affected. Attackers alter these logs 
upon gaining unauthorised access, thereby hiding the evidence of their crimes. In this 
case, it is very difficult to ensure the integrity of digital evidence.  These log files 
should be preserved in a separate server to protect the integrity of these files. 
6.5 Summary 
The chapter aimed to conducts a comparative analysis by comparing current method of 
digital investigation and the proposed model. The researcher also discussed the 
challenges of this model. The researcher found that the security mechanism and 
guidelines incorporated in the digital investigative process are useless when digital 
investigator ignores the security guidelines.   
This chapter also discussed this model use in the real world. The first case was the case 
of teardrop denial of service attack where a system administrator of a server in a 
company identified that the server was suddenly generating a large amount of network 
traffic, consuming large bandwidth. This model was able to apply the investigative 
process and identified that the attack took place and the incorporated security measures 
and guidelines ensured the integrity of the digital evidence is preserved. In the second 
case, an individual violates the IT policy of an organisation by gaining unauthorized 
access to its systems and network. The model was able to identify the attack occurred 
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by providing relevant information. CDFIM was also used to ensure that the integrity of 
the digital information is preserved.   
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Chapter Seven: Discussion and 
Evaluation 
Objectives: 
 to discuss the results of the experiments and case studies 
 to evaluate CDFIM 
  
This chapter of the thesis aims to discuss the result of experiment and test investigation 
of CDFIM. The aim of this research is to explore the use of modern technologies to 
avoid security threats, when considering digital forensic investigation process in an 
attempt to present solution that contributes to a good security level and as a measure for 
integrity of digital evidence. 
7.1 Experiments and Case study Analysis 
Due to the increased development in the communication area and various technologies 
involved in the delivery of information from source to destination, IP mobility is faced 
with increased research ideas. Also due to the increase in communication devices and 
different technologies, digital investigators are recently faced with increasing cases for 
investigation. In mobile networking, users are attracted to the requirement of roaming 
while maintaining the ability of having a network communications preferably without 
service interruption. A mobile communicating device should have the ability to move 
from one network to another while maintaining its normal communication and active 
sessions with its Correspondent mobile device. The Internet Engineering Task Force 
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(IETF) developed a protocol of Mobile IPv6, which is a host-based approach. Mobility 
IPv6 solves the issue of IP mobility. With the drive in assisting in a shift in IP mobility 
protocol, IETF proposed a network-based localized mobility management known as the 
PMIPv6. Standard PMIPv6 is faced with critical performance issues such as handover 
latency and packet loss. 
It was observed that all the layers of the model were required after the experiment 
analysis. The selection was based on understanding the needs and requirement of 
different aspects of protection and relationship between the threats and the security 
measures required during digital investigation. The main target of digital investigators is 
to be able to present accurate and reliable digital evidence. In the area of mobile 
network, digital devices require support for IP mobility in order to maintain its 
connectivity with its peers while they move across networks and to minimize their 
service disruption. In this research, it has been identified that loss of data packets can be 
a threat to the integrity of digital evidence. Therefore, the performance issue of 
handover latency of mobile node and packet loss can affect the successful sending or 
transporting of packet therefore, influence the integrity of data packet.  
Thus in this research PMIPv6 with improved buffering function is identified to 
minimize packet loss during mobile node handover. The purpose of the PMIPv6 with 
improved buffering is to assist in providing reliable service as a solution the 
performance issues, which not only cause long service delays but also consume more 
networks and system resources. This is identified in the research as able to assist digital 
investigation, since the network will have reliable service. It was observed in the result 
of the experiment conducted in chapter 5 that in the standard PMIPv6 250 packets were 
lost during the mobile node handover while with the PMIPv6 with improved buffering 
all the data packets buffered in the LMA were received by the mobile node. 
Furthermore, PMIPv6 with improved buffering transmitted packets quicker than the 
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standard PMIPv6. The result has also identified that if data are transmitted quickly it 
avoid the situation where system resources is used that can lead to denial of service 
attack. The result of the experiment also found that the use of security mechanism and 
guidelines with the investiagtion process based on CDFIM, enables the ability to 
identify the attack or incident and also ensured that the integrity of the digital evidence 
was preserved. 
In this research, the second test examined in chapter 5 contains the realistic data used in 
conducting the email content investigation. In the  hypothetical scenario in which a 
personal email account is used in a way that breaches the IT security policy of an 
organisation, the computer is acquired and there is need to determine the user's 
activities. By examining the emails and log files, it was able to confirm the activities of 
the user. The digital evidence was collected and FTK was used for analysis. Using the 
FTK, copies of the email and relevant information was found. A protocol analyser 
known as Wireshark was also deployed for the purpose of monitoring the network for 
any abnormality of the system during the investigation. The Wireshark and other 
security mechanism and FTK, were effectively used and managed. The investigative 
tools were securely protected from threats and vulnerabilities.  one of the test 
experiment of digital investigation conducted based on CDFIM  is discussed as folows: 
7.1.1 Preparation  
The test conducted identified the need to begin an investigation, therfore, an approach 
strategy was applied on how to conduct the investigation as discusse: 
 Step 1 (S1): Secure Application and Content Based Tecnology 
 An organised working environment was prepared. The physical and operational 
infrastructures was ready to be used. Tools and applications were properly prepared and 
managed. During the investigation, there was need for proper security component to be 
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available. Security component such as antivirus, personal firewalls and secured protocol 
analyzer were made available and configured. 
 It was ensured that consistent availability of antivirus software which will detect any 
malicious code and stop them from infecting the workstation. The objective of this was 
to ensure that the risk of systems being infested with viruses and other malicious 
program were minimized. Since there is a huge risk of data loss when the workstation is 
infested with malicious programs. The Antivirus software's virus definition files was 
kept up to date, so that it can detect the most recent viruses. Also firewall was 
implemented to prevent malicious packet from entering the system or workstation. The 
objective of this was to prevent gaining access to digital information. In order to 
monitor the network traffic, a Protocol analyzer known as Wireshark was deployed in 
order to detect and confirm incident, event or any unusual activities that may be 
malicious and that can influence the integrity of digital evidence in the digital 
investigation. All unused port where disabled to avoid any unauthorized access that can 
cause disruption. For instance in monitoring the system and network, it can avoid any 
damaged that can be caused by denial of service.  In order to ensure the integrity of the 
digital information, crytographic techniques were applied. 
 Step 2 (S2): Secure Policies 
The systems, tools and applications that were used during the digital  investigation were 
authenticated using password in order to ensure that only authorized investigators  had 
access to the digital information. The objective of this, is to avoid impersonating that 
can cause damage to the digital information.  
 Step 3 (S3): Secure Operational Procedures 
The investigative tools where managed properly and correctly used. Passwords were 
managed securely in order to avoid access to the system by unauthorized individuals 
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and thus, tempering with the digital information. Regular check was conducted on the 
security mechanism such as Antivirus to ensure that they were up to date for the 
purpose of accurately securing the network and systems. In the need for accessing the 
internet, only secure connections were made. 
Step 4 (S4): Network and System Performance 
The digital forensic and investigation tools were managed properly and in a secure 
manner. Secure operational procedures such as authorization access and methods used 
to monitor systems and tools were enabled during the digital investigation. Performance 
monitor was used to keep track of activities by monitoring performance on the server or 
system. 
 It can be observed that  all the security measures or guidelines were followed to ensure 
a good security level of digital information. The result of the experiment shows that the 
use of security mechanism and guidelines with the investigation process, based on 
CDFIM was able to identify the attack and also ensured that the integrity of the digital 
evidence was preserved.  
The preparation stage is where the actual reasoned examination begins, which is where 
concrete facts begin to take shape that support or falsify hypotheses built during the 
investigation. The ability to know the technologies and tools used, in addition to an 
understanding of the underlying mechanisms and technical principles involved are of 
great importance in digital investigation at this phase.  
The nature and extent of a digital evidence examination depends on the known 
circumstances of the crime and the limitation placed on the digital investigator. In the 
test scenario since the crime committed  was carried out in a  digital scene, it was 
ensured that both the physical and digital environment were secured to avoid further 
damage done.  
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7.1.2 Interaction 
In this phase, the digital information was identified (identification), and the location of 
the potential evidence from the data collected (collection) was converted to an 
understandable language (examination). The focus of the examination was on the 
specific of the case (case specific analysis). A chronological time line analysis was 
conducted. Duplicate copies of the data are made to ensure integrity. In the 
investigation, working with the recovered source information, descriptive material about 
the content were gathered. After the preliminary investigation,  important steps that 
were considered in the interaction phase was the imaging of the digital information and 
preserving the integrity of digital evidence. This was conducted in a way that will not 
alter the integrity of the data. Adequate process was in place for making available safe 
media on which to image the data to be processed. Also the preservation of the evidence 
was conducted by applying the evidence processing options for indicating the 
cryptographic options that will be considered for ensuring the integrity of the duplicate 
files of the digital evidence. In the test experiment, the cryptographic options were 
applied as follows: 
 MD5 HASH: This option generates an MD5 hash for all evidence files. An 
MD5 hash is a 128-bit generated value based upon a file’s content. It is used to 
identify files uniquely. Hashes can be used to verify file integrity or to identify 
duplicates files. MD5 are used by the Known File Filter (KFF) to identify files. 
 SHA-1 HAH: It generates a SHA-1 hash for all evidence files. A SHA1 hash is 
a 160-bit value. The SHA-1 hashing algorithm is newer than MD5, but has not 
yet been widely used. This algorithm is not used in the KFF comparison and 
cannot be added to the KFF hash database but can still be used to identify a file 
uniquely through a manual comparison. 
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 SHA-256: Generates a SHA-256 hash (newer than sha-1) for all evidence files. 
SHA-256 hash values are not used in the KFF comparison and cannot be added 
to the KFF hash database but can still be used to identify a file uniquely through 
a manual comparison. 
 Fuzzy Hash: This generates Fuzzy Hash for all evidence items. 
 KFF: The KFF is a utility that compares file hashes against a database of hashes 
for known files.  
All the security measures and guidelines  from Step 1 - 4 were followed to ensure 
proper distribution, examinaing and preserving the integrity of digital  evidence. The 
PMIPv6 proposed and implemented in this research to address handover latency and 
loss of data  can provide reliable services. This can asssit digital investigation. 
7.1.3 Reconstruction 
In the reconstruction phase, the security guidelines were consistently applied. This 
phase involves bringing together the result of relevant information/activities from the 
earlier parts of the process and any other relevant information which investigators may 
have obtained to provide a detailed account of the events and actions at the crime scene. 
This phase ensures that all activities conducted in collecting the relevant digital 
information properly adhere to the security measures. Also the secure transportation and 
storage of the digital evidence was paramount in this phase. Therefore proving the 
integrity of  the digital evidence. The protocol analyser was used as the security 
mechansim which enusres consistent monitoring of the network of the workstation to 
detect and confirm any incident that can affect or influence the integrity of the digital 
evidence. 
 
Considering the case example of the indiviudal that gained unauthorized access to an 
organization's systems, the IP mobility identified in this research was applied as a 
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solution to the case. IP addresses has two roles as locators and identifiers. IP addresses 
are locators that specify by means of the routing system, how to reach the mobile mode 
such as communication device or network interface which is using a specific destination 
address. The routing system keeps information about how to reach different sets of 
addresses that have a common network prefix. On the other hand IP addresses are also 
identifiers used by protocol such as the TCP to identify the endpoints of a 
communication channel, also names of mobile nodes are translated by the Domain 
Name System to IP addresses therefore playing the role of node identifiers. 
Mobility involves separating the identifier role from the location one. From the 
identification view, the IP addess of a mobile mode should never change but from the 
location point of view the IP address should change each time the mobile node moves, 
showing its current location. The IP mobility solution identified in this research provide 
mobile nodes with a permanent address known as the Home Address (HA) to be used as 
identifier and the and a temporal address known as the Care-of Address (CoA) to be 
used as locator. Therefore in the above mentioned case the IP addresses can be used to 
identify the offender. In order to overcome the performance issue of handover latency 
and packet loss in Mobile IPv6, as shown in the result of the experiment, PMIPv6 with 
impoved buffering was implemented to minimize handover delays and packet loss. 
Therefore, this can assist as a solution to avoid a situation of denial of service which can 
be caused by handover latency in mobile devices leading to utilization of network 
resouces which can cause data packet loss by this, affecting the integrity of digial 
information. 
7.1.4 Presentation 
In the test investigation, while all the necessary security measures were still in place. 
All findings in the course of the investigation where carefully outlined and documented. 
Documenting established digital evidence requires integrating all findings and 
240 
 
conclusions into a final report that explains the findings to others, in some cases the 
investigator may have to present in court, but this is beyond the scope of this research. 
Report writing is an important stages of the digital forensic process because it is the 
only view that others have of the entire process. In this investigation FTK presented a 
good documentation process by generating a custom formatted report that shows the 
content of the case including the relevant email content as shown in the Appendix.  
7.2 Summary 
This chapter discussed the experiments results and evaluate the Comprehensive Digital 
Forensic Investigation Model. During the investigation, it was important to ensure that 
all the investigation processes were conducted ensuring that the security mechanism 
were available and all neccessary security guidelines followed. The model discussed can 
be used to define tools for supporting investigations. It is important for any digital 
investigation to be able to prove the integrity of digital evidence. One way that this can 
be achieved is for investigators to ensure that security mechanism and policies were 
followed during the invesitgation. And also the security mechanisms must be integrated 
in the investigation process to ensure that digital information are secured from security 
threats and vulnurabilities that can alter digital object such as the computer and its 
information hence altering the digital evidence.  
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Chapter Eight: Recommendations 
Objectives: 
 to enhance security mechanism to assist digital investigation 
 to improve the preservation process of digital investigation 
 
This chapter provides a number of recommendations as methods to enhance the 
performance of a system, prevent data loss therefore assisting digital investigation, and 
improve the process by which digital investigators apply authentication techniques for 
securing digital data. This chapter also improves the process of digital investigation by 
recommending preservation methods. These recommendations will lead to 
improvements in the process of digital investigation. 
 8.1 Recommendation for Enhancing Systems and Tools Authentication 
Passwords are the most used method for authentication. Although, there are lots of 
problems faced with password authentication such as password guessing, cracking, 
eavesdropping and users writing down password in an open place. There is need for 
digital investigators to enhance their authentication techniques in order to prevent 
attackers gaining their passwords applied to systems and tools used during 
investigation. In order to enhance the password used, the following should be 
considered: 
8.1.1 Implementation of Multifactor Authentication 
The use of simple and easy passwords makes the password vulnerable to attack. Hence, 
in multifactor authentication, passwords depend on something the user know (PIN), 
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have (smart card), and are (biometrics) in order to enhance authentication. The 
researcher believes that the use of multifactor authentication can prevent attackers from 
gaining investigators credentials, accessing the gathered digital evidence and then 
altering the evidence thereby endangering the integrity of such evidence.  
8.1.2 Password Salting 
Users often apply simple authentication methods such as user-name and passwords. 
This assumes only a reduced security requirement because these passwords are easy and 
not difficult to guess. In order to prevent password cracking or guessing, password is 
randomly salted before it is hashed which is the addition of pseudorandom data to a 
message before it is hashed, so that dictionary attack cannot be conducted. Hashing is a 
fast computation; therefore computing a few extra thousand digest for all the words in 
the dictionary makes a brute force attack more difficult to carry out. 
8.1.3 Implementing Password Complexity 
This is applying passwords and ensuring that they are strong and complex. For instance, 
passwords should not be the user's pet name, full name or dictionary word but it must 
contain characters, digits and symbols. A password should consist of at least a specific 
number of characters and numbers, enforcing password length. 
8.2 Ensuring Integrity of Digital Evidence using Keyed Hash Functions 
A data hashes to the same digest no matter how many times it is computed. The only 
way to change a created digest is by changing the message; this feature provides the 
proof of data integrity. Digital investigator must be able to verify that data was not 
altered in any way. Most hash functions do not require any type of key to create their 
digests but there are hash functions designed to require keys. The reason for this is that 
even though they have all of the same principles as a normal hash function they also 
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have additional property of the digest not able to be created without the proper key. 
Being able to create a data key combination that hashes to the same digest should be 
computationally corresponding to counting through all the keys.  
8.3 Implementing Intrusion Prevention Systems 
Firewall filters incoming packets while intrusion detection system monitors the packets 
and activity on a network and sends alerts if there is malicious activity. There is need 
for a more proactive approach for providing good level of security. Unlike intrusion 
detection systems, an intrusion prevention system (IPS) monitors the packet and 
activity, and in the case of malicious traffic, IPS deals with it immediately. A host 
intrusion prevention systems (HIPS) can be installed on the systems that needs to be 
protected. In addition, network intrusion prevention systems (NIPS) can be installed to 
protect the entire network and all devices that are connected to it, which monitors 
network traffic and immediately react to block a malicious attack or incident.  The 
researcher believes that the use of IPS during digital investigation can assist in dealing 
with malicious activity that can disrupt the investigation and alter the integrity of digital 
evidence.    
8.4 Recommendation for Enhancing Digital Resource Performance 
An enhanced network and system performance can assist in digital investigation. When 
the performance of a system and network is normal, there is a minimise risk of incident 
that can cause loss of data. For instance, when there is high rate in usage of network 
bandwidth, this can be a DoS attack. 
8.4.1 Enhancing Digital Resource Performance 
PMIPv6 with buffering function can be used to improve service reliability. PMIPv6 
with buffering function can assist in minimising packet loss during mobile node 
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handover. When applying route optimization without a buffering function, the out-of-
sequence problem occur, which is packets arriving out of order because of the gap of 
transmitting time through optimized paths. Thus, causing increased network load and 
service delay, providing unreliable services. In implementing PMIPv6 with improved 
buffering function, this provides reliable services and minimise loss of data packets. 
Therefore, it can improve digital investigation since the loss of data affects the integrity 
of digital evidence.  
8.4.2 Enabling IPv6 Traffic using 6to4 for Encapsulation 
Most organizations use a client/server network environment and they rely on computer 
systems to perform process, transmit, store and retrieve data. Packet flushing that does 
not consider network bandwidth is the reason behind rapid network load and packet 
loss. In an organisation, this could result to performance issues and loss in data while in 
digital forensic investigation it could cause the issue of loss in data leading to 
compromise in the integrity of digital evidence. Every organisation or individual that 
makes use of the network including digital investigators are interested in high 
performance of the network. Therefore there is consistent need of analysing the 
response times in a network, this can assist in ruling out latency issues.  
There is need for more internet traffic to be carried through tunnel as the internet 
infrastructure migrates from IPv4 to IPv6.  Envisaging this, figure 69 shows the use of 
IPv6 traffic with 6to4 for encapsulation.  
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Figure 70: Using IPv6 with 6to4 for Encapsulation 
Figure 70 shows that packets were sent to the IP address 192.88.99.1. The 6to4 global 
address used is 2002:4637:d5d3::4637:d5d3. Further analysis shows that IPv4 uses 32-
bit addresses and can support many devices connected directly to the internet while 
IPv6 uses 128-bit addresses and supports a virtually unlimited number of devices. This 
can be of great assistance in the area of digital forensic investigation where the need for 
investigating digital devices on the network is growing tremendously.  
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Figure 71: Using 6to4 techniques by encapsulating IPv6 in IPv4 header 
As shown in figure 71 6to4 is a tunnelling technique for connecting IPv6 host or 
networks to each other over an IPV4 backbone. The networks can connect to the IPv6 
internet using an IPV4 connection in 6to4 methods. A major benefit of 6to4 is that it 
does not require configured tunnels; it can be implemented in border routers without a 
great deal of router configuration.  
8.5 Summary 
This chapter has identified some recommendations. These recommendations would 
improve the digital systems and tools authentication such as enhancing password policy 
and enabling muitifactor password and password salting. They would also improve the 
performance for digital resources which in turn assist digital investigation. Furthermore, 
the researcher suggests the implementation of keyed hash function in order to ensure 
that the integrity of digital evidence is preserved. Also the researcher recommends the 
inplementation of intrusion prevention systems which can assist in monitoring traffic 
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and immediatly react to block malicious attack or incident that can alter the intergrity of 
digital evidence. 
The researcher also suggests implmenting PMIPv6 with improved buffering function 
and IPv6 traffic using 6to4 for encapsulation in order to improve performance, minimise 
data loss and ensure service reliability. These recommendations will assist and improve 
the process of digital investigation. 
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Chapter Nine: Conclusion 
9.1 Conclusion 
This research has established the importance of the use of modern technologies, 
identifying security threats when conducting digital forensic investigations in order to 
present solution that correctly identify suspect, also solution that contributes to a good 
security level and as a measure for integrity of digital evidence.The need for a security 
mechanism that contributes to a good security level of digital forensic investigation 
process and as a measurement tool for the intergrity of digital evidence should not be 
ignored . Due to the fragile nature of digital evidence, it must be handled properly, 
carefully and accurately to be able to prove its integrity. Once digital evidence is 
established, its integrity is assessed to determine its probative value. If there is concern 
that the evidence was tampered with prior to collection, during and after collection, 
these doubts may reduce the weight assigned to the evidence. 
The research reflects on the importance of integrating system mechanism and intelligent 
software in conducting digital investigation, also serving as a measurement tool for the 
integrity of digital evidence. A model was then constructed, CDFIM, that builds on 
current models in order to fulfil this function. 
The research identified the main issues facing digital investigators involved in 
conducting digital investigation. Firstly, the need to be able to attain and maintain the 
integrity of digital evidence. Secondly, security attacks and vulnerabilities on digital 
resources such as system, mobile communication devices and networks may affect the 
integrity of digital evidence. Thirdly, there is no comprehensive model for digital 
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forensic investigation that identifies mobility IP as an approach to assist in the integrity 
of digital evidence. 
The research collectively identified the major activities of the investigative process 
conducted during digital investigation in four phases. It was also understood in the 
research that successful digital investigation should depend not only on the investigative 
process but also on the integration of security mechanism, which assist in the integrity 
of digital evidence.    
The Comprehensive Digital Forensic Investigation Model (CDFIM) was therefore 
created by developing upon the investigative process used by other models. The model 
is an advancement on existing models in its comprehensive nature to address security 
issues faced in digital investigation. CDFIM includes preparation, interaction, 
reconstruction and presentation phase. The interaction phase  is a major phase 
introduced in this research which assist in the distribution and maintaining of 
information during and after the investigation. The collection, transportation and 
maintaining the integrity of information is a major key aspect of supporting the work of 
investigators and it can be a fruitful area for the development of advanced applications 
The model is easy to understand and can be used by even non-expert individuals with 
management responsibility for digital devices. The CDFIM presented in this thesis can 
be used for multiple real cases such as computer forensics, network forensics and email 
forensics. 
 
The test of the hypothesis was by conducting experiment, and test case investigation 
covering possible attacks that can affect the integrity of digital evidence. In the area of 
mobile network, PMIPv6 with improved buffering was proposed and implemented to 
address performance issue to provide reliable services, which can assist digital 
investigation. The experiment results based on current approach of managing network-
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based IP mobility, which is the standard PMIPv6, and the proposed method of PMIPv6 
with improved buffering are compared, the results identified that during handover in 
mobile node the application of PMIPv6 with improved buffering assisted in minimizing 
handover latency and loss of data packets.  In addition, a case of violation of an 
organisation's IT policies was examined and used to test the research hypothesis and the 
applicability of the model. The model was used to deal with and investigate two real 
cases.  
The success of research presented in this thesis has been measured according to the 
following criteria: 
1. Evaluation: This research conducted a network experimental test which is 
based on  standard PMIPv6, buffering and PMIPv6 with improved buffering  set 
up to carry out attacks by analysing performance measures which are handover 
latency and loss of data packet. Current method of network-based IP mobility 
management (PMIPv6) was compared to PMIPv6 with improved buffering. In 
addition, a test case was investigated evaluating the proposed investigative 
process of CDFIM. 
2. Comparative Analysis: The investigative process approach used in CDFIM 
was compared with methods of other models. 
3. Case Study: Two real cases used this model to identify whether incident/attacks 
were carried out and envisage attack during digital investigation that can pose as 
threat to the integrity of digital evidence thereby applying precaution (security 
guidelines/measures) to avoid such threat. The first case concerned the system 
administrator of a server in a company who identified that the server was 
suddenly generating a large amount of network traffic, consuming increased 
bandwidth. CDFIM was used to determine whether this attack occurred. CDFIM 
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indeed found that the attack occurred and followed security guidelines/measures 
that ensure the integrity of the digital evidence. 
In the second case, it was alleged that an unauthorised access was gained into a 
network by using a piece of software retrieving stolen username and passwords 
and a number of files were accessed and downloaded, data was deleted from the 
organisation's database and there was system shutdown causing disruption and 
damage to the organisation. However, CDFIM revealed that there were links 
between the activities carried out by the individual. CDFIM also revealed the 
use of internet protocol to create a relationship between an activity and the 
attacker. CDFIM also followed security measures that ensure the integrity of 
digital evidence. 
 The researcher also discussed the limitations of CDFIM. One of these is the model's 
inability to enforce human intervention, digital investigators that ignore security 
guidelines and policies can affect the integrity of digital evidence. Another limitation of 
the model is mis-configured security components.  Security components such as 
firewalls or Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) are hardware or software used to protect 
an organisation's system by filtering out unwanted network traffic and recording 
suspicious computer events. This record is essential if one is to comprehend the 
computer incident and the behaviour of the attacker. However, if the IDS is not 
deployed correctly in a way that it can detect attack, a loss of digital evidence can occur. 
In addition, another difficulty faced by the model is lack of preservation of the log files, 
if log files are not preserved correctly, the integrity of log files is affected. 
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9.2 Future Work 
Implementation of improved cryptographic systems/techniques 
Based on the experimental results, it is important to apply cryptographic techniques 
available with the forensic investigative tools in order to preserve the integrity of the 
digital data. The researcher believes that studies should be conducted to identify more 
improved cryptographic systems or techniques that should be applied in order to 
improve the process of preserving digital data. 
Developing CDFIM 
Another task for future research is the development of CDFIM to work automatically as 
an investigation tool that will lead to the preparation, interaction and reconstruction of 
digital evidence, ensuring that the integrity of the evidence is preserved and presenting 
the digital evidence in a way that is easily understood and admissible. 
The researcher believes that CDFIM can be applied to investigations into various types 
of attack/incidents such as data loss, information theft, email abuse and denial of 
service. The researcher suggests improving this model by using it to conduct 
investigation into different future digital attacks and preserve the integrity of the digital 
evidence. 
A major task for future research is the development of CDFIM to work automatically as 
an investigative and security tool that will support in digital investigation and assist in 
preserving the digital evidence. The researcher believes that CDFIM can be applied to 
investigations into various types of attacks or offence.  
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APPENDIX 1: Building the Testbed 
 
1.1 Ubuntu 
 
In order to implement the buffering function, a testbed was established using OAI 
PMIPv6 version 0.3.1 and reference was made to the method of establishment provided 
by OAI. The operating system used is Ubuntu 10.04. 
Ubuntu Requirement:  
 
The minimum system requirements of Ubuntu Desktop are as illustrated in Table 10 
shown below:  
 
Table 10: Minimum System Requirements of Ubuntu 
 
 Minimum System 
Requirements 
Recommended minimum 
Requirements  
 
Processor 300 MHz 700 MHz 
Memory 256 MB 384 MB  
 
Hard drive  
 
4 GB  
 
8 GB  
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1.2 Setting the Network 
Network was set up between the machines. The PMIP domain is created that contains 3 
nodes which are 1LMA and 2MAG's.The 3 nodes were connected to the same collision 
domain. 
To test the network connection between the machines to ensure machines can reach 
each other. ping 192.168.1.4. Figure 72 shows the experiment's network connection 
reach other.  
 
 
Figure 72:  Using ping for testing experiment's network connection 
The rest of the machines are configured the same way but the IP addresses for the rest 
machines are shown in Table 11 
Table 11: IP address for experimental machines  
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Machine Name IP Address 
LMA 192.168.1.4 
MAG1 192.168.1.5 
MAG2 192.168.1.6 
  
 
1.3 Netfilter Operations 
In order to implement the buffering function, the Netfilter and IP6Tables by Linux were 
used: 
 Once a packet is entered into the system, some simple consistency checks are 
carried out, and the packet is passed to the NF_IP_PRE_ROUTING hook point 
(line 1-3). 
 Next, the routing code decides whether the packet is intended for another 
machine or higher layers( line 4) 
 If it is intended for higher layers, it navigates through the NF_IP_LOCAL_IN 
hook point before being passed to the local process of the higher layers (line 5) 
 If the packet is intended to pass to another machine, the packet navigates 
through the NF_IP_FORWARD hook point (line 6). 
 A packet sent from higher layers navigates through the NF_IP_LOCAL_OUT 
hook point and enters the routing code (line7-9). 
The packet then passes a final Netfilter hook point, NF_IP_POST_ROUTING, and is 
sent to the device driver (10-11). Figure 72 Netfilter framework operation 
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Figure. 72 Netfilter framework operations 
 
 
1.4 Testbed 
 
Figure 73: The real testbed of Proxy MIPv6 representation  
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To conduct the experiment, an OAI PMIPv6 v0.3 testbed was established for standard 
PMIPv6. The testbed consist of an LMA and 2MAGs. Hubs were used rather than 
Access Point for the wireless link. 
All the network entities in the test-bed are running Ubuntu 10.04 LTS with its generic 
Linux kernel. The functionalities for LMA and MAG have been developed above UMIP 
and discussed as follows: 
• An unmodified MN, which does not have any specific software for mobility, 
uses its wireless card to attach to one of the hub. 
• Each hub is directly connected to a MAG. 
• The implementation of MAG functionalities contains additional features and 
modifications of UMIP to handle PBU and PBA messages and mobility options, and a 
modified Router Advertisement daemon (RADVD), which unicasts RAs with a specific 
HNP per MN.  
• Each MAG is connected to the LMA.  
• The LMA is configured as a modified HA in UMIP, which stores the HNP in the 
BCE for each MN, and it is able to handle PBU and PBA messages. 
• Finally, an unmodified CN is connected to the LMA. 
 
1.5. Message flow demonstration 
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Figure 74: Message flow demonstration 
The message flow demonstration is as follows: 
 The Mobile Node enters the PMIP domain for the first time and connects to 
Mobile Access Gateway ‘s hub 
 MAG1 detects the MN and checks for host authorization 
 MAG1 updates then the Local Mobility Anchor about the current location of the 
mobile node 
 Both MAG1 and LMA create an IP in IP bi-directional tunnel 
 MAG1 sends a Router Advertisement message to MN with its specific Home 
Network Prefix 
 The MN auto-configures itself according to the HNP. An unlimited ICMP traffic 
(ping6 command) is started between the MN and CN 
 While MN keeps pinging CN, the Mobile Node moves. It connects now to 
MAG2 via the second hub and loses connection with MAG1. 
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 After a while, MN leaves MAG2 and goes back to MAG1 area. 
 After a while, MN leaves again MAG1 and return to MAG2 
 
 
1.6 Proxy Mobile Internet Protocol Version 6 (PMIPv6) domain 
 
Figure 75: the PMIPv6 domain 
1.7 Packet Collection 
The Libipq library is provided as part of the IP6Tables. It is used to store the packets. 
Figure 76 and 77 shows the packets stored for buffering and forwarding. 
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Figure 76: Packets for Mag1 
 
 
Figure 77: Packets for Mag2 
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Appendix 2:  
Digital Investigation with Comprehensive Digital Forensic Investigation Model 
(CDFIM) using FTK 
 
Figure 78: test email box  
 
 
276 
 
 
Figure 79: test email box with incoming messages 
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Figure 80: the Email folder and its content 
 
 
Figure 81: FTK case log information 
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Figure 82: FTK File overview 
  
279 
 
 
Figure 83: FTK Evidence list 
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CASE LOG RECORD 
31/05/2012 11:40:43 -- FTK Version 1.81.6 build 10.04.02 
 FTK Exe Path: C:\Program Files\AccessData\AccessData Forensic 
Toolkit 1.81.6\Program\ftk.exe 
 Examiner's Machine: 
 Phys Mem: Total: 2,128,252,928 Available: 1,496,666,112 Used: 
631,586,816 
 Virt Mem: Total: 2,147,352,576 Available: 1,927,348,224 Used 
220,004,352 
 Page File Available: 3,592,515,584 
 ---------------------------------------------------- 
31/05/2012 11:40:43 -- KFF database being used: none 
31/05/2012 11:40:43 -- Examiner's Local Machine Setting is time zone 
used for file times (create, modify, accessed) in file display and 
reports. 
31/05/2012 11:40:57 -- Warning: unable to open Examiner information 
file C:\Program Files\AccessData\AccessData Forensic Toolkit 
1.81.6\DefaultCase\FtkExaminer.dat. Data not loaded. 
31/05/2012 11:47:07 -- Loading case 
31/05/2012 11:47:07 -- Updating Overview Cache 
31/05/2012 11:47:07 -- Filtering file list 
31/05/2012 11:47:07 -- Initializing thumbnail view 
31/05/2012 11:47:07 -- Resetting search terms list 
31/05/2012 11:47:07 -- Building the indexed search results tree... 
31/05/2012 11:47:07 -- Building the live search results tree... 
31/05/2012 11:47:07 -- Building the bookmark tree 
31/05/2012 11:48:14 -- Warning: unable to open Examiner information 
file C:\Program Files\AccessData\AccessData Forensic Toolkit 
1.81.6\DefaultCase\FtkExaminer.dat. Data not loaded. 
31/05/2012 11:48:25 -- Loading case 
31/05/2012 11:48:25 -- Updating Overview Cache 
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31/05/2012 11:48:25 -- Filtering file list 
31/05/2012 11:48:25 -- Initializing thumbnail view 
31/05/2012 11:48:25 -- Resetting search terms list 
31/05/2012 11:48:25 -- Building the indexed search results tree... 
31/05/2012 11:48:25 -- Building the live search results tree... 
31/05/2012 11:48:25 -- Building the bookmark tree 
31/05/2012 11:49:22 -- Warning: unable to open Examiner information 
file C:\Program Files\AccessData\AccessData Forensic Toolkit 
1.81.6\DefaultCase\FtkExaminer.dat. Data not loaded. 
31/05/2012 12:42:06 -- Loading case 
31/05/2012 12:42:06 -- Updating Overview Cache 
31/05/2012 12:42:06 -- Filtering file list 
31/05/2012 12:42:06 -- Initializing thumbnail view 
31/05/2012 12:42:06 -- Resetting search terms list 
31/05/2012 12:42:06 -- Building the indexed search results tree... 
31/05/2012 12:42:06 -- Building the live search results tree... 
31/05/2012 12:42:06 -- Building the bookmark tree 
01/06/2012 14:31:34 -- Evidence added by investigator INI using FTK 
version 1.81.6 build 10.04.02 
 Processes to be performed: 
  File Extraction: Yes 
  File Identification: Yes 
  MD5 Hash: Yes 
  SHA1 Hash: Yes 
  KFF (Known File Filter): Yes 
  Entropy Test: Yes 
  Full Text Index: Yes 
  Prerender Thumbnails: No 
  File Listing Database: No 
  HTML File Listing: No 
  Data Carving: No 
  Preprocess Registry Files: No 
282 
 
  Decrypt EFS Files: No 
 Default Case Refinement Settings: 
  Add files only if they satisfy BOTH the file status and the 
file type criteria as follows: 
   File Status Criteria: 
    Deletion status: any 
    Encryption status: any 
    From email status: any 
    Duplicate status: any 
    OLE stream status: any 
   File Type Criteria: 
    documents: yes 
    spreadsheets: yes 
    databases: yes 
    graphics: yes 
    email messages: yes 
    executables: yes 
    archives: yes 
    folders: yes 
    other recognized: yes 
    unknown: yes 
 Default Index Refinement Settings: 
  Index files only if they satisfy BOTH the file status and the 
file type criteria as follows: 
   File Status Criteria: 
    Deletion status: any 
    Encryption status: any 
    From email status: any 
    Duplicate status: any 
    OLE stream status: any 
   File Type Criteria: 
    documents: yes 
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    spreadsheets: yes 
    databases: yes 
    graphics: yes 
    email messages: yes 
    executables: yes 
    archives: yes 
    folders: yes 
    other recognized: yes 
    unknown: yes 
 -- Evidence 1 -- 
 Name/Number:  
 Location: U:\outlook\Outldommyuser1@gmail.com-00000002.pst 
 Display name: Outldommyuser1@gmail.com-00000002 
 Type: Individual file 
 Comment:  
 Evidence-specific Case Refinement Settings: 
  Add files only if they satisfy BOTH the file status and the 
file type criteria as follows: 
   File Status Criteria: 
    Deletion status: any 
    Encryption status: any 
    From email status: any 
    Duplicate status: any 
    OLE stream status: any 
   File Type Criteria: 
    documents: yes 
    spreadsheets: yes 
    databases: yes 
    graphics: yes 
    email messages: yes 
    executables: yes 
    archives: yes 
284 
 
    folders: yes 
    other recognized: yes 
    unknown: yes 
 Evidence-specific Index Refinement Settings: 
  Index files only if they satisfy BOTH the file status and the 
file type criteria as follows: 
   File Status Criteria: 
    Deletion status: any 
    Encryption status: any 
    From email status: any 
    Duplicate status: any 
    OLE stream status: any 
   File Type Criteria: 
    documents: yes 
    spreadsheets: yes 
    databases: yes 
    graphics: yes 
    email messages: yes 
    executables: yes 
    archives: yes 
    folders: yes 
    other recognized: yes 
    unknown: yes 
01/06/2012 14:31:34 -- Starting to add evidence items... 
01/06/2012 14:31:35 -- Completed adding Outldommyuser1@gmail.com-
00000002 
01/06/2012 14:31:35 -- Updating Overview Cache 
01/06/2012 14:31:35 -- Filtering the list 
01/06/2012 14:31:35 -- Updating counts 
01/06/2012 14:31:35 -- Flushing case data to disk 
01/06/2012 14:31:36 -- Loading case 
01/06/2012 14:31:36 -- Building explore path tree 
285 
 
01/06/2012 14:31:36 -- Building explore, graphic and email path tree 
01/06/2012 14:31:36 -- Updating Overview Cache 
01/06/2012 14:31:36 -- Filtering file list 
01/06/2012 14:31:36 -- Initializing thumbnail view 
01/06/2012 14:31:36 -- Resetting search terms list 
01/06/2012 14:31:36 -- Building the indexed search results tree... 
01/06/2012 14:31:36 -- Building the live search results tree... 
01/06/2012 14:31:36 -- Building the bookmark tree 
01/06/2012 14:31:36 -- Final Status Update: 
 Total Elapsed Time:    0.00:00:02 
 Total Items Examined:   9 
 Total Items Added:     9 
 Total Indexing Completed: 
   Items Indexed:     9 
   Index Time:      0.00:00:00 
   Data Indexed:     287,864 
   Data Indexed (filt):  16,504 
   Index granularity set at: 4 
 Indexing completed since last update: 
   Items Indexed:     10 
   Index Time:      0.00:00:00 
   Data Indexed:     287,864 
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APPENDIX 3 
 Bill of Indictment 
   Data Indexed (filt):  16,504 
 Total Bytes Processed:   16,504 
 Physical Memory Available: 825,784KB of 2,078,372KB 
 Virtual Memory Available: 1,717,816KB of 2,097,024KB 
 Page File Available:    2,331 
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 US vs. GARY MCKINNON INDICTMENT 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF 
VIRGINIA 
Alexandria Division 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA              ) 
                                      )   Criminal No. 
    v.                                ) 
                                      )   18 U.S.C. § 1030 
GARY MCKINNON,                        )   Fraud and Related Activity 
in 
                                      )   Connection with Computers 
               Defendant              )   (Counts 1 through 7) 
                                      ) 
INDICTMENT 
NOVEMBER 2002 Term - At Alexandria 
Introduction 
THE GRAND JURY CHARGES THAT: 
1.   At all times material to this Indictment: 
     a.    The United States Army is a military department of the 
United States Government, which provides military forces to defend the 
United States and any occupied territory and to overcome any aggressor 
that imperils the peace and security of the United States. 
     b.    The Department of the Navy is a military department of the 
United States Government, which provides naval forces that defend the 
United States and are capable of winning wars, deterring aggression 
and maintaining the freedom of the seas. 
     c.    The Department of the Air Force is a military department of 
the United States Government, which provides military forces that 
defend the United States through the control and exploitation of air 
and space. 
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     d.    The Department of Defense is a department of the United 
States Government and is responsible for providing military forces 
that defend the United States and any occupied area, and overcome any 
aggressor that imperils peace and security of the United States. 
     e.    The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (“NASA”) 
is an agency of the United States Government, which conducts research 
into flight within and outside the Earth's atmosphere, including the 
exploration of space. 
     f.    RemotelyAnywhere is a software program that provides a 
remote access and remote administration package for computers on the 
Internet and can be downloaded over the Internet from 03AM 
Laboratories PL, Hungary. Once installed on a host computer, 
RemotelyAnywhere allows the user to remotely control the host computer 
and access the host computer from any other computer connected to the 
Internet. RemotelyAnywhere provides the user with the ability to 
transfer and delete files or data, and the ability to access almost 
every administrative function available on the host computer. 
     g.    Defendant GARY MCKINNON was an unemployed computer system 
administrator living in London, England. 
     h.    The above introductory allegations are realleged and 
incorporated in Counts One through Seven of this indictment as though 
fully set out in Counts One through Seven. 
COUNT 1 
(Fraud and Related Activity in Connection with Computers) 
THE GRAND JURY FURTHER CHARGES THAT: 
2.   Between on or about February 1, 2002, and on or about February 
22, 2002, within the Eastern District of Virginia, and elsewhere, the 
defendant GARY MCKINNON did knowingly cause the transmission of codes, 
information and commands, and as a result of such conduct, 
intentionally caused damage without authorization to a protected 
computer, belonging to the United States Army. 
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3.   Specifically, the defendant intentionally accessed a computer 
belonging to and used exclusively by the United States Army, Fort 
Myer, Virginia, with the Internet Protocol address of 160.145.40.25, 
which computer was used in interstate and foreign commerce and 
communication. The defendant then obtained administrator privileges 
and transmitted codes, information and commands that: (1) deleted 
approximately 1300 user accounts; (2) installed RemotelyAnywhere; (3) 
deleted critical system files necessary for the operation of the 
computer; (4) copied a file containing usernames and encrypted 
passwords for the computer; and (5) installed tools used for obtaining 
unauthorized access to computers.       As a result of such conduct, 
the defendant intentionally caused damage without authorization by 
impairing the integrity and availability of data, programs, a system 
and information, and that damage: (a) caused loss aggregating more 
than $5,000 in value during a one-year period to the United States 
Army; and (b) affected the use of the computer system used by a 
government entity, the United States Army, in furtherance of the 
administration of national defense and national security. 
(All in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Sections 
1030(a)(5)(A)(i), 1030(a)(5)(B)(i) and 1030(a)(5)(B)(v)). 
COUNT 2 
(Fraud and Related Activity in Connection with Computers) 
THE GRAND JURY FURTHER CHARGES THAT: 
4.   From in or about September 2001, through on or about March 19, 
2002, within the Eastern District of Virginia, and elsewhere, the 
defendant GARY MCKINNON did knowingly cause the transmission of codes, 
information and commands, and as a result of such conduct, 
intentionally caused damage without authorization to protected 
computers, belonging to the United States Army. 
5.   Specifically, the defendant intentionally accessed computers 
exclusively used by the United States Army, which computers were used 
in interstate and foreign commerce and communication. Then, the 
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defendant obtained administrator privileges on these computers and 
installed RemotelyAnywhere. On several of the computers, the defendant 
installed tools used for obtaining unauthorized access to computers, 
deleted critical system files necessary for the operation of the 
computers and copied files containing unclassified information to his 
own computer. The computers accessed and damaged by the defendant 
included the following: 
             IP Address           Location 
            160.145.18.111      Fort Myer, VA  
             160.145.30.89      Fort Myer, VA  
             160.145.33.52      Fort Myer, VA  
             160.145.40.22      Fort Myer, VA  
             160.145.40.31      Fort Myer, VA  
             160.145.40.51      Fort Myer, VA  
            160.145.214.25   Fort McNair, Washington, DC  
            160.145.214.26   Fort McNair, Washington, DC  
            160.145.214.27   Fort McNair, Washington, DC  
            160.145.214.31   Fort McNair, Washington, DC  
            160.145.214.202   Fort McNair, Washington, DC  
            160.145.214.204   Fort McNair, Washington, DC  
            160.145.214.205   Fort McNair, Washington, DC  
             128.190.84.39      Alexandria, VA  
            128.190.130.16      Fort Belvoir, VA  
            128.190.178.21      Fort Belvoir, VA  
            128.190.224.22      Alexandria, VA  
            128.190.253.68     Fort A.P. Hill, VA  
             134.11.65.17      Arlington, VA  
             134.11.65.33      Alexandria, VA  
            134.11.237.129      Arlington, VA  
             134.66.12.64      Fort Irwin, CA  
             140.153.67.5      Fort Polk, LA  
            140.153.61.133      Hinton, WV  
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             140.183.2.14     Fort Belvoir, VA  
            140.183.220.75     Fort Belvoir, VA  
             141.116.58.63      Arlington, VA  
            141.116.204.150   Pentagon, Arlington, VA  
            141.116.230.88   Pentagon, Arlington, VA  
             150.177.124.5     Fort Meade, MD  
            150.177.193.130     Fort Meade, MD  
            150.177.193.248     Fort Meade, MD  
             155.213.1.201    Fort Benning, GA  
             155.213.4.100    Fort Benning, GA  
             155.213.11.46    Fort Benning, GA  
             160.145.28.84     Fort Myer, VA  
            160.145.102.216     Fort McNair, DC  
            160.147.41.166     Fort Belvoir, VA  
            160.147.126.16     Fort Belvoir, VA  
            160.147.126.180     Fort Belvoir, VA  
            160.147.131.150     Alexandria, VA  
             160.151.76.10      Arlington, VA  
             160.151.76.56      Arlington, VA  
             160.151.77.78      Arlington, VA  
            160.151.77.118      Arlington, VA  
            (160.151.76.128)  
            199.114.42.111      Rosslyn, VA  
             199.122.33.10     Alexandria, VA  
             199.122.33.24     Alexandria, VA  
             199.122.41.3     Fort Meade, MD  
             199.122.45.7      Alexandria, VA  
             204.34.24.217     Great Lakes, MI  
             214.3.73.14      Alexandria, VA  
As a result of such conduct, the defendant intentionally caused damage 
without authorization by impairing the integrity and availability of 
data, programs, systems and information, and that damage caused loss 
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aggregating more than $5,000 in value during a one-year period to the 
United States Army. 
(All in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Sections 
1030(a)(5)(A)(i) and 1030(a)(5)(B)(i)). 
COUNT 3 
(Fraud and Related Activity in Connection with Computers) 
THE GRAND JURY FURTHER CHARGES THAT: 
6.   From in or about March 2001, through on or about March 19, 2002, 
within the Eastern District of Virginia, and elsewhere, the defendant 
GARY MCKINNON did knowingly cause the transmission of codes, 
information and commands, and as a result of such conduct, 
intentionally caused damage without authorization to protected 
computers, belonging to the United States Navy. 
7.   Specifically, the defendant intentionally accessed computers 
exclusively used by the United States Navy, which computers were used 
in interstate and foreign commerce and communication. Then, the 
defendant obtained administrator privileges on these computers and 
installed RemotelyAnywhere. On several of the computers, the defendant 
installed tools used for obtaining unauthorized access to computers 
and deleted system logs. The computers accessed and damaged by the 
defendant included the following:  
                 IP Address   Location 
                144.247.5.1   Groton, CT  
                144.247.5.22   Groton, CT  
                144.247.5.6   Groton, CT  
                144.247.5.14   Groton, CT  
                144.247.5.17   Groton, CT  
                144.247.5.11   Groton, CT  
                144.247.5.5   Groton, CT  
                144.247.5.40   Groton, CT  
                144.247.5.29   Groton, CT  
                144.247.5.4   Groton, CT  
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                144.247.5.10   Groton, CT  
                144.247.5.8   Groton, CT  
                144.247.5.3   Groton, CT  
                144.247.5.7   Groton, CT  
                 198.97.72.252  Patuxent River, MD  
                 199.211.89.77  Crystal City, VA  
                (199.211.89.146)  
                131.158.84.161  Patuxent River, MD  
                 131.158.65.9   Bethesda, MD  
                 204.34.154.59  Pearl Harbor, HI  
                 199.211.163.7    Wayne, PA  
As a result of such conduct, the defendant intentionally caused damage 
without authorization by impairing the integrity and availability of 
data, programs, systems and information, and that damage caused loss 
aggregating more than $5,000 in value during a one-year period to the 
United States Navy. 
(All in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Sections 
1030(a)(5)(A)(i) and 1030(a)(5)(B)(i)). 
COUNT 4 
(Fraud and Related Activity in Connection with Computers) 
THE GRAND JURY FURTHER CHARGES THAT: 
8.   From in or about September 2001, through on or about March 19, 
2002, within the Eastern District of Virginia, and elsewhere, the 
defendant GARY MCKINNON did knowingly cause the transmission of codes, 
information and commands, and as a result of such conduct, 
intentionally caused damage without authorization to protected 
computers, belonging to NASA. 
9.   Specifically, the defendant intentionally accessed computers 
exclusively used by NASA, which computers were used in interstate and 
foreign commerce and communication. Then, the defendant obtained 
administrator privileges on these computers and installed 
RemotelyAnywhere. On several of the computers, the defendant installed 
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tools used for obtaining unauthorized access to computers, deleted 
system log files and copied a file containing usernames and encrypted 
passwords. The computers accessed and damaged by the defendant 
included the following: 
                     IP Address  Location 
                  192.42.75.135  Hampton, VA  
                 128.157.55.97   Houston, TX  
                 198.122.128.114  Houston, TX  
                 139.169.118.33  Houston, TX  
                 139.169.118.28  Houston, TX  
                 139.169.18.77   Houston, TX  
                 128.183.158.148  Greenbelt, MD  
                 198.116.200.1   Huntsville, AL  
                 198.119.37.16  Greenbelt, MD  
                 128.155.18.249  Hampton, VA  
                 192.150.38.45  Moffett Field, CA  
                 192.150.38.14  Moffett Field, CA  
                 192.150.38.51  Moffett Field, CA  
                 192.150.38.125 Moffett Field, CA  
                 128.183.144.73  Greenbelt, MD  
                 198.116.36.16   Herndon, VA  
As a result of such conduct, the defendant intentionally caused damage 
without authorization by impairing the integrity and availability of 
data, programs, systems and information, and that damage caused loss 
aggregating more than $5,000 in value during a one-year period to 
NASA. 
(All in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Sections 
1030(a)(5)(A)(i) and 1030(a)(5)(B)(i)). 
COUNT 5 
(Fraud and Related Activity in Connection with Computers) 
THE GRAND JURY FURTHER CHARGES THAT:  
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10.   Between in or about February 2001, and on or about March 19, 
2002, within the Eastern District of Virginia, and elsewhere, the 
defendant GARY MCKINNON did knowingly cause the transmission of codes, 
information and commands, and as a result of such conduct, 
intentionally caused damage without authorization to protected 
computers, belonging to the United States Department of Defense. 
11.   Specifically, the defendant intentionally accessed computers 
exclusively used by the United States Department of Defense, which 
computes were used in interstate and foreign commerce and 
communication. Then, the defendant obtained administrator privileges 
on this computer and installed RemotelyAnywhere. The defendant 
accessed and damaged the following computers: 
                   IP Address   Location 
                150.177.2.192   Fort Meade, MD  
               150.177.178.130  Fort Meade, MD  
As a result of such conduct, the defendant intentionally caused damage 
without authorization by impairing the integrity and availability of 
data, programs, a system and information, and that damage caused loss 
aggregating more than $5,000 in value during a one-year period to the 
United States Department of Defense. 
(All in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Sections 
1030(a)(5)(A)(i) and 1030(a)(5)(B)(i)). 
COUNT 6 
(Fraud and Related Activity in Connection with Computers) 
THE GRAND JURY FURTHER CHARGES THAT: 
12.   Between in or about February 2001, and on or about March 19, 
2002, within the Eastern District of Virginia, and elsewhere, the 
defendant GARY MCKINNON did knowingly cause the transmission of codes, 
information and commands, and as a result of such conduct, 
intentionally caused damage without authorization to a protected 
computer, belonging to the United States Air Force. 
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13.   Specifically, the defendant intentionally accessed a computer 
exclusively used by the United States Air Force, which computer was 
used in interstate and foreign commerce and communication. Then, the 
defendant obtained administrator privileges on this computer and 
installed RemotelyAnywhere. The defendant accessed and damaged the 
following computer: 
                  IP Address    Location 
                 209.22.51.6    Crystal City, VA 
As a result of such conduct, the defendant intentionally caused damage 
without authorization by impairing the integrity and availability of 
data, programs, a system and information, and that damage caused loss 
aggregating more than $5,000 in value during a one-year period to the 
United States Air Force. 
(All in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Sections 
1030(a)(5)(A)(i) and 1030(a)(5)(B)(i)). 
COUNT 7 
(Fraud and Related Activity in Connection with Computers) 
THE GRAND JURY FURTHER CHARGES THAT: 
14.   From in or about September 2001 through on or about March 19, 
2002, within the Eastern District of Virginia, and elsewhere, the 
defendant GARY MCKINNON did knowingly cause the transmission of codes, 
information and commands, and as a result of such conduct, 
intentionally caused damage without authorization to protected 
computers, belonging to the companies identified in paragraph 15. 
15.   Specifically, the defendant intentionally accessed computers 
belonging to the companies identified below, with the Internet 
Protocol addresses and locations described below, which computers were 
used in interstate and foreign commerce and communication. 
          IP Address    Location          Company 
        204.2.33.22     Houston, TX       Tobin International 
        128.169.32.181    Knoxville, TN     University of Tennessee 
        206.245.175.40    Wayne, PA        Frontline Solutions 
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        206.218.158.90   LaFourche, LA     Louisiana Technical College 
        206.166.40.243     Colfax, IL      Martin Township Library 
        206.245.141.46   Bethlehem, PA      Bethlehem Public Library 
Then, the defendant obtained administrator privileges and installed 
RemotelyAnywhere. On some of the computers, the defendant installed 
tools used for obtaining unauthorized access to computers.    As a 
result of such conduct, the defendant intentionally caused damage 
without authorization by impairing the integrity and availability of 
data, programs, systems and information, and that damage caused loss 
aggregating more than $5,000 in value during a one-year period to the 
identified companies. 
(All in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Sections 
1030(a)(5)(A)(i) and 1030(a)(5)(B)(i)). 
A TRUE BILL 
FOREPERSON 
Paul J. McNulty 
United States Attorney 
By: 
  Justin W. Williams 
  Assistant United States Attorney 
  Chief, Criminal Division 
  Scott J. Stein 
  Michael J. Elston 
  Assistant United States Attorneys 
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Appendix 4 
Federal Rules of Evidence (2012) 
Article IX.  
 
Authentication and Identification 
 
Rule 901. Authenticating or Identifying Evidence 
(a) In General. To satisfy the requirement of authenticating or identifying an item of 
evidence, the proponent must produce evidence sufficient to support a finding that the 
item is what the proponent claims it is.  
(b) Examples. The following are examples only — not a complete list — of evidence 
that satisfies the requirement: 
(1) Testimony of a Witness with Knowledge. Testimony that an item is what it is claimed 
to be.  
(2) Non-expert Opinion about Handwriting. A non-expert’s opinion that handwriting is 
genuine based on a familiarity with it that was not acquired for the current litigation.  
(3) Comparison by an Expert Witness or the Trier of Fact. A comparison with an 
authenticated specimen by an expert witness or the trier of fact. 
(4) Distinctive Characteristics and the Like. The appearance, contents, substance, 
internal patterns, or other distinctive characteristics of the item, taken together with all 
the circumstances. 
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(5) Opinion about a Voice. An opinion identifying a person’s voice — whether heard 
firsthand or through mechanical or electronic transmission or recording — based on 
hearing the voice at any time under circumstances that connect it with the alleged 
speaker. 
(6) Evidence about a Telephone Conversation. For a telephone conversation, evidence 
that a call was made to the number assigned at the time to: 
(A) a particular person, if circumstances, including self-identification, show that the 
person answering was the one called; or  
(B) a particular business, if the call was made to a business and the call related to 
business reasonably transacted over the telephone. 
(7) Evidence About Public Records. Evidence that:  
(A) a document was recorded or filed in a public office as authorized by law; or  
(B) a purported public record or statement is from the office where items of this kind are 
kept. 
(8) Evidence about Ancient Documents or Data Compilations. For a document or data 
compilation, evidence that it:  
(A) is in a condition that creates no suspicion about its authenticity;  
(B) was in a place where, if authentic, it would likely be; and  
(C) is at least 20 years old when offered. 
(9) Evidence about a Process or System. Evidence describing a process or system and 
showing that it produces an accurate result. 
(10) Methods Provided by a Statute or Rule. Any method of authentication or 
identification allowed by a federal statute or a rule prescribed by the Supreme Court.  
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